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<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:63-66</identifier><datestamp>2010-03-31</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

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  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:63-66</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Price setting and price adjustment in some European Union Countries: introduction to the special issue</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This introductory essay briefly summarizes the 11 empirical studies of price setting and price adjustment that are included in this special issue. The studies, which use data from several European countries, were conducted as part of the European Central Bank's Inflation Persistence Network. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1502</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Daniel Levy</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Frank Smets</dc:creator>
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<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:235-247</identifier><datestamp>2010-03-31</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:235-247</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Survey evidence on price-setting patterns of Romanian firms</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper presents for Romanian firms the results of the first survey on price-setting patterns among the New Member States of the EU. Diverging from Inflation Persistence Network (IPN) findings, generally small firms perceive higher competitive pressure and adopt the market price, using a state-dependent rule, while lower perceived competition is consistent with medium and large firms using mark-up pricing. Prices are reviewed and changed more often than for EMU firms and are more flexible than wages. Similar to IPN evidence, contracts are the main sources of price stickiness. The survey suggests full price transmission of large unanticipated financial shocks. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1484</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Mihai Copaciu</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Florian Neagu</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Horia Braun-Erdei</dc:creator>
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<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:193-208</identifier><datestamp>2010-03-31</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:193-208</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Rigidities and inflation persistence of services and regulated prices</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper studies price level rigidity and inflation persistence for EU15 member states using data on more than 1500 HICP sub-indices. Services and HICP sub-indices subject to price regulation exhibit a higher degree of price rigidity, with less frequent but larger index changes and a stronger asymmetry between increases and decreases. For most countries as well as for the EU15 and the euro area aggregates, excluding services from the HICP leads to a lower measured degree of inflation persistence; a similar though smaller effect is obtained by removing regulated indices from the HICP. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1489</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Patrick Lünnemann</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Thomas Y. Mathä</dc:creator>
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<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:135-149</identifier><datestamp>2010-03-31</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:135-149</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Price setting behaviour in the Netherlands: results of a survey</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Using a survey among Dutch firms on price setting behaviour in the Netherlands the study identifies how sticky prices are, which prices are sticky and why they are sticky. The most distinctive feature of the Dutch survey is its broad coverage of the business community (seven sectors and seven size classes), including the service sector and small firms. Our primary finding is that price setting behaviour depends critically on both a firm's size and the competitive environment it faces. Small firms in particular adopt more rigid pricing policies, and the weaker the competition a firm faces, the stickier a company's price will be. Furthermore, we find that wholesale and retail prices are more flexible than those for business-to-business services. The survey suggests that explicit and informal contracting are the most important sources of price stickiness. Menu costs and psychological pricing-two prominent explanations of price stickiness in the literature-are of minor importance. Finally, there is clear evidence of asymmetries in shocks driving price increases and decreases. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1478</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Marco Hoeberichts</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ad Stokman</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
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<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:151-160</identifier><datestamp>2010-03-31</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:151-160</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>How are prices adjusted in response to shocks? Survey evidence from Austrian firms</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper we investigate the response of prices to shocks based on a survey of Austrian firms. We find that firms are more likely to change prices after a cost shock than after a demand shock. In this vein, our analysis suggests that regular customers are an important explanation for price rigidity after demand shocks. Furthermore, lacking competition is another significant explanation for price stickiness. Finally, we find asymmetric responses after cost and demand shocks. Prices appear to be more rigid downward than upward after cost shocks, while they are more rigid upward than downward in reaction to shifts in demand. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1482</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Claudia Kwapil</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Johann Scharler</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Josef Baumgartner</dc:creator>
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<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:123-134</identifier><datestamp>2010-03-31</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:123-134</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Price stickiness in Portugal evidence from survey data</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper analyses the results of a survey conducted on a sample of Portuguese firms, with the main purpose of investigating their price setting behaviour. The evidence points to a considerable degree of price stickiness: most firms do not change prices more than once a year; time lags in price reactions to shocks are significant; and more than half of the firms follow time-dependent price reviewing and build their price decisions disregarding any indication of future economic developments. Implicit contracts between firms and their customers under which the former pledge to stabilise their prices as a way to increase customers' loyalty are apparently the main reason preventing firms from changing their prices more frequently. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1483</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Fernando Martins</dc:creator>
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<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:105-121</identifier><datestamp>2010-03-31</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:105-121</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Price-setting behaviour in Spain: evidence from micro PPI data</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper explores the key features of manufacturing price-setting behaviour in Spain using an extensive micro Producer Price Index data set. The main focus is placed on the impact on the frequency of price adjustment of some explanatory variables, including the cost structure, degree of market competition, demand conditions and inflationary pressures. All these factors are found to explain cross industry heterogeneity in price stickiness. A comparison of consumer and producer price-setting practices is also presented to ascertain the role of the retail sector in explaining price stickiness. We find some evidence that producer prices are more flexible than consumer prices. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1496</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Luis J. Álvarez</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Pablo Burriel</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ignacio Hernando</dc:creator>
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<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:209-233</identifier><datestamp>2010-03-31</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:209-233</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Price setting and market structure: an empirical analysis of micro data in Slovakia</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Most empirical studies on price setting that use micro data focus on advanced industrial countries. In this paper we analyze the experience of an emerging economy, Slovakia, using a large micro-level dataset that accounts for a substantial part of the consumer price index (about 5 million observations). We find that market structure is an important determinant of pricing behavior. The effect of market structure on persistence of inflation results from two conflicting forces. Increased competition may reduce persistence by increasing the frequency of price changes. On the contrary, higher competition may increase persistence through inertial behaviour induced by the strategic complementarity among price setters. In our case study, we find that the latter effects dominate. Indeed, the dispersion of prices is higher while persistence is lower in the non-tradable sectors, suggesting that higher competition is not conducive to lower persistence. Furthermore, we find that the frequency of price changes depends negatively on the price dispersion and positively on the product-specific inflation. These results seem consistent with predictions of Calvo's staggered price model. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1480</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Fabrizio Coricelli</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Roman Horváth</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
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<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:93-104</identifier><datestamp>2010-03-31</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:93-104</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Price adjustment in Italy: evidence from micro producer and consumer prices</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper investigates the behaviour of consumer and producer prices in Italy using micro data. The frequency of price changes is computed in order to obtain a quantitative measure of the unconditional degree of price rigidity at both the consumption and the production stage. On average, producer prices tend to remain unchanged for around 6 months, whereas consumer prices exhibit a longer duration, of 10 months. A comparison of the price behaviour of similar items confirms that prices are more flexible at the production stage. Prices, however, are not adjusted uniformly across sectors. The duration of producer prices is less for food and non-energy intermediate products and greater for non-food consumer and investment goods. At the consumption stage, price spells are longer for non-energy industrial goods and services, much shorter for energy products. In exploring the possible reasons for the differences, we observe that a higher share of labour in total costs is associated with lower frequency of price adjustment. Moreover, the structure and functioning of the retail sector in Italy may slow price adjustment at the consumption stage, together with other specific economic factors that affect mainly consumer price behaviour, such as menu costs and attractive pricing policies. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1481</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Silvia Fabiani</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Angela Gattulli</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Giovanni Veronese</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Roberto Sabbatini</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
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<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:161-176</identifier><datestamp>2010-03-31</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:161-176</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Price setting in Hungary-a store-level analysis</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper uses Hungarian micro-CPI data between December 2001 and June 2007 to provide descriptive statistics of store-level pricing practices in Hungary. First we present simple descriptive statistics about the frequency and average size of price changes, and compare it with similar statistics from other countries. Then we decompose the observed variations in the inflation rate to variations in frequencies and sizes. Finally, we estimate the inflation effects of three general VAT-rate changes during our sample period. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1479</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Péter Gábriel</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ádám Reiff</dc:creator>
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</metadata>
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<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:67-92</identifier><datestamp>2010-03-31</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:67-92</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Price adjustment in German manufacturing: evidence from two merged surveys</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper presents new evidence on the formation of producer prices. The database combines a one-time survey that was conducted in June 2004 on a sample of 1200 firms in manufacturing and time series information on price adjustment of the same firms. Twenty percent of firms set prices as time-dependent but neither Taylor nor Calvo-type price setting describes them aptly. Few firms are forward-looking. According to the one-time survey, fixed contracts and coordination failure are the main reason for postponing price adjustment. However, the hazard rates for price changes from the time series information do not support this. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1485</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Harald Stahl</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
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<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:177-192</identifier><datestamp>2010-03-31</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:2-3:p:177-192</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Consumer price behaviour: evidence from Luxembourg micro data</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We analyse micro-level consumer price data in Luxembourg with a particular view on price change reversals and wage indexation. The median duration is roughly 8 months. On an average, price decreases are as large as price increases. With the exception of services, individual prices do not show signs of downward rigidity. Excluding price change reversals reduces the weighted frequency of price change from 17 to 12%. Accumulated price and wage inflation, automatic wage indexation, and the cash changeover increase the probability of a price change, whereas pricing at attractive pricing points and price regulation have the opposite effect. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1490</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Patrick Lünnemann</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Thomas Y. Mathä</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:8:p:531-543</identifier><datestamp>2010-12-02</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:8:p:531-543</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Endogenous managerial incentive contracts in a differentiated duopoly, with and without commitment</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In a differentiated Cournot duopoly, we examine the contracts that firms' owners use to compensate their managers and the resulting output levels, profits and social welfare. If products are either sufficiently differentiated or sufficiently close substitutes, owners use Relative Performance contracts. For intermediate levels of product substitutability, they use Market Share contracts. When owners do not commit over the types of contracts, each type is an owner's best response to his rival's choice. Product substitutability has differential effects on output levels and profits, depending on the configuration of contracts in the industry. Finally, managerial incentive contracts are welfare enhancing if they increase consumers' surplus. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1507</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Constantine Manasakis</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Evangelos Mitrokostas</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Emmanuel Petrakis</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
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<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:8:p:503-515</identifier><datestamp>2010-12-02</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:8:p:503-515</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Worker absenteeism and incentives: evidence from Italy</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In Italy, employees are fully insured against earning losses due to illness. Since worker's health is not easily verifiable, absenteeism due to illness is considered an empirical proxy for employee shirking. The Bank of Italy Household Survey (SHIW) provides individual data on days of absence. Controlling for personal characteristics and potential determinants of health status and family responsibilities (age, gender, education, marital status, children at home), we show that the nature of employment contracts affects workers' incentives to provide effort: sickness absences, at least partially, hide opportunistic behaviours. The type of occupation and the labour contracts affects workers' behaviour in that more protected and difficult to monitor jobs show significantly higher levels of absenteeism: employees in public sector or in large firms, with permanent contracts or with longer tenure, individuals living in regions with low unemployment rates. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1504</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Vincenzo Scoppa</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:8:p:517-529</identifier><datestamp>2010-12-02</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:8:p:517-529</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>NCAA conference realignment and football game day attendance</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Between the 2004 and 2005 football seasons, 17% of the college football programs competing in the NCAA's Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) changed conference affiliation. Football represents nearly half of the revenue generated by athletic departments competing at the FBS level and is thus critical to their financial success. The objective of this study is to estimate the impact a change in conference affiliation has on football game day attendance. The results indicate teams that changed conferences enjoyed an increase in attendance even after controlling for the increase in quality of competition. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1506</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Mark D. Groza</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:8:p:549-555</identifier><datestamp>2010-12-02</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:8:p:549-555</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The managerial limit to the growth of Firms revisited</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The Penrose Hypothesis that managerial resources will grow at a rate somewhat faster than that of firm size is tested along with the alternative steady-state hypothesis that both grow at the same rate. A dynamic firm model is used to motivate the study. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics' Occupational Employment Statistics are used to measure managerial resources. Firm size is in terms of employment, or real value added, or real value of shipments. The data cover the period 2003–2006 and are used with a Cobb‐Douglas type log‐form growth function. The statistical results are quite strongly in favor of the Penrose Hypothesis, suggesting a managerial limit to the rate of growth of the firm. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1512</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>James P. Gander</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:8:p:545-547</identifier><datestamp>2010-12-02</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:8:p:545-547</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A note on two‐part pricing under uncertainty</dc:title>
  <dc:description>HASH(0x1009ae038)</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1510</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Roger D. Blair</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Christina DePasquale</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:8:p:497-501</identifier><datestamp>2010-12-02</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:8:p:497-501</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Managerial economics: a forward looking assessment</dc:title>
  <dc:description>HASH(0x1009c0850)</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1509</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Paul H. Rubin</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Antony W. Dnes</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:8:p:557-566</identifier><datestamp>2010-12-02</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:8:p:557-566</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Using a decision tree to analyze mortgage borrower decision behavior and values concerning interest rates and house prices</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1514</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>En‐Der Su</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:4:p:235-251</identifier><datestamp>2009-05-21</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:4:p:235-251</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Effective utility functions induced by organizational target-based incentives</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Many companies set performance targets for their divisions to decentralize the decision-making process and communicate with outside investors. This paper analyzes the effects of performance targets on the decision-making behavior of the divisions. We introduce the notion of an 'effective utility function'-a function that a division should use in its selection of projects if it wishes to maximize the probability of achieving its targets. We show that many target-based incentives induce S-shaped utility functions and discuss the organizational problems they may pose. We then show how an organization can set targets that induce expected utility maximization. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1448</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Ali E. Abbas</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>James E. Matheson</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Robert F. Bordley</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:4:p:211-233</identifier><datestamp>2009-05-21</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:4:p:211-233</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Stock market perceptions of the motives for mergers in cases reviewed by the UK competition authorities: an empirical analysis</dc:title>
  <dc:description>A number of studies have considered the motivation of managers to follow a merger strategy. However, as far as we are aware none has looked at the influence of competition regulation on merger motives using stock market data and event study techniques. Data drawn from 63 merger cases in the UK between 1989 and 2003 are examined for the stock market's perceptions of what motivated managers to pursue their initial merger bid. The findings suggest that the Synergy and Hubris dominate as motivations for mergers and that, unintentionally, competition policy may help to reduce the number of mergers motivated by Managerialism. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1445</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Malcolm Arnold</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>David Parker</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:4:p:265-280</identifier><datestamp>2009-05-21</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:4:p:265-280</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Cost efficiency and value driver analysis of insurers in an emerging economy</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study investigated cost inefficiencies and its relationship with value drivers of insurers in United Arab Emirates (UAE). The study revealed that there were 21-33% cost inefficiencies in these insurers under different model specifications of stochastic frontier and DEA; value drivers such as lower leverage risk, lower capital risk significantly improved cost efficiencies consistent with Basel II norms; ROE positively influenced cost efficiencies with further trade off between increased profit margin, decreased asset utilization and|or reduced equity multiplier by the insurer managements to achieve a target-ROE; and the trend of cost efficiency was improving during 2000-2004. The study suggests that stock insurers could overcome their cost inefficiencies through adoption of efficient measures such as risk mapping of clients, risk prioritization besides ALM techniques. The study has direct implications for individual and institutional investors in making their portfolio investment decisions in insurance sector, policymakers, and regulators to closely monitor inefficient insurers consistent with Basel II norms. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1454</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Attiea Marie</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ananth Rao</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Hossein Kashani</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:4:p:253-264</identifier><datestamp>2009-05-21</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:4:p:253-264</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Share price reactions to advertising announcements and broadcast of media events</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Over the last two decades, marketers have gravitated toward placing their ads in specific television programs such as the Super Bowl, Academy Awards, and the last episodes of sitcoms. While anecdotal evidence of positive outcomes in the form of increased sales, phone inquiries, and hits on the web sites of advertisers, there has not been any credible measurement of investor returns in this expensive strategy. We find that firms advertising for the first time, with greater advertising expenditures relative to sales, and with more effective|creative campaigns fare better in terms of the market reaction to their campaigns. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1450</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Greg Filbeck</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Xin Zhao</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Daniel Tompkins</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Peggy Chong</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:359-368</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-17</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:359-368</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Ownership structure and board composition: A multi‐country test of agency theory predictions</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Patterns of corporate governance and control differ significantly across countries because of national differences in structures of ownership and composition of boards of directors. Based on agency theory, we examine the relationship between ownership structure and the composition of the board of directors of 390 large manufacturing firms based in Japan, Western Europe and the United States. In particular, we examine how ownership concentration, bank control and state ownership affect the percentage of outside directors on the corporate boards. The results show that, consistent with predictions of agency theory, ownership structure has significant effects on board composition.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090150409</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jiatao Li</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:341-357</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-17</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:341-357</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Evidence on the effects of hostile and friendly tender offers on employment</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper provides evidence on the effects of successful tender offers on the number of target and acquiring firm employees. No significant change in combined employment is observed, on average, over the three-year period following offer completion. However, hostile tender offers completed between 1980 and 1984 are followed by an average 17.2% decline in employment. Net divestitures of operations over the period are responsible for some of the observed employment decrease; however, an estimated ‐12.2% change remains, on average, after adjusting for divestiture activity. Information contained in firm annual reports and in the Wall Street Journal indicates that the tender offers in the sample are often followed by considerable restructuring activity with respect to both target and acquiring firm operations. The findings suggest that acquiring firm managements may acquire new operations when the need to restructure their existing operations frees up resources, e.g. cash and/or managerial time and talent. The evidence also suggests that the corporate control market must be viewed as an integral part of the process by which US firms restructure to meet changing circumstances.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090150408</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Diane Kowalski Denis</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:369-381</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-17</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:369-381</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Managerial incentives for undertaking exchange offers</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper empirically examines management's motivation to convey information regarding firm value through exchange offers. We report a positive relation between stock price reactions to announcements of exchange offers and managerial stockholdings, and a weak negative relation with salary plus bonus. These findings are consistent with the incentives required for managers to signal firm value through exchange offer-induced leverage change.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090150410</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Yash P. Joshi</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Anil K. Makhija</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:299-315</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-17</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:299-315</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>An empirical analysis of the corporate control, tax and incentive motivations for adopting leveraged employee stock ownership plans</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper examines three motivations for leveraged ESOP adoption: as a takeover defense, as a mechanism for providing incentives to employees and as a vehicle for tax savings. ESOP adoption is more likely for companies with a higher predicted probability of takeover, but ESOP adopters have many characteristics that are different from takeover targets. Companies that adopt ESOPs can be distinguished from non-adopting companies based on characteristics associated with the tax and incentive effects of these plans. The size of the ESOP is shown to depend primarily on the tax and incentive characteristics.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090150405</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Anne Beatty</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:317-327</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-17</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:317-327</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Shareholder wealth effects when an officer of one corporation joins the board of directors of another</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Officers of large corporations, having demonstrated expertise in managing complex organizations, would appear to be ideal additions to the boards of directors of other corporations. Shareholder wealth effects are examined for 124 announcements in which an officer of one public corporation joins the board of directors of another. The results indicate that the values of nonfinancial firms that send directors to other firms decline significantly, while those of financial senders increase significantly. Receiving firms of both types do not gain. The results suggest that for nonfinancial firms the added duties of an outside directorship distract corporate officers from managing their own firms or are signals to the market that managers are available to other firms. For financial senders, the benefits of networking appear to strongly outweigh any drawbacks. Cross-sectional regressions suggest that prediction errors are higher for receiving firms if they have performed poorly prior to the announcement and less negative for sending firms if they have performed well prior to the announcement. Abnormal returns are negatively related to the size of the sender, adding support for the notion that busy executives are less valuable as outside directors.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090150406</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Stuart Rosenstein</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jeffrey G. Wyatt</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:329-340</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-17</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:329-340</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Firm performance and board composition: Some new evidence</dc:title>
  <dc:description>HASH(0x1009eb8e0)</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090150407</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Scott W. Barnhart</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>M. Wayne Marr</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Stuart Rosenstein</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:383-397</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-17</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:383-397</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The theory of corporate takeover bids: A subgame perfect approach</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper I re-examine Grossman &amp; Hart's (1980a) earlier work on corporate takeovers and address three main shortcomings of their theory. First, their theory implies that in the ‘Nash equilibrium’ either all shareholders will decide to tender their shares or all will refuse the raider's tender offer. Hence, they look only at the pure strategy equilibria. Second, there does not exist any free‐rider problem in the extreme cases of pure strategy equilbria because everyone sells his or her share and the raider does not have to deal with any minority shareholder in the equilibrium. On the other hand, if the raid fails and no one sells, then there is no question of dilution either. I show some mixed‐strategy equilibria using assumptions of Grossman and Hart. Third, Grossman and Hart claim that their theory rules out the possibilities of takeovers by the inefficient raider in which the shareholders who tender their shares are worse off than they would have been otherwise with the incumbent management. It appears from the model that their argument is based on rather arbitrary assumptions.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090150411</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Suresh Deman</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:291-298</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-17</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:291-298</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>How do large minority shareholders wield control?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>While high ownership concentrations in even the largest American corporations provide prima facie evidence that large minority shareholders wield control, the economics and finance literatures have mostly overlooked the question of how they do so. Using a simple framework adapted from work by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), this paper shows how minority shareholders can use takeover threats to discipline management. It then shows how they can bolster their threats, and hence their influence, simply by threatening to increase these minority stakes. When inside information is not too problematic, a relatively small stake can endow minority shareholders with considerable ongoing control.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090150404</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>David A. Butz</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:279-289</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-17</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:15:y:1994:i:4:p:279-289</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Paying for performance: Efficiency wages and mutuality</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The motivation of individuals lies at the core of corporate governance. For CEOs much research has been directed at the linkage between pay and enterprise performance. The results, however, provide only weak support for the efficacy of profit-related pay. Herein we adopt a different perspective and test for the existence of efficiency wages in a mutual sector wherein the use of traditional control mechanisms is particularly problematic. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that efficiency wages do yield superior performance. We therefore conclude that efficiency wages are a much‐needed tool of corporate governance in the mutual sector. Furthermore, as an incentive mechanism, efficiency wages do not require the observability of individual effort, thus they potentially provide an equitable incentive mechanism for all organizations.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090150403</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Hilary Ingham</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Steve Thompson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:3:p:i-i</identifier><datestamp>2010-02-04</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:3:p:i-i</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Corporate governance and firm efficiency: evidence from China's publicly listed firms</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The above article (DOI: &lt;DOI HREF="10.1002/mde.1447"&gt;10.1002|mde.1447&lt;/DOI&gt;) was published online in Early View on 29 October 2008. Printing errors were subsequently identified in the article. &lt;P&gt;Page 1: There should be no affiliation 'd'

Page 1: Affiliation 'a' should read: 'Department of Economics and Finance, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong'.

Page 14, 'Acknowledgements': The 'Acknowledgements' should read:

We thank two anonymous referees, Sanford Berg, Joel Houston, Guohua Jiang, Alan Stent, Lihui Tian, Tracy Wang, and participants at the Fifth Annual China Economic Conference, the Sixth Annual International Conference on Financial Engineering, and the Journal of Banking and Finance 30&lt;SUP&gt;th&lt;/SUP&gt; Anniversary International Conference for their helpful comments and suggestions. The financial support from Lingnan University (DR07B2) and the RGC of Hong Kong SAR Government (No. LU3110|03H) is gratefully acknowledged. Su also wishes to acknowledge the financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 70572065), the Ministry of Education of China (Grant No. 200403), the Guandong Project of Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences at Universities (Grant No. 04JDXM79001 and 07JDTDXM79005) and the Innovative Research Team Project of Jinan University (Grant No. 04SK2D03). However, we are responsible for all remaining errors of this paper.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1463</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Chen Lin</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Yue Ma</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Dongwei Su</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:7:p:465-479</identifier><datestamp>2009-11-05</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:7:p:465-479</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A transaction cost perspective on why, how, and when cash impacts firm performance</dc:title>
  <dc:description>While both financial and behavioral theories suggest that cash holdings may be beneficial to R&amp;D-intensive firms, agency theory would suggest that strong monitoring may be needed to ensure that cash holdings are not squandered. We contend that transaction cost economics provides a valuable lens for understanding the performance implications of cash holdings because not only does it explicate the benefits and costs of cash holdings in a single unified theoretical framework, but it further clarifies how environmental uncertainty critically moderates these relationships. Empirical tests on a large sample of US corporations yield strong support for our theory. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1457</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jonathan P. O'Brien</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Timothy B. Folta</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:8:p:551-560</identifier><datestamp>2009-11-05</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:8:p:551-560</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>External knowledge sourcing: science, market and the value of patented inventions</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper analyzes the choice between alternative sources of knowledge in patented inventions. Inventors can use scientific and|or market-oriented sources of knowledge. We formally test whether these two types of knowledge acquisition are complementary or substitutable in the value of patented inventions. The results suggest that simultaneous exploitation of different knowledge inputs is 'subadditive' since inventors would have to manage assimilation and integration of disparate items of external knowledge stemming from distant technological contexts. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1474</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Cédric Schneider</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:8:p:513-515</identifier><datestamp>2009-11-05</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:8:p:513-515</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Sales by multi-product retailers: a comment</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Immanent to the retail business is its multiproduct nature. In a recent issue of this journal Richards (2006) introduces a multiproduct model for perishable food items. Richards concludes that depth and breadth of sales are complementary marketing tools to increase store sales. He also provides empirical support for this hypothesis. We will show in the following that Richards' model does not suggest a complementarity between depth and breadth of sales. Instead, these tools are substitutes in his model. Therefore, the interpretation of his empirical result has to be reconsidered. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1467</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jens-Peter Loy</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Christoph R. Weiss</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:8:p:491-501</identifier><datestamp>2009-11-05</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:8:p:491-501</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Allocation of decision rights in joint ventures</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Previous studies in organizational economics and international business research have not tested a property rights view on the allocation of decision rights (DR) in joint ventures (JVs). The paper offers a test of the property rights explanation by using data from Hungarian JVs. Our analysis derives the following hypothesis: The more important the JV partner's intangible knowledge assets for the generation of residual surplus, the more residual DR are assigned to him. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1464</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>J. Windsperger</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:8:p:529-538</identifier><datestamp>2009-11-05</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:8:p:529-538</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Are multi-resort ski conglomerates more efficient?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper compares the efficiency of large ski resort conglomerates with independent ski resorts using data on four countries (Canada, France, United States, Switzerland). Using the stochastic frontier production approach, I find that ski resorts that are owned and managed by the Intrawest group are significantly more efficient than independent ski resorts. The efficiency gap is about nine percentage points on average. The remaining ski resort conglomerates (American Skiing, Vail Resorts Inc., and Compagnie des Alpes SA) do not operate more efficiently than independent ski resorts. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1470</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Martin Falk</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:7:p:443-464</identifier><datestamp>2009-11-05</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:7:p:443-464</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Academic entrepreneurship</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper proposes a model of the choice to commercialize research, of the amount and type of pre-commercial research to perform, and of the timing of commercialization by an academic scientist, and analyzes the returns and costs of these choices. The behavior and performance of the academic scientist is compared with that of an industrial researcher. Unlike the industrial researcher, the academic scientist receives direct benefit from performing research, e.g. in the form of publication and peer recognition. However, the type of research that is more effective in reducing commercialization costs may not be the one generating the highest scientific benefit. It is shown that, while in some cases the academic scientist is more reluctant to commercialize research, in other cases she may commercialize faster than a solely profit-seeking agent would-and perform less research. Academic and non-academic scientists also select different projects, and this may explain the good performance of academic entrepreneurs found in several empirical studies. The model offers a unified framework to interpret the mixed evidence on the success of, and the arguments in favor and against, the involvement of universities into commercial activities. Managerial and public policy implications are also examined. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1461</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Nicola Lacetera</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:7:p:423-442</identifier><datestamp>2009-11-05</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:7:p:423-442</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Profit and productivity of US Class I railroads</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper examines how productivity changes and price changes have contributed to short-run profit change in the railroad industry. Using an unbalanced panel of US Class I railroads for the period 1996-2003, a short-run profit change decomposition model is used to attribute intertemporal profit change to its causal factors. We find that productivity improvements and an increased scale of production contributed to increases in profit, and that variation in operating efficiency had a mixed impact on profit. We also find that relative changes in rail rates and variable input prices exerted downward pressure on profit. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1462</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Siew Hoon Lim</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>C.A. Knox Lovell</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:8:p:503-511</identifier><datestamp>2009-11-05</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:8:p:503-511</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The determinants of industry concentration: two new empirical regularities</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper reports two new empirical regularities concerning industry concentration. First, concentration levels closely correlate in related industries. Second, the correlation is moderated by the degree of relatedness between the industries. These regularities are derived from the Trinet database, using a survivor-based measure of relatedness. We argue that these previously overlooked relations may be explained in terms of (1) 'spillover effects' between industries and (2) life cycle factors. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1466</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Lasse B. Lien</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Nicolai J. Foss</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:8:p:517-527</identifier><datestamp>2009-11-05</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:8:p:517-527</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Distribution conventionality in the movie sector: an econometric analysis of cinema supply</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper empirically analyzes the impact of several factors on a 'conventionality index (CI)' in the specific context of the cinema exhibition sector. To our knowledge, it is the first time that a standard CI has been constructed for this purpose. Econometric analysis of the determinants of variation in this index provides decision-makers with an empirical focus for analyzing distributional aspects of the movie exhibition market, with particular emphasis on product differentiation. Specifically, (i) do cinemas based in a city area have a different or 'specialized' focus in contrast to cinemas in small towns? or (ii) do multiplexes have a different or more specialized focus in comparison with cinemas? To this end, cross-sectional econometric models are estimated to help analyze these effects in three Italian regions for a sample of cinemas covering the 2006 season. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1469</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Alan Collins</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Antonello E. Scorcu</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Roberto Zanola</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:7:p:481-490</identifier><datestamp>2009-11-05</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:7:p:481-490</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Merging with a buyer group member</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We examine a merger between a national retailer and a local retailer who is a member of a buyer group. While the traditional literature on mergers assumes an oligopolistic industry (where the merger takes place) supplied by a perfectly competitive one, we assume here that retailers obtain their input from a supplier that can offer quantity discounts. In this setting, a merger can be profitable for insiders (solving the merger paradox) and can also be more profitable for insiders than for outsiders (solving the free-riding problem). This result holds even if the merged firm ends-up with a small share of the market. However, welfare decreases post-merger. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1465</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Can Erutku</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Patrick de Lamirande</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:8:p:539-549</identifier><datestamp>2009-11-05</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:8:p:539-549</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Tax-avoidance strategies of American multinationals: an empirical analysis</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper analyzes the opportunities of American multinationals to reallocate their profits into tax havens. In contrast to previous papers, a comprehensive look on the profit-shifting process is undertaken by proposing three different tests. Multinationals in high-tax countries have a lower equity ratio than affiliates in tax havens, indicating that income is shifted by extensively financing subsidiaries in high-tax countries with debt. Furthermore, the share of retained earnings is lower in high-tax countries owing to the unattractiveness of tax deferral. When testing for the outcomes of profit shifting, the results show that the pre-tax profitability of American multinationals is higher in tax havens. This relationship is consistent with the opportunities of multinationals to shift income outside high-tax jurisdictions. Finally, the paper shows that profit shifting largely takes place into tax havens, whereas other countries do not benefit from profit-shifting activities. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1471</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Peter Schwarz</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:6:p:373-392</identifier><datestamp>2009-09-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
<dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:6:p:373-392</dc:identifier>
<dc:type>article</dc:type>
<dc:title>Complexity as a constraint on firm expansion within and across industries</dc:title>
<dc:description>With this paper, we want to shed light on factors influencing a firm's rate of expansion. We argue that expansion is a complex task and complexity associated with expansion projects in one period can negatively impact rate of expansion in the following period. Moreover, we argue that firm portfolio complexity also slows down further expansion. Using longitudinal data on the expansion path of 91 German companies, we show that added product scope of expansion and degree of internationalization characterizing expansion in one period as well as level of product and international diversity have a significant impact on slowing down rate of expansion in the subsequent period. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1459</dc:identifier>
<dc:creator>Thomas Hutzschenreuter</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Fabian Guenther</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:6:p:351-371</identifier><datestamp>2009-09-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
<dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:6:p:351-371</dc:identifier>
<dc:type>article</dc:type>
<dc:title>Similarities and differences between stockpiling and reference effects</dc:title>
<dc:description>The correlation of past prices and demand is commonly attributed to reference effects. Although reference dependence is robust, support for loss aversion is mixed; some find demand more sensitive to price increases, consistent with loss aversion, others find no difference or greater sensitivity to price decreases. Stockpiling offers an explanation for these mixed findings. Combining theory, analytical models and simulations, stockpiling and reference dependence predict similar effects and the more stockable the product, the greater sensitivity of demand to price decreases, the opposite of loss aversion. We show that a model combining stockpiling and reference effects best aligns with previous findings and under what conditions each effect should dominate. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1453</dc:identifier>
<dc:creator>Robert Slonim</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Ellen Garbarino</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:6:p:405-422</identifier><datestamp>2009-09-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
<dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:6:p:405-422</dc:identifier>
<dc:type>article</dc:type>
<dc:title>Entrepreneurial signaling to attract resources: the case of franchising</dc:title>
<dc:description>Why firms and individuals reveal information is the subject of considerable theoretical research, but little empirical work has been possible due to a lack of suitable data. In this paper we examine why entrepreneurs selling business opportunities (franchisors) reveal information regarding potential profits (termed earnings claims). Empirical analysis shows that: first, contrary to theory, only a small percentage of franchisors claim; and, second, the franchisors that do claim have lower costs or are responding to competition. In particular, the prediction of theoretical models from economics that resource providers will not transact if information is not disclosed is not supported; resource providers can and do make significant investments even when entrepreneurs refuse to disclose information. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1460</dc:identifier>
<dc:creator>Steven C. Michael</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:6:p:393-403</identifier><datestamp>2009-09-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
<dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:6:p:393-403</dc:identifier>
<dc:type>article</dc:type>
<dc:title>Holistic investment assessment: optimization, risk appraisal and decision making</dc:title>
<dc:description>On deciding for the most appropriate investment when capital restrictions exist, investors define their alternatives and analyze each one of them. Traditionally, the definition, appraisal and analysis stages are treated separately. Herein, an innovative holistic method is proposed for bridging these stages. Within this method, investment attributes definition occurs by genetic algorithm optimization, while the analysis of the investment is realized through simulation. The method also proposes the NPV Expected Shortfall and the NPV Risk Preference Index as investment evaluation criteria. An illustrative case study of two mutually exclusive renewable energy investment scenarios is also used for demonstration purposes. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
<dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1458</dc:identifier>
<dc:creator>Georgios Tziralis</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Konstantinos Kirytopoulos</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Athanasios Rentizelas</dc:creator>
<dc:creator>Ilias Tatsiopoulos</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:4:p:215-229</identifier><datestamp>2011-06-30</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:4:p:215-229</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A discrete choice model of dividend reinvestment plans: classification and prediction</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We use a discrete choice recursive model to classify companies with and without dividend reinvestment plans (DRIPs). Our model classifies 72.0% of companies correctly. We interpret misclassified companies as being likely to switch their plan status. For example, if financial data erroneously suggest that a company should have a DRIP then we expect that it would be more likely to institute a plan than other companies in the sample. Our results support this conjecture. Companies that add DRIPs tend to have more extreme levels of variables that control for management entrenchment, higher levels of variables that control for the ability to pay dividends and higher payout ratios. Copyright (C) 2011 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1527</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Thomas P. Boehm</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ramon P. DeGennaro</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:4:p:265-279</identifier><datestamp>2011-06-30</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:4:p:265-279</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Cross‐hedging and forward‐contract pricing of electricity in the Pacific Northwest</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper develops a linear regression model for using actively traded NYMEX natural gas futures as a cross-hedge against electricity spot‐price risk in the Pacific Northwest and for pricing the forward contracts in the presence of temperature and hydro risks. Our approach comports with reality and provides power purchasers with an effective instrument through which they can hedge their electricity bets through natural gas futures. It also demonstrates the sharp month‐to‐month variations in the natural gas futures' optimal hedge ratios and hedge effectiveness. Finally, it finds significant risk premiums in the Pacific Northwest forward prices, supporting the hypothesis that forward‐contract buyers are relatively more risk‐averse than sellers. Copyright (C) 2011 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1533</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Chi‐Keung Woo</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ira Horowitz</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Arne Olson</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Andrew DeBenedictis</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>David Miller</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jack Moore</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:4:p:243-259</identifier><datestamp>2011-06-30</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:4:p:243-259</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The adoption, diffusion, and evolution of organizational form: insights from the agrifood sector</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The adoption and diffusion of contract farming and vertical integration in modern agriculture has varied widely across regions, commodities, or farm types. This paper lays out a framework for understanding the evolution of organizational practices in U.S. agriculture by drawing on theories of the diffusion of technology and organizational complementarities. Using recent trends as stylized facts, with case studies from various agricultural industries, we argue that research identifying complementarities within specific sectors of the agrifood system will greatly improve our understanding of the organizational structure of agricultural production, and we identify several specific lines of inquiry. Copyright (C) 2011 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1531</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Harvey S. James</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Peter G. Klein</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Michael E. Sykuta</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:4:p:261-264</identifier><datestamp>2011-06-30</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:4:p:261-264</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Decision tree analysis and real options: a reconciliation</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate in a simple framework how decision tree analysis (DTA) and real options approach (ROA) yield the same results when markets are complete. The common scepticism regarding DTA has its roots in the incorrect assumption that one can apply the same discount rate to the project cash flows and the value of the investment opportunity when the decision maker has the option to defer investment. Copyright (C) 2011 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1532</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Vasiliki Makropoulou</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:4:p:231-241</identifier><datestamp>2011-06-30</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:4:p:231-241</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Corporate cash holdings and dividend payments: evidence from simultaneous analysis</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study explores the simultaneous relationship between corporate cash holdings and dividend policy using a large sample of around 400 non-financial firms for the period from 1991 to 2008. The results show that cash holdings are affected by dividends, leverage, growth, size, risk, profitability, and working capital ratio. Dividend policy is affected by cash, leverage, growth, size, risk, and profit. When controlling for simultaneity, dividend payments do not appear to significantly affect cash holdings, nor do cash holdings affect dividend policy. The empirical analysis suggests that simultaneity is crucial in analyzing corporate cash holdings and dividend policy. Copyright (C) 2011 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1529</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Basil Al‐Najjar</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Yacine Belghitar</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:5:p:333-353</identifier><datestamp>2011-09-01</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:5:p:333-353</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The Effects of Personality Composition and Decision‐making Processes on Change Preferences of Self‐managing Teams</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Katrin Muehlfeld</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jenny Doorn</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Arjen Witteloostuijn</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:5:p:281-292</identifier><datestamp>2011-09-01</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:5:p:281-292</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Competition Between Online and Physical Stores: The Implications of Providing Product Information by Pure‐Play E‐tailer</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Ryohei Tojo</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Nobuo Matsubayashi</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:6:p:399-412</identifier><datestamp>2011-09-01</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:6:p:399-412</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Does Managerial Behavior Determine Farm Technical Efficiency? A Case of Grape Production in an Economy in Transition</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Gordana Manevska‐Tasevska</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Helena Hansson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:5:p:305-323</identifier><datestamp>2011-09-01</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:5:p:305-323</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Investigating Collaborative R&amp;D Using Patent Data: The Case Study of Robot Technology in Japan</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Sébastien Lechevalier</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Yukio Ikeda</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Junichi Nishimura</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:6:p:355-369</identifier><datestamp>2011-09-01</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:6:p:355-369</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Private Benefits of Control and Dual‐Class Share Unifications</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Benjamin Maury</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Anete Pajuste</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:5:p:293-304</identifier><datestamp>2011-09-01</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:5:p:293-304</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The Effects of a Separation of Ownership from Control on UK Listed Firms: An Empirical Analysis</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Kenny Crossan</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:5:p:325-331</identifier><datestamp>2011-09-01</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:5:p:325-331</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The Effect of Leasing versus Buying on Entry Deterrence</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Wen Mao</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Peter Zaleski</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:6:p:385-398</identifier><datestamp>2011-09-01</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:6:p:385-398</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Tournament Structure of Managerial Pay: Evidence from the Transition Period</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Teodora Paligorova</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:6:p:371-384</identifier><datestamp>2011-09-01</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:6:p:371-384</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The Perils of Altering Incentive Plans: A Case Study</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Antti Kauhanen</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:6:p:413-424</identifier><datestamp>2011-09-01</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:6:p:413-424</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Product Innovation, Credit Constraints, and Trade Credit: Evidence from a Cross‐country Study</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Werner Bönte</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Sebastian Nielen</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:6:p:415-430</identifier><datestamp>2010-09-09</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:6:p:415-430</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Managerial succession and organizational performance-evidence from the German Soccer League</dc:title>
  <dc:description>It has been widely studied how organizational performance changes after the replacement of managers. However, there is little evidence whether environmental changes moderate the efficiency of management replacements. In this paper, I explicitly consider the effect of a change in the environment of organizations on post-replacement effects. Analyzing the performance effect of coach replacements in the German Soccer League before and after the introduction of the 3-points-rule theoretically and empirically I find that the magnitude of the performance effect of coach replacements differs under alternative regimes. The empirical analysis confirms predictions from my theoretical model and identifies moderating effects. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1495</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Stefan Wagner</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:6:p:403-414</identifier><datestamp>2010-09-09</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:6:p:403-414</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The impact of group incentives on performance of small firms: Hausman-Taylor estimates</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper investigates the impact of group incentives on firms' performance. It shows that group incentive raises firms' performance. This result empirically validates the implication of the theoretical literature that performance-related pay can potentially improve firms' performance, in the context of a developing country, and indicates the importance of group incentives in small firms. It also shows that partnership firms perform better than private limited companies and labour unions have a negative impact on firms' performance. It employs the Hausman-Taylor random effects estimator in order to isolate the effects of time-invariant covariates and also to tackle potential endogeneity problem. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1494</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Kshitija Dixit</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Rupayan Pal</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:6:p:387-401</identifier><datestamp>2010-09-09</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:6:p:387-401</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Endogeneity and the relationship between board structure and firm performance: a simultaneous equation analysis for the Athens Stock Exchange</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The main goal of this paper is to examine the relationship between the three most important characteristics of the board of directors with firm performance. More specifically, we investigate whether the independence of the board, the leadership structure and the board size, are exogenous determinants to the firm's performance, using a simultaneous equations framework. Our database is composed of firms quoted in the ASE, starting from 146 observations in 2000 and ending with 232 firms in 2006. The findings suggest that the board independence and the leadership structure do not affect the firm performance. On the other hand, an inverse relationship between board size and firm performance is observed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1492</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>A. A. Drakos</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>F. V. Bekiris</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:6:p:373-386</identifier><datestamp>2010-09-09</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:6:p:373-386</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Measurement of the efficiency of football teams in the Champions League</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In the case of football it could be argued that the purpose of clubs is to win the competitions in which they participate. However, the assessment of football clubs from the efficiency would be relevant in judging whether the results have been obtained without waste. The chosen sample is football teams who played in the Champions League from 2003 to 2007 and the method of calculating the efficiency will be both the traditional version of the DEA as well as the version proposed by Andersen and Petersen (1993), which allows discrimination among efficient units. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1491</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Manuel Espitia-Escuer</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Lucia Isabel Garcia-Cebrián</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:5:p:353-361</identifier><datestamp>2010-07-08</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:5:p:353-361</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>R&amp;D and &lt;TOGGLE&gt;Tobin's q&lt;/TOGGLE&gt; in an emerging financial market: the case of the Athens Stock Exchange</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper aims at providing further evidence on the consequences of R&amp;D investment on Tobin's q for firms publicly traded in an emerging financial market. Panel data methodology is applied using data for the manufacturing and computer firms listed in the Athens Stock Exchange, a market classified as emerging by the major securities analysts, for the period 1996-2004. The empirical findings show first, that the Greek firms' R&amp;D investment effect on the market value of a firm is consistent with other US and European studies. Second, the impact of the R&amp;D investment on the market value is higher for small firms. The findings of this paper may have significant industrial and technological policy implications for other emerging markets sharing similar characteristics to Greece. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1493</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Efstathios G. Parcharidis</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Nikos C. Varsakelis</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:5:p:311-324</identifier><datestamp>2010-07-08</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:5:p:311-324</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Influential ownership and capital structure</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper explores the relation between ownership structures and capital structures in Russia-an economy with a state-run banking sector, weak corporate governance, and highly concentrated ownership. We find that firms with the state as controlling shareholder have significantly higher leverage than firms controlled by domestic private controlling shareholders other than oligarchs. Both firms controlled by the state or oligarchs finance their growth with more debt than other firms. Profitability is negatively related to leverage across all types of controlling owners, indicating a preference for internal funding over debt. The results indicate that firms with owners that have political influence or ties to large financial groups enjoy better access to debt. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1477</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Salla Pöyry</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Benjamin Maury</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:5:p:325-338</identifier><datestamp>2010-07-08</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:5:p:325-338</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Competition in prescription drug markets: is parallel trade the answer?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This article uses a price determination model with dynamic panel data estimation to examine the extent to which pharmaceutical parallel trade promotes price competition and leads to downward price convergence. Little evidence of sustainable price competition is found. We find that prices are mainly affected by regulation and by competition in the wholesale distribution chain; that the pricing strategy of parallel distributors resembles that of originator drugs in importing countries; and that there may be upward rather than downward price convergence. Drawing on the European evidence, the findings also indicate that opening the US market to parallel imports will not necessarily lead to competition and enhance pharmaceutical cost containment. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1486</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Panos Kanavos</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Sotiris Vandoros</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:5:p:339-352</identifier><datestamp>2010-07-08</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:5:p:339-352</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Incentive schemes for executive officers when forecasts matter</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper develops a new perspective on results-based incentive schemes for non-CEO managers. It shows that it is possible to establish incentive schemes that take into account both the actual output obtained and the forecast figure previously established as a target, without the negative consequences derived from the perverse loop of hiding-ratchet effects. A general linear two-staged scheme is proposed. In addition, relevant properties of this incentive system are stated that show how principals (corporate management) may determine the expected forecasting behavior of agents (executive officers) by suitably choosing the scheme parameters according to a simple set of rules. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1487</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Joaquim Vergés</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:5:p:363-372</identifier><datestamp>2010-07-08</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:5:p:363-372</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Individual efficiency and club performance: a panel analysis of professional baseball</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper investigates whether players' individual- and club-level efficiency has substantial impact on club performance in the Chinese Professional Baseball League (CPBL). Using data from 1990 to 2000, and a stochastic frontier model, we propose a different way to measure club-level efficiency. Our empirical results indicate that club-level efficiency is crucial to club performance, measured by the winning percentage. Although the literature shows that some inefficient clubs with abundant resources are still very successful on the diamond, our results confirm that club-level efficiency has a moderate impact on the success of a baseball club in the CPBL. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1497</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Wen-Jhan Jane</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Wei-Hsin Kong</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Yi-Hsiue Wang</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:1:p:33-45</identifier><datestamp>2010-01-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:1:p:33-45</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Corporate borrowing and profitability in India</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper examines effects of different types of corporate borrowing on firm profitability in India. We show that in contrast to the conventional thinking on the importance of monitored debt in determining firm performance, what matters more is arm's-length lending in the form of fixed deposits in influencing firm profitability. We argue that the strategic implications of fixed deposits can be mainly attributed to the fact that they are both unsecured and privately held, which make the creditors associated with this type of debt the most likely to monitor firms' performance. The results suggest that debt structure matters, and it is important to take into account institutional differences and the heterogeneity of debt in the analysis of capital structure on firm performance. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1472</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Sumit Majumdar</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Kunal Sen</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:1:p:1-18</identifier><datestamp>2010-01-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:1:p:1-18</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Absorptive capacity-one size fits all? A firm-level analysis of absorptive capacity for different kinds of knowledge</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper empirically analyzes the effect of R&amp;D activities, human resource and knowledge management, and the organization of knowledge sharing within a firm on the absorptive capacity of innovative firms for three different types of knowledge, namely absorptive capacity to use knowledge from a firm's own industry, knowledge from other industries and knowledge from research institutions. Using data from the German innovation survey, we investigate how firms are able to exploit knowledge from external partners for successful innovation activities. The estimation results show that the determinants of absorptive capacity differ with respect to the type of knowledge absorbed for innovation activities. In particular, we find that the R&amp;D intensity does not significantly influence absorptive capacity for intra- and inter-industry knowledge. Additionally, our results suggest that absorptive capacity is path dependent and firms can influence their ability to exploit external knowledge by encouraging individuals' involvement in a firm's innovation projects. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1423</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Tobias Schmidt</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:1:p:47-62</identifier><datestamp>2010-01-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:1:p:47-62</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>On corporate structure, strategy, and performance: a study with directed acyclic graphs and PC algorithm</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper reconsiders empirical evidence on relationships among variables related to corporate strategy, structure, and performance. Causal relationships among variables are modeled as directed acyclic graphs using PC-algorithm. Return on Assets appears to be determined by Advertising Intensity, Unrelated Diversification, R&amp;D Intensity, and Organizational Ownership Hierarchy. Debt Structure and Investor Characteristics do not cause (either directly or indirectly) return on assets. These latter two variables appear to be effects of return on assets, not causes. Results offer mixed support of the theory that structure causes strategy, which in turn causes performance. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1475</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Hogun Chong</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Mary Zey</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>David A. Bessler</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:1:p:19-31</identifier><datestamp>2010-01-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:1:p:19-31</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Identifying the best companies for leaders: does it lead to higher returns?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Since 2002, Chief Executive magazine, in conjunction with the Hay Group, has published a list of the Top 20 Companies for Leaders. In this paper, we examine the performance of those companies listed as being the best for leaders. We examine the announcement impact on share price associated with the press releases for firms included in the list and holding period returns between subsequent survey releases. While we generally do not find a significant difference in the performance of the Best Leader sample compared with either the market or the matched sample, we do find that the Best Leader sample outperforms other benchmarks on a raw and risk-adjusted basis during times of high market volatility. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1468</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Greg Filbeck</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Raymond F. Gorman</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Xin Zhao</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:5:p:281-305</identifier><datestamp>2009-07-16</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:5:p:281-305</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Reducing estimation risk in optimal portfolio selection when short sales are allowed</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The issue of estimation risk is of particular interest to the decision-making processes of portfolio managers who use long-short investment strategies. Accordingly, our paper explores the question of whether a VaR constraint reduces estimation risk when short sales are allowed. We find that such a constraint notably decreases errors in estimates of the expected return, standard deviation, and VaR of optimal portfolios. Furthermore, optimal portfolios in the presence of the constraint are substantially closer to the 'true' efficient frontier than those in its absence. Finally, we provide VaR bounds and confidence levels for the constraint that lead to the best out-of-sample performance. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1451</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Gordon J. Alexander</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Alexandre M. Baptista</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Shu Yan</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:5:p:335-350</identifier><datestamp>2009-07-16</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:5:p:335-350</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>R&amp;D investment as a signal in corporate takeovers</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects that takeover threats have on firms' preacquisition R&amp;D intensity. Critics of takeovers usually argue that takeover threats may reduce target firms' R&amp;D investments. However, I find that target firms may increase R&amp;D investment in order to signal their compatibility with the acquiring firm. The identity of the acquired firm depends on the market size and target firms' efficiency and compatibility. Through R&amp;D investments, target firms may affect this result, signaling potential outsiders the kind of competition they may face, and forcing them to accept lower takeover offers. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1456</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>M. Pilar Socorro</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:5:p:325-333</identifier><datestamp>2009-07-16</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:5:p:325-333</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly: price competition with managerial delegation</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We introduce a managerial delegation contract into the mixed duopoly model and examine its influence on price setting in a mixed duopoly in the context of the endogenous-timing problem. We obtain the result that owners of a public and a private firm prefer to delay the setting of the prices of their products as much as possible. Thus, in equilibrium, the firms choose their prices simultaneously in the latter stage of the game. This is in contrast to the findings of the entrepreneurial case, according to which firms choose prices simultaneously in the former stage. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1455</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Yasuhiko Nakamura</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Tomohiro Inoue</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:5:p:307-324</identifier><datestamp>2009-07-16</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:5:p:307-324</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Improving performance through vertical disintegration: evidence from UK manufacturing firms</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Unlike previous work on the vertical integration-performance relationship, we investigate the performance consequences of vertical disintegration. We offer a theoretical justification for the disintegration decision and we condition the disintegration effect on performance on the initial degree of firm integration, the timing and the direction of disintegration. Using a sample of UK manufacturing firms and controlling for disintegration endogeneity, we find that disintegration eventually results in improved operating performance, particularly when disintegration occurs as a reaction to poor performance and in cases of forward between-sector disintegration. However, being highly integrated does not guarantee gains from disintegration. The implications of these findings are discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1452</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Panos Desyllas</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:42-43</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:42-43</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Data sources for managerial economists</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Most people think they know what market research is, and generally have a picture of a girl with a clip-board asking about voting intentions. In fact, the term ‘market research’ covers a widely varied family of activities, using different techniques to achieve different purposes. This paper describes the various combinations of research types into which a survey can fall (large sample/small sample, quantitative/qualitative, industrial/consumer, etc.) and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the different methodologies. It then provides information about the size and structure of the market research industry in the United Kingdom.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010108</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Harold Lind</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:132-137</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:132-137</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Why should firms manufacture retailer brands?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>For firms manufacturing convenience goods there are three branding policies available, a proprietory brand policy, a retailer brand policy and a mixed brand policy. A firm's choice depends on differences in demand and promotion costs between the proprietory and retailer brand markets. This can be analysed using a simple elaboration of the standard 3rd degree price discrimination model. But if the two markets are not independent over the long-term there may be other consequences of following the optimization rules of the model. If retailers develop consumers' preference for their own shops and their own brands, the demand advantage enjoyed by manufacturers' brands may be reduced further. The more willing are manufacturers to supply retailer brands, the more retailers win undermine the demand for manufacturers' proprietory brands.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010306</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>David Morris</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>John Nightingale</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:105-118</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:105-118</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Platform strategy of video game software in Japan, 1984–1994: theory and evidence</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper analyzes a model of platform competition in markets of system products composed of hardware and complementary software, with a specific focus on exclusive contracting. When hardware products are strongly differentiated, or when consumers value the marginal benefit of additional software variety highly, we find that, in equilibrium, hardware firms will engage in exclusive contracting of software development. This finding is strongly supported by our empirical results in the Japanese home video game industry, dominated by Nintendo from 1984 to 1994. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1521</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Masayoshi Maruyama</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Kenichi Ohkita</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:73-80</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:73-80</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The role of entry barriers in the development of the offshore supply sector in scotland</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper examines the offshore oil supply sector and shows how the entry barriers experienced by new supply firms are imposed not by other supply firms but by the oil companies. This is done to ensure product quality and reliability of service rather than the more general attention to price considerations. The range of entry barriers are discussed in relation to key characteristics of the oil industry. As a spin-off this experience appears to have generated a more responsive attitude towards technological and commercial change throughout Scottish industry.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010206</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Lyle Moar</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:46-46</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:46-46</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Financial management: An introduction, S. H. Archer, G. M. Choate and G. Racette, financial management: An introduction, Wiley, New York, 1979. £11.95</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010109</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Paul Draper</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:101-102</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:101-102</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Government controlled enterprises: International strategic and policy decisions and japan's public policy companies.: Chalmers Johnson, Japan's public policy companies, American enterprise institute, Washington, DC, 1978. 120 pp. $3.75</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010213</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Simon Coke</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:v-v</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:v-v</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>MDE editorial</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010201</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Iain H. McNicoll</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:112-116</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:112-116</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The dominant firm with convex technology</dc:title>
  <dc:description>HASH(0x1009b29d0)</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010303</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Gavin C. Reid</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:47-48</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:47-48</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Operations research support methodology, Albert G. Holzman (editor), operations research support methodology, Marcel Dekker, New York, 1979. pp. 647. £6.50</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010112</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>H. P. Williams</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:28-36</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:28-36</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Resource allocation in the nationalized energy sector of the United Kingdom</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Resource allocation in the energy sector of the United Kingdom is a difficult area to plan, because demand and supply projections need to embrace both the large private sector oil industry and the public sector fuel industries. In addition, relationships between the latter are complex as they involve both competition and co-ordination. One approach to the problem has been to find common ground in the concept of marginal cost pricing, but there are practical difficulties in application. Government has encouraged the use of analytical techniques, such as corporate planning, by the fuel industries as a means of co‐ordination in areas where market mechanisms may no longer always be effective.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010106</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>D. J. Harris</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>B. C. L. Davies</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:47-47</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:47-47</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The British disease (second edition), G. C. Allen: The British disease (second edition), hobart Paper 67. Institute of economic affairs, London, 1979. pp. 94. £1.50</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010111</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Ronald Savitt</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:102-102</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:102-102</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>North sea development – experiences and challenges.: North sea development, Heyden–experiences and challenges, London, 1979. pp. xliv+230. £14.00. ISBN 0 85501 339 7</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010214</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Lyle Moar</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:100-100</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:100-100</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>North sea oil in the future.: C. Robinson and J. Morgan, North sea oil in the future, The macmillan press limited, London, 1978. pp. xvii+216. £4–95</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010210</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>I. H. McNicoll</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:100-101</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:100-101</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Energy and environment: Conflict in public policy.: Walter J. Mead, Energy and the environment: Conflict in public policy, American enterprise institute, Washington, DC, pp. 38. $2.00</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010211</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>W. Duncan Reekie</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:49-55</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:49-55</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Appraising world energy prospects</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The authors begin by outlining a multi-scenario technique for coping with future uncertainty in assessments of the business environment for energy planning. The discussion then leads to a quantification of world energy demand under two exploratory scenarios, whose results are compared with published forecasts. Analysis of the components of demand highlights the importance of the Third World. After a review of the world's fossil fuel resources, the likely effective availability of oil and other energy sources (including nuclear power and the renewables) is set against the scenario levels of energy demand. The paper ends with a summary of the implications for action in the field of energy.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010202</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>A. W. Clarke</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>T. F. Hart</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:164-166</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:164-166</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The political economy of advertising.: D. G. Tuerck (Ed.), The political economy of advertising, AEI, 1978, pp. 217. $4.75 paper, $9.75 cloth</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010314</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Gavin C Reid</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:i-ii</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:i-ii</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Mde editorial</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010301</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>W. Duncan Reekie</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:119-134</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:119-134</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Leadership and information in a single‐shot collective action game: An experimental study</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We consider a leader–follower mechanism in a collective action game, which exhibits both free riding and coordination problems. Leaders can persuade group cooperation by making a costly commitment to a project. Followers can choose to follow their leaders. The project's return can be transparent to all or only to the leaders. We show experimentally that when free riding is the dominant strategy of an informed subject, concentrating information in the hands of the leaders improves cooperation more effectively than a regime of information dispersal. The coordination problem, however, may be reduced more effectively in a regime of information dispersal. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1522</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Mana Komai</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Philip J. Grossman</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Travis Deters</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:48-48</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:48-48</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Spending advertising money, simon broadbent, spending advertising money (3rd edition), business books, london, 1979. pp. XII+381. Hardback £8.95; paperback £4.95</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010113</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>W. Duncan Reekie</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:117-122</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:117-122</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>ARRAY(0x1008482e0)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>HASH(0x1009e61d0)</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010304</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Leonard Forman</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:138-149</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:138-149</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Foreign capital inflows, domestic savings and the price of political stability in the sudan: Weisskopf revisited</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper reworks Weisskopf's estimates of the effect of foreign capital inflow on domestic savings for a later time period. The Sudan is presented as an example of a public sector dominated economy, dependent on one major export crop and politically unstable. While Weisskopf's savings function had an indication of a negative relationship between public sector savings and official foreign capital inflow, problems of collinearity between the independent variables cast doubt on its utility for analysis of economies dependent on limited primary exports. The negative relationship between public sector savings and official is explained in terms of the expansion of the state's bureaucracy and military.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010307</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>John S. Henley</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Vassilis Droucopoulos</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Mohamed A. Ibrahim</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:162-163</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:162-163</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Debtors to their profession: A history of the institute of bankers – 1879–1979.: Edwin Green, Debtors to their profession: A history of the institute of bankers – 1879–1979. Methuen, London, £7.50</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010310</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>R. N. Forbes</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:91-104</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:91-104</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Peer‐group dependence in salary benchmarking: a statistical model</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Although salary benchmarking is widely used to help set compensation, there has been a lack of attention to the statistical implications of this practice on compensation patterns of peer institutions. We adapt some empirical tools from spatial econometrics to analyze compensation decisions exhibiting peer-group dependence, and apply the methods to compensation of administrators in Texas nursing facilities. We find evidence that this leads to dependence of administrators pay on average pay of administrators in ‘peer’ facilities, defined here as those having similar outlays on nursing services. This leads to a situation where changes in facility characteristics, such as the occupancy rate and the revenue received from Medicaid and from private‐pay residents, impact compensation of own‐institution administrators as well as that of administrators from other peer facilities. Our peer‐group model appears applicable to other areas of organizational, regulatory and behavioral research and can easily be implemented using publicly available software. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1519</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Eric Blankmeyer</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>James P. LeSage</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>J. R. Stutzman</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Kris Joseph Knox</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>R. Kelley Pace</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:123-131</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:123-131</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>An econometric comparison of uk and german foreign holiday behaviour</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Econometric models which explain the generation and distribution of foreign holidays undertaken by UK and German residents are constructed and estimated. These comprise the basic model, a less constrained transformation and a modified model which incorporates supply constraints and habit persistence. Both versions of the basic model are shown to exhibit a structural break across the two sets of origin data, suggesting that habit and/or supply factors are important. The empirical findings also imply that the British regard foreign holidays as luxuries whereas Germans view them as necessities.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010305</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Stephen F. Witt</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:71-83</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:71-83</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Materiality, settlements and the FTC'S Ad substantiation program: Why wonder bread Lost No Dough</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Previous studies (e.g. by Peltzman and Mathios-Plummer) reveal powerful share‐value effects of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) actions against firms for their advertising. Curiously, however, Mathios‐Plummer finds that when the FTC announces an investigation but simultaneous settlement of the case with the advertiser, no adverse impact results, an empirical finding thus far unexplained. This article adds to the literature in two ways. First, we analyze statistically more recent cases, and show that the Mathios‐Plummer results—no impact when the FTC issues simultaneously a complaint and settlement—have been robust over time. More important, the article uses a recent FTC action, in which the accused advertiser suffered no adverse equity impact, to explain lack of impact when complaint and settlement are announced simultaneously. The article focuses empirically on the issue of materiality. Many advertising messages challenged by the FTC are not material to consumers. If not—and especially when, as in the case discussed here, the advertiser had much earlier discontinued the advertising challenged—the advertiser predictably would not suffer. Econometric evidence strongly indicates that the messages the FTC challenged were immaterial to consumers. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1501</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Richard S. Higgins</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Fred S. McChesney</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:158-161</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:158-161</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Share‐ownership schemes for employees – proposals and prospects</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Recent statutory and other developments in the United Kingdom seem to have stimulated the introduction of share-ownership schemes for employees. This article considers the merits of such schemes, and their potential role within companies. The article also points up some weaknesses in the 1978 Finance Act, and suggests the need for caution on the part of those in industry who might contemplate the introduction of share‐ownership arrangements.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010309</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>P. J. White</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:1-3</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:1-3</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Herbert simon appreciation and aspiration</dc:title>
  <dc:description>HASH(0x1009bc8c0)</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010102</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Norman C. Hunt</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:163-163</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:163-163</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Nuclear power and the energy crisis. politics and the atomic industry.: Duncan Burn, Nuclear power and the energy crisis. Politics and the atomic industry. Macmillan press, London, 1978. pp. xix + 348. £12.00</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010311</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Brian G. Main</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:12-18</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:12-18</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A model of market‐making with imperfect information</dc:title>
  <dc:description>ARRAY(0x1009b4168)</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010104</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>I. R. C. Hirst</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:150-157</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:150-157</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Lease finance in industrial markets</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Financial leasing is being used increasingly to acquire items of industrial equipment where use is more crucial than ownership. Its advantages over traditional forms of finance are straightforward and to a large degree appear to be based on the utilization of a cost advantage deriving from the fiscal system. In view of this, it might be expected that price would be a dominant marketing variable since the ‘product’ is relatively homogeneous, even though the industry structure is oligopolistic. This has been the case to a certain extent but policies of product differentiation and market segmentation have enabled firms to avoid some of the rigours of price competition.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010308</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>J. F. Lowe</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>E. J. Morgan</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>C. R. Tomkins</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:61-66</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:61-66</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Oil supply projection techniques: Past developments and future requirements</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper presents a critical assessment of the development of economic models of oil supply projection over the last two decades. The survey illustrates the fact that although most models have stressed the significance of the economic variables in the supply function, few attempts have been made to incorporate technology as a variable. Although such an approach can be justified under certain special circumstances, it is considered unsuitable as a supply forecaster in the increasingly numerous marginal fields where operations approach the technology frontier. In this connection, the latter part of the paper discusses the possibility of and problems associated with incorporating technology as a variable in the projection of supply.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010204</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Alistair Bruce</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:ix-ix</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:ix-ix</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>MDE editorial</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010101</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>W. Duncan Reekie</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Iain H. McNicoll</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Leonard Forman</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:56-60</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:56-60</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The british clearing banks and north sea financing</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This article reviews available data on North Sea financing with respect to the provision of funds for the offshore exploration and development effort of the oil companies, and for the onshore components suppliers and service companies. In particular it examines the role of the British clearing banks and the changes induced in their lending techniques and habits by the demands of the oil industry. It concludes that financial provision has been adequate and that neither the pace of oil development nor the participation of British industry in the offshore markets has suffered for lack of ready funding.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010203</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>R. G. Baird</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:91-98</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:91-98</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The impact of oil on the shetland economy</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper uses input-output analysis to measure the impact of oil supply bases and oil construction on the economy of Shetland. The output, income and employment created in each local industry by oil activities is measured. Oil industry multipliers are derived. Possible negative effects of oil on the local economy are considered. Finally, a forecast is made of the impact of oil on the Shetland economy in 1985.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010208</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>I. H. McNicoll</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:85-89</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:85-89</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The welfare costs of monopoly are larger than you think</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We show that monopoly is the parent of monopsony when an industry employs specialized resources. This means that the welfare loss from monopoly and monopolization is larger than commonly portrayed. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1511</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Dwight R. Lee</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Robert D. Tollison</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:135-139</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:2:p:135-139</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Spatial aspects of ticket scalping</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We develop a simple insurance model of the secondary market for tickets to account for some of the observed spatial patterns of prices. Beyond ticket markets the model draws attention to the existence of subtle insurance fees in market prices that may be incorrectly attributed to breakdown of the law of one price or attributed solely to a cost-based rationale. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1523</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Brian L. Goff</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Robert D. Tollison</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:164-164</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:164-164</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Issues in advertising: The economics of persuasion.: D. G. Tuerck (Ed.), Issues in advertising: The economics of persuasion, AEI, 1978, pp. 284. $5.75 paper, $10.75 cloth</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010313</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Gavin C Reid</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:99-99</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:99-99</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Energy in america's future: The choices before US.: Sam H. Schurr, Joel darmstadter, william ramsay, harry perry and milton russell. Energy in america's future: The choices before Us. resources for the future and johns hopkins university press, Washington, DC, 1979. pp. XXVI + 555. $10.95</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010209</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>W. Duncan Reekie</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:67-72</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:67-72</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>An analysis of the economic impact of north sea oil activity on the scottish economy in 1973</dc:title>
  <dc:description>There was no production of crude oil and natural gas in 1973. However, exploration and preparatory production work were well underway. The paper examines the impact within Scotland in 1973 of the expenditure required to supply these activities. The data used for the study are those contained in or associated with the 1973 Scottish Input Output tables and the analysis uses input-output techniques. The pattern of crude oil consumption within the Scottish economy in 1973 is also examined.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010205</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>H. M. Al‐Ali</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>R. Burdekin</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:81-90</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:2:p:81-90</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Factors influencing the export potential of the british offshore supplies industry</dc:title>
  <dc:description>After establishing exporting in its context as a strategic alternative in corporate planning, and explaining its apparent appropriateness given the anticipated decline in the domestic market and the supposed technological lead held by British offshore suppliers, a wide range of factors influencing the export potential of the industry are identified, emphasizing in particular that the United Kingdom's technological superiority (and its relevance with respect to exports) has in the past been exaggerated, while inept marketing continues to be a problem.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010207</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>P. Gregory</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:46-47</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:46-47</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Pricing: Making profitable decisions, Kent B. Monroe, pricing: Making profitable decisions, McGraw‐Hill, New York, 1979. pp. xv+286. £8.50</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010110</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>W. Duncan Reekie</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:103-111</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:3:p:103-111</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Returns to research and development in the us pharmaceutical industry</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Research concerning the pharmaceutical industry rate of return has concentrated on two policy issues: (1) possible resource misallocation and (2) the drug innovation environment. Accounting returns are suspect for policy purposes, requiring attention to the role of, and impact on, expectations of returns. This paper uses evidence about expectations and about resource flows into R&amp;D consistent with those expectations to infer the level of economic returns. Our results provide evidence of a decline in expected returns, with exit of firms and resources. Regulation may be one of the major causes of the adverse shift in prospective returns from R&amp;D investments.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010302</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>John R. Virts</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>J. Fred Weston</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:37-41</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:37-41</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Economic misconceptions in the pharmaceutical industry</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The pharmaceutical industry has failed to defend itself effectively against criticisms of its economic behaviour, because it has largely failed to understand the factors affecting its own economic structure. These concern the importance of competitive research and pricing, and the need to protect and nurture the fruits of its innovation by the use of patents, brand names and sales promotion. There is still need for a better understanding of the importance of these factors both outside the industry and amongst its own staff, if its contribution to modern medical technology is not to be stifled by irrational criticisms and controls.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010107</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>George Teeling‐Smith</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:4-11</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:4-11</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Models of changes in managerial salaries in five economies</dc:title>
  <dc:description>International comparisons of many kinds are hindered by the lack of data that are consistent between countries. This has been the case particularly with comparisons of managerial remuneration and, along with the lack of consistent data, there has been no satisfactory theory of differentials in managerial remuneration either in absolute terms for example, as between a given-status manager in, say, Canada and the UK – or in relative terms ‐ for example, the differential between two managers of different status in each country. This article uses some recently published, and expensively gathered, data on managerial remuneration in five countries with the purpose of extending the usage of the data, which were published more or less merely as information, and introducing some tentative steps towards a better understanding of absolute and relative differences in managerial salaries.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010103</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Gerald D. Newbould</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>John R. Sparkes</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:19-27</identifier><datestamp>2011-02-24</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:1:p:19-27</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The crumbling of apartheid: An application of managerial economics</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The thesis of this examination of Apartheid in the Republic of South Africa is that the sophistication of capital structure, whether viewed macro-economically or at the level of the firm, passes nigh‐irrestible power to even unorganized workers. This non‐Marxist social system model is empirically substantiated by South African economic history but, more particularly, from managerial decisions in respect of the production function – especially in the critical gold‐mining industry – over time. This leads to the logical conclusion that the dynamic intensification of foreign capital investment in the Republic alone can end that country's system of Apartheid.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010105</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Ralph Horwitz</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:4:p:249-261</identifier><datestamp>2010-05-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:4:p:249-261</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Principal-principal-agency relationships and the role of external governance</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper explores agency problems associated with mutual and joint stock organizational forms. It examines whether the independent mode of distribution acts as a governance factor that reduces principal-agent and principal-principal costs. By analyzing a 1990-1997 panel of life insurance companies this paper provides evidence that mutuals have higher principal-agent costs, but lower principal-principal costs, compared with stocks. Independent distribution mitigates both agency problems by reducing managerial expenses while safeguarding interests of policyholders. These relationships are positively moderated by product complexity and free cash flow. This is consistent with the assumption that companies that use independent agents exhibit lower levels of manager and shareholder opportunism. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1473</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Damian Ward</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Igor Filatotchev</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:4:p:263-276</identifier><datestamp>2010-05-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:4:p:263-276</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Discriminatory input pricing and strategic delegation</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper examines how discriminatory input pricing by an upstream monopolist affects the incentives that owners of downstream duopolists offer their managers. Regardless of the mode of competition (quantity or price), owners of downstream firms induce their managers to be more profit-oriented and to behave less aggressively when the monopolist is allowed to price-discriminate than when he charges a uniform price. If the monopolist price-discriminates, managerial downstream firms always earn more than owner-managed profit-maximizing firms. However, if the monopolist charges a uniform price, managerial downstream firms earn more than profit-maximizing counterparts under price competition and earn less under quantity competition. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1476</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Pei-Cheng Liao</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
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<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:4:p:277-301</identifier><datestamp>2010-05-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:4:p:277-301</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Evidence on competitive advantage and superior stock market performance</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This article analyzes the value-relevance of industry-based and resource-based competitive advantage in a large sample of firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. We measure competitive advantage by a single variable and perform a new decomposition into its underlying sources. In 1986-2005, the industry-based and the resource-based competitive advantage explain more than 20% of abnormal stock market returns, accumulated over 5 years. The resource-based advantage is almost 4 times more important than the industry-based advantage. Differences in both the return and the risk capability of firms' net assets relative to their industry peers are significant parts of the resource-based advantage, estimated at 60 and 40%, respectively. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1488</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Øystein Gjerde</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Kjell Knivsflå</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Frode Sættem</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:4:p:303-310</identifier><datestamp>2010-05-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:31:y:2010:i:4:p:303-310</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Managerial optimism and investment choice</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper analyzes whether it might be desirable for a firm to hire an overoptimistic manager to commit to a certain R&amp;D strategy. I consider a Cournot model with an ex-ante R&amp;D stage where firms can invest in cost reduction before product market competition takes place. I show that firms want to hire overoptimistic managers and argue that a manager's type may serve as a substitute for strategic delegation via contracts. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1498</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Florian Englmaier</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:213-214</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:213-214</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Profits, Politics and drugs.: W. Duncan Reekie and Michael H. Weber, Profits, Politics and drugs, Macmillan, London, 1979. pp. x + 190. £12.00</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010414</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>S. Young</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:209-210</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:209-210</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Book Review: economic regulation of prescription drugs</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010410</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Leonard G. Schifrin</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:214-214</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:214-214</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Issues in pharmaceutical economics.: Robert L. Chita (editor), issues in pharmaceutical economics, Lexington books, D. C. heath and company, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1979</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010415</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>W. Guy Scott</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:3:p:193-204</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:3:p:193-204</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The speed of human capital formation in the baseball industry: the information value of minor‐league performance in predicting major‐league performance</dc:title>
  <dc:description>ARRAY(0x1009b2290)</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1526</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Neil Longley</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Glenn Wong</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:184-196</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:184-196</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The drug regulation reform act of 1978: Putting some economic issues into different contexts</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010405</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>William W. Vodra</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:3:p:175-191</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:3:p:175-191</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Managerial economics and operating beta</dc:title>
  <dc:description>HASH(0x1009c1248)</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1525</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Thomas J. O'Brien</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:201-203</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:201-203</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The impact of the 1962 drug amendments on the research process</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010407</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Richard E. Faust</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:3:p:205-213</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:3:p:205-213</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A preliminary exploration of the effects of rational factors and behavioral biases on the managerial choice to invest in corporate responsibility</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We explore a possible decision-making process in which mixes of rational and non‐rational factors affect the choice made by a firm's management to invest in corporate responsibility. We propose that the rational factors affecting the decision‐makers' investment choice are: (a) moral choice; (b) risk management; (c) consequential changes that would be required in corporate structure or production processes; and (d) long‐term versus short‐term considerations. The non‐rational behavioral biases that we suggest affecting the decision‐makers' investment choice are: (a) attitude to risk, (b) status quo bias, (c) subjective discounting, and (d) myopic loss‐aversion. Copyright (C) 2011 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1530</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Tal Shavit</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Avshalom M. Adam</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:197-200</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:197-200</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>On estimating the economic impact of regulations: A case study on trade secrets disclosure</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010406</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Fay H. Dworkin</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:167-171</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:167-171</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Some recent economic studies bearing on public policy toward civilian technology</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010402</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Edwin Mansfield</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:204-206</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:204-206</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The maximum allowable cost program</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010408</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Raymond A. Gosselin</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:179-183</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:179-183</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Measures for social rate of returns from pharmaceutical innovations</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010404</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>S. Y. Wu</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:172-178</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:172-178</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Returns to drug industry common stocks: An alternative measure of economic profitability</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010403</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Robert I. Chien</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Roger B. Upson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:i-ii</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:i-ii</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>MDE editorial</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010401</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Robert I. Chien</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:3:p:141-158</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:3:p:141-158</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Transaction cost economics and corporate governance: the case of CEO age and financial stake</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Agency theory provides a valuable lens for understanding the role and importance of many varied governance mechanisms. We argue that transaction cost economics (TCE) provides a complementary theoretical lens for studying corporate governance because it illuminates the various contingencies that moderate the importance of alternative governance mechanisms. Using agency theory, we argue and find evidence that the confluence of advancing CEO age and large CEO stock holdings will cause the CEO to become overly risk-averse. Moreover, we use TCE to more fully explicate the ensuing performance consequences as well as the contextual factors that critically moderate this relationship. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1520</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Patrick L. McClelland</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jonathan P. O'Brien</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:207-208</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:207-208</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Comment on Grabowski and Vernon, and on Jadlow</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010409</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Peter Temin</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:211-211</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:211-211</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Medicines for the year 2000.: George Teeling‐Smith and Nicholas Wells (editors), Medicines for the year 2000, Office of health economics, London, 1979. £8.00</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010411</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>John M. Vernon</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:3:p:159-173</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:32:y:2011:i:3:p:159-173</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The impacts of hospital alliance membership, alliance size, and repealing certificate of need regulation, on the cost efficiency of non‐profit hospitals</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper investigates how alliance membership, size of the alliance, membership in multiple organizations, repealing certificate of need (CON) regulation for acute care facilities, and other factors, impacts hospital cost efficiency. Using a 1996–1999 panel of 144 urban US Midwestern hospitals, empirical results show that repealing state CON programs, signing more HMO and PPO contracts, and membership in only an alliance, helped to enhance cost efficiency. Membership in an additional organization (network, system) did not help enhance hospital cost efficiency. Membership in a larger size alliance (more hospitals in the alliance) contributed to an improvement in cost efficiency. Copyright (C) 2010 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1524</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Gerald Granderson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:212-212</identifier><datestamp>2011-04-07</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:1:y:1980:i:4:p:212-212</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Steuerung im Gesundheitssystem: Systemanalyse der Arzneimittelversorgung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.: Dietrich Nord, Steuerung im Gesundheitssystem: Systemanalyse der Arzneimittelvenorgnng in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Regulation in the health system: Systems analysis of drag provision in the Federal Republic of Germany), Medizinisch Pharmazeutische Studiengesellschaft, Frankfurt/Main, 1979</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.4090010413</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Ulrich Stumpf</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:4:p:249-257</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:4:p:249-257</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Duality, income and substitution effects for the competitive firm under price uncertainty</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper uses duality theory to decompose the total effect on the competitive firm's output of an increase in the riskiness of output price into income and substitution effects. Properties of preferences that control the sign of each effect are identified. The analysis extends to the general class of quasi-linear decision models in which the payoff is linear in the random variable. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1217</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Carmen F. Menezes</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>X. Henry Wang</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:6:p:579-589</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:6:p:579-589</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Production, inventory and waiting time</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper, I introduce the idea of adjusting waiting time as an alternative to price adjustment in order to study the relationship between waiting time, demand, profits and inventories. In the model, demand depends on both price and waiting time. Consumers are willing to pay more if they do not have to wait long. I derive the conditions under which a monopoly may profit from utilizing the option of holding inventory by changing the waiting time facing the consumers. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1328</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Gil S. Epstein</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:3:p:151-161</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:3:p:151-161</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Learning from input-output mixes in DEA: a proportional measure for slack-based efficient projections</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Several Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models use a radial distance measure that is based on the Debreu-Farrell notion of (in)efficiency. While this measure has an attractive interpretation, its use may be problematic if slacks or zeros are present in the data. The additive DEA model can perfectly deal with these problems, but the meaning of its associated scores is less intuitive than the one attached to the radial measures. We introduce an alternative efficiency measure, based on the results of the additive model, that can be decomposed in a Debreu-Farrell component and a factor that captures differences in input-output mixes with respect to those of the best practice reference observation. On an aggregate level, this second component can be considered as an indicator of the dispersion between radial efficiency measurement and results based on the Pareto-Koopmans efficiency notion. On the individual level, the measure allows us to regard relative inefficiency as resulting from (i) a divergence of implicit cost price vectors, and (ii) a cost level that is too high, even after adjustment for the implicit cost prices. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Laurens Cherchye</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Tom Van Puyenbroeck</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:6:p:299-313</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:6:p:299-313</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The effects of ownership concentration on investment and performance in privatized firms in Russia</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper provides new survey evidence on effects of concentrated ownership on restructuring and performance in privatized firms in Russia. The major findings are that large-block shareholding is negatively associated with the firm's investment and performance, and this relationship does not depend on the identity of controlling shareholders. These results are consistent with the assumption that when minority shareholders' rights are not adequately protected, the entrenched controlling shareholders may be engaged in extracting 'control premium' before pro rata distribution of dividends. The issues raised have relevance to other transitional economies where the privatization process has been followed by an increase in ownership concentration. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1008</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Igor Filatotchev</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Rostislav Kapelyushnikov</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Natalya Dyomina</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Sergey Aukutsionek</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:457-466</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:457-466</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The bioeconomic causes of war</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Wars are fought not only for material goals but for intangible ends such as honor and prestige. In biological terms the ultimate functional motives for fighting are food and sex, the essential elements of reproductive success. Like many other animals, humans seek food and sex directly, but also indirectly via dominance and prestige. In modern times the direct food and sex motives for warfare have waned. But, although largely disconnected from reproductive success, intangible goals such as prestige, dominance, and respect-amplified by the 'affiliative instinct'-remain with us as continuing causes of war. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Jack Hirshleifer</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:2-3:p:171-185</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:2-3:p:171-185</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Interaction between public research organizations and industry in biotechnology</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper summarizes the most important findings of the literature on the close interaction between public research organizations and industry in biotechnology. The first question deals with why researchers in academic organizations were and are still important players in the biotechnology industry. Three arguments explain why biotechnology emerged as an organization network: its origins in academic research, the impact of participation in networks on competitiveness and the weight of these networks on R&amp;D intensity and innovation. The second focuses on the factors that explain the regional concentration of such interactions and of biotechnology firms. The paper concludes with a discussion of policy implications. The dynamic of biotechnology is rather unique and can be attributed to the specific institutional arrangements characterizing the American scientific system. Its replication to other sectors or countries seems rather difficult. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1082</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Masao Nakamura</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Robert Dalpé</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:2-3:p:217-233</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:2-3:p:217-233</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Balancing cooperation and competition in human groups: the role of emotional algorithms and evolution</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We examine emotional algorithms and their role in a fundamental dilemma that confronts human groups-whether actors should take care of 'me' (compete) or take care of 'we' (cooperate). We argue that human emotions, triggered in algorithmic fashion through four common, although culturally specified, mechanisms, powerfully direct humans to compete or cooperate. Drawing on evolutionary psychology, we first define and characterize these hard-wired emotional algorithms, presenting evidence for their independent influence. Their regulatory influence on human groups, however, can only be appreciated once we examine them as a system. We show how, as a system, these algorithms help explain the dynamic balance that members of human groups can (and often must) achieve between competition and cooperation. We derive three propositions regarding how these algorithms play out in groups. We suggest that understanding these dynamics can help leaders better manage cooperation and competition in organizational groups. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1294</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Christoph H. Loch</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>D. Charles Galunic</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Susan Schneider</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:719-729</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:719-729</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Investor self-selection: evidence from a mutual fund survey</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Using survey data on a random sample of 2000 mutual fund investors, we classify investors by their level of financial literacy and their place of mutual fund purchase. After using a probit model to separately estimate the determinants of an investor's choice of distribution channel and level of financial literacy, a bivariate probit model that jointly endogenizes an investor's level of financial literacy and choice of distribution channel is estimated. Strong evidence that an investor's level of financial literacy and choice of distribution channel are jointly determined is found. Thus, the hypothesis put forth in this paper, that investors self-select into different distribution channels based on their overall level of financial literacy, is supported by the data. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Gordon J. Alexander</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jonathan D. Jones</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Peter J. Nigro</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:2:p:109-120</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:2:p:109-120</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Motivating long-term employment contracts: risk management in major league baseball</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Long-term employment contracts have typically been modeled as mechanisms whereby workers reduce the risk of lost income with a guaranteed long-term wage that is less than the expected spot wage. Examination of contract length among major league baseball players shows that long-term contracts for marginal players, those for whom it would seem most logical to desire this insurance, are rarely observed. Star players, whose income levels should enable them to purchase this sort of insurance from other sources, represent the majority of long-term contract holders. This paper presents a theoretical model showing that firms, when facing both market uncertainty and uncertainty about an employee's future productivity, have an incentive to reallocate risk with long-term labor contracts. In such cases, a long-term contract may be observed without a risk premium paid by the worker. The labor markets of professional sports represent this combination of market and productive uncertainty. Empirical results from major league baseball using a binary choice probit model, which corrects for sample selection bias, support the hypothesis that factors, which increase market uncertainty and reduce productive uncertainty, are consistent with the observation of long-term contracts. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1112</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Joel Maxcy</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:57-66</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:57-66</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Edith Penrose's contribution to economics and strategy: an overview</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The motivation behind this special issue of Managerial and Decision Economics was two-fold: First, the special issue offered the opportunity to re-consider the huge contribution of Edith Penrose to the fields of strategy and economics. Second, it allowed us to present new research from both perspectives on the process of firm growth, an area pioneered by Penrose. In this introduction we discuss the contributions to the special issue in the context of Edith Penrose's life and work. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1216</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Steve Thompson</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Mike Wright</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:7:p:413-419</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:7:p:413-419</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The impact of institutions on entrepreneurial activity</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper presents an empirical analysis of the factors which promote entrepreneurial activity across a number of transition, developing and developed countries. It produces results which highlight the importance of institutions in promoting entrepreneurial activity. This work is part of an on-going research project on the relationship between the legal system and factors which influence economic development. In particular, it has been shown that legal rules protecting creditors and investors influence the size of financial markets which in turn influence economic development. Our paper thus extends the analysis of the impact of institutions beyond that previously established to demonstrate its influence on another driver of economic development. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1254</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Frank H. Stephen</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>David Urbano</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Stefan van Hemmen</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:1:p:63-64</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:1:p:63-64</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Book review: Money for nothing: politicians, rent extraction, and political extortion, by McChesney, F.S., Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1997</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>J. High</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:519-528</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:519-528</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Protection of minority interest and the development of security markets</dc:title>
  <dc:description>While excessive regulation is an obstacle to the development of financial markets, we argue that lack of basic rules or poorly enforced regulation may explain the relative importance across countries of banking and security markets in financing firms. A selective or arbitrary enforcement transforms legal rules into an exclusionary good; arm's length market exchanges become unreliable. As a result, transactions tend to become intermediated through institutions or concentrated among agents bound by some form of private enforcement. Provision of funding shifts from risk capital to debt, and from markets to institutions with long term relations. &lt;P&gt;Securities, as standardized arm's length contractual relationships, are most vulnerable to poor enforcement. We show that when small investors' rights are poorly protected, the ability of firms to raise equity capital is impaired, and as a result, profitable new ventures will be forsaken. This suggests a conflict of interest over regulatory standards between the controlling shareholders in listed firms and new entrepreneurs. More generally, fewer firms will be financed with outside equity, resulting in a low capitalization relative to GNP and a predominance of internal (unlisted) equity and bank lending over traded securities.

We present some supporting evidence on the correlation between investor protection and development of security markets. We rely on a price measure, the premium on voting stock, which is related to the control premium. In countries where this premium is large, corporate financing is dominated by bank lending and equity markets are much smaller. Although the sample size is limited, the correlation is quite strong. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Franco Modigliani</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Enrico Perotti</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:187-207</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:187-207</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The role of irreversibilities in competitive interaction: behavioral considerations from organization theory</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Using behavioral insights from organization theory, this paper examines the significance of the irreversibility of an attacker's competitive move in interfirm competitive interaction. The study suggested that irreversibility is a multifaceted construct that is broadly composed of two dimensions: internal commitment (which is based on organizational inertia) and public commitment (which is based on the degree of publicity or public exposure received). It hypothesized that these two irreversibilities would have opposite effects on competitors' responses. The hypotheses were tested with data on competitive moves and countermoves exchanged by major US airlines. As predicted, the results reveal that internal commitment tended to reduce the likelihood of response, increased the response delay, and decreased the probability that the initial move will be matched; on the contrary, the impacts of public commitment were exactly the opposite. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1061</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Ming-Jer Chen</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>S. Venkataraman</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Sylvia Sloan Black</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ian C. MacMillan</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:4:p:205-208</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:4:p:205-208</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Winning at craps: Are casinos vulnerable to state suits for social costs?-A preliminary analysis</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Assume that Lucky has flown to the state of Nitro from his home state of Peach intending to gamble and lose perhaps two to three hundred dollars but instead has lost $50,000. This triggers the loss of his car, house, job, and eventually his wife. What issues are involved for the state of Peach? Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1176</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Frank J. Vandall</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:5:p:239-240</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:5:p:239-240</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Managerial and Decision Economics: a UK Special Issue</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Antony W. Dnes</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:4:p:329-334</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:4:p:329-334</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Efficient Intertemporal Utility Pricing under Uncertainty</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Electric utilities today face increasing competition from substitutes for utility-generated power. As a result, utilities are being forced to reevaluate their pricing policies to address competition from other fuels and potential customer 'bypass' of the utility. This paper extends the analysis of second-best utility pricing to explicitly account for both the short- and long-run price responses of customers with competitive alternatives to utility-generated power. The presence of long-run substitution opportunities reduces the optimal percentage mark-up of price over marginal cost for noncore customers. Uncertainty concerning the substitution response of noncore electricity customers also tends to reduce the optimal price mark-up. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>L. Dean Hiebert</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:639-647</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:639-647</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Price rigidity and flexibility: new empirical evidence</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The marketplace, along with its price system, is the single most important institution in a western-style free enterprise economy. The ability of prices to adjust to changes in supply and demand conditions enables the market to function efficiently, and that ability lies behind the magical invisible hand mechanism. The behaviour of prices and in particular the ability of prices to adjust to changes in market conditions, therefore, have fundamental implications for many key issues in many areas of both microeconomics as well as macroeconomics. It is, therefore, critical to study and understand whether there are barriers to price adjustments, what are the nature of these barriers, how the barriers lead to price rigidity, what are the possible implications of these rigidities, etc. This introductory essay briefly summarizes the 14 empirical studies of price rigidity that are included in this special issue. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1384</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Daniel Levy</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:2-3:p:103-129</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:2-3:p:103-129</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Cognitive adaptations for n-person exchange: the evolutionary roots of organizational behavior</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Organizations are composed of stable, predominantly cooperative interactions or n-person exchanges. Humans have been engaging in n-person exchanges for a great enough period of evolutionary time that we appear to have evolved a distinct constellation of species-typical mechanisms specialized to solve the adaptive problems posed by this form of social interaction. These mechanisms appear to have been evolutionarily elaborated out of the cognitive infrastructure that initially evolved for dyadic exchange. Key adaptive problems that these mechanisms are designed to solve include coordination among individuals, and defense against exploitation by free riders. Multi-individual cooperation could not have been maintained over evolutionary time if free riders reliably benefited more than contributors to collective enterprises, and so outcompeted them. As a result, humans evolved mechanisms that implement an aversion to exploitation by free riding, and a strategy of conditional cooperation, supplemented by punitive sentiment towards free riders. Because of the design of these mechanisms, how free riding is treated is a central determinant of the survival and health of cooperative organizations. The mapping of the evolved psychology of n-party exchange cooperation may contribute to the construction of a principled theoretical foundation for the understanding of human behavior in organizations. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1287</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>John Tooby</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Leda Cosmides</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Michael E. Price</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:7:p:555-563</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:7:p:555-563</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Product design rivalry: multiple-attributes approach to differentiation</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper studies product design competition between potentially symmetric firms. We specifically employ the multiple-attributes approach as the method of product design. While various product-specific attributes contribute to firms' differentiation, they may cause confusion resulting in consumer dissatisfaction. We show that in the presence of these opposite effects and any setup costs for attributes, the differentiation by multiple attributes is beneficial for firms if, and only if they are moderately competitive. We furthermore show that the socially efficient number of attributes can only be sustained when there are not very many firms and the setup cost is low. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1418</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Nobuo Matsubayashi</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:2:p:99-106</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:2:p:99-106</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>On contracting for uncertain R&amp;D</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Using a two-stage model, this paper studies auctions of research and development (R&amp;D) contracts when the outcome of research is uncertain. The agent is contracted by the principal to invent a new product or a new process. The principal selects the most capable agent through an auction and writes an incentive contract with the winning agent to share risks. The main finding of the paper is that the generally superior incentive contracts might not be desirable under plausible conditions in R&amp;D contracting. In particular, we find that the principal prefers a cost-plus contract in cases of large R&amp;D projects or rising innovation benefits, but would prefer a fixed-price contract when the number of bidders increases. An alternate elasticity interpretation of results holds promise for empirical analysis. Public policy implications are finally discussed. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Rajeev K. Goel</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:6:p:339-340</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:6:p:339-340</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>THE MICROECONOMICS OF MARKET FAILURES, by Salanié, B. Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2000, ix&amp;plus;224 pp., $35.00 (cloth). ISBN: 0-262-19443-0.</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1011</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Dennis Coates</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:2:p:61-62</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:2:p:61-62</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Introduction to the special issue on sports economics</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1106</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Gerald W. Scully</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:6-7:p:457-469</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:6-7:p:457-469</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The product differentiation hypothesis for corporate trade credit</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The product differentiation hypothesis for trade credit says that business managers use trade credit like advertising to differentiate their products. Prior studies of this hypothesis conclude that higher profit margins induce firms to increase trade credit and vice versa. We better represent the relation between the cost of bad debts and the price of the product offered on credit. When prices are higher, firms suffer greater losses from non-payment. Our model shows that, contrary to early versions of the product differentiation hypothesis, when managers adjust trade credit and profit margins for a perturbation in marginal cost, optimal profit margin and trade credit may move in opposite directions. A manager maintains revenue for price elastic demand by moderating the price increase, which decreases profit margin. At the same time, the manager also increases trade credit, which serves to maintain revenue by encouraging product demand. We report evidence of a negative relation between corporate receivables and profit margin. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1113</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>George W. Blazenko</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Kirk Vandezande</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:3:p:191-207</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:3:p:191-207</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Pricing training and development programs using stochastic CVP analysis</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper sets forth, analyzes and applies a stochastic cost-volume-profit (CVP) model specifically geared toward the determination of enrollment fees for training and development (T&amp;plus;D) programs. It is a simpler model than many of those developed in the research literature, but it does incorporate one advanced component: an 'economic' demand function relating the expected sales level to price. Price is neither a constant nor a random variable in this model but rather the decision-maker's basic control variable. The simplicity of the model permits analytical solutions for five 'special prices': (1) the highest price which sets breakeven probability equal to a minimum acceptable level; (2) the price which maximizes expected profits; (3) the price which maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function based on expected profits and breakeven probability; (4) the price which maximizes breakeven probability; and (5) the lowest price which sets breakeven probability equal to a minimum acceptable level. The model is applied to data provided by the Center for Management and Professional Development at the authors' university. The results suggest that there could be a significant payoff to fine-tuning a T&amp;plus;D provider's pricing strategy using formal analysis. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1204</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>James A. Yunker</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Dale Schofield</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:285-291</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:285-291</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Commentary</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The three papers by Scherer (2007), Berndt et al. (2007), and Reiffen and Ward (2007) in this issue cover disparate topics, but together they manage to encompass much of what is important during a drug's lifecycle. Scherer's paper examines pharmaceutical industry R&amp;D productivity and efficacy and safety testing during a new drug's development, Berndt, Danzon and Kruse investigate cross-national data on utilization, pricing, promotion, and diffusion of brand name drugs after they have been developed for marketing approval, and Reiffen and Ward explore generic competition once a new drug loses patent protection. They add much to our understanding of these topics. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1341</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Joseph A. DiMasi</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:8:p:609-618</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:8:p:609-618</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Ability and specialization among economic researchers</dc:title>
  <dc:description>It is not obvious whether a firm's more talented workers should be more specialized, and in fact, the relationship between ability and specialization seems to differ across industries. In this paper, I examine the case of knowledge production in economic research, and find that abler economists tend to publish more general research. This result suggests substitutability between general and specialized skill in research. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1424</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Todd D. Kendall</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:2:p:63-70</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:2:p:63-70</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Performance evaluation of National Football League teams</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Most recent empirical analyses of production in the sports economic literature have focused on Major League Baseball. This paper extends that literature by analysing football production in the National Football League (NFL). Using the Poisson regression model, we measure the performance of NFL teams and head coaches. The measure is based on a production process where player skills are converted into games won. The evidence reveals that quality coaching is an important component in the production process. It appears that efficient coaching can account for an additional three to four victories in a given season. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Lawrence Hadley</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Marc Poitras</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>John Ruggiero</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Scott Knowles</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:5:p:207-207</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:5:p:207-207</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Inventory control, by Axsater, S. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, 202 pp., $95.00 (cloth).</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.968</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Bahram Alidaee</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:1:p:48-49</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:1:p:48-49</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The Economics of Sports, by Leeds, M. and von Allmen, P., Boston: Addison-Wesley, 2002, xviii &amp;plus;446 pp., $88.00 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1043</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Brian Goff</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:319-331</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:319-331</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The measurement of marketing efficiency in the presence of spillovers: theory and evidence</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We develop a model of marketing efficiency based on a directional distance function that allows for marketing spillovers. A parametric model is used to test for spillovers from rival marketing and from a firm's marketing activity of its other related products. We then show how this information can be incorporated into a non-parametric model and used to estimate marketing inefficiency. We apply brand level data from the US brewing industry to the non-parametric model to determine the effectiveness of television, radio, and print advertising. We find that advertising spillovers are important in brewing and show that efficiency estimates are inaccurate when spillover effects are ignored. Our results also suggest that marketing efficiency may be an important component to firm success in brewing, a result that may apply to other consumer goods industries. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1262</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Michael Vardanyan</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Victor J. Tremblay</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:1:p:55-56</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:1:p:55-56</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The half-life of policy rationales: how new technology affects old policy issues, edited by Foldvary, F. E. and Klein, D. B. A Cato Institute Book, New York and London: New York University Press, 2003, ix &amp;plus; 276 pp., USD 60.00 (cloth); 20.00 (paper)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1139</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Noel D. Campbell</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:2:p:89-90</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:2:p:89-90</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Employees and Corporate Governance, edited by Blair, M.M. and Roe, M.J. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999, v&amp;plus;362 pp., $39.95 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Charles R. Knoeber</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:7:p:399-410</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:7:p:399-410</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Decision theory and real estate investment: an analysis of the decision-making processes of real estate investment fund managers</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Decision theory is the study of models of judgement involved in, and leading to, deliberate and (usually) rational choice. In real estate investment, there are models for the pricing and allocation of assets. These asset allocation models suggest an optimum allocation between the respective asset classes based on retrospective judgements of performance and risk. The representation and role of real estate in a multi-asset portfolio has, historically, been viewed in the context of portfolio theory. Real estate is selected, as other assets, on the basis of some criteria, e.g. commonly, its marginal contribution to the production of a mean-variance efficient multi-asset portfolio, subject to the investor's objectives and capital rationing constraints. However, decisions are made relative to current expectations and current business constraints. Whilst a decision-maker may believe in the required optimum exposure levels, as dictated by an asset allocation model, the final decision may|will be influenced by factors outside the parameters of the mathematical model. The focus of decision theory is on the mathematical models. These may be probability based, loss functions, or other forms of statistical representations of judgements. Yet, much of decision theory does not lie entirely within any one discipline: it draws upon psychology, economics, mathematics, statistics, social sciences and many other areas of study. This paper discusses investors' perceptions and attitudes towards real estate, and highlights the important difference between theoretical exposure levels and pragmatic business considerations. The lynchpin in the decision-making process is how investors perceive risk. The concept of risk plays a central role in various kinds of decision problems under uncertainty. It is possible that the definition of risk within an asset allocation model, where risk is equated with the uncertainty of achieving a specific required return, sits uncomfortably with the definition of risk used by the decision-maker, where risk may equate to the consequence of not matching the performance of the competitors. In this paper, the author discusses the behavioural aspects of the decision-making process for UK pension funds in their asset allocation role, and relates the various decision-making models to the that process. Whilst the apparent question being asked is 'how much should they invest in real estate?', the answer achieved must be viewed in the context of what is pragmatically possible, or institutionally acceptable, with the constraints of business risk considerations. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1029</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Nick French</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:6:p:327-332</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:6:p:327-332</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>An agency analysis of church-pastor relations</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Incentives are critical to the study of economics. But do they work in non-traditional economic settings, such as religious organizations, in a manner consistent with economic theory? This study considers the agency relationship between churches and their clergy. This paper contends that pastor compensation is not typically tied directly to performance, but rather indirectly through promotion tournaments. Pastors whose performance is recognized as being exceptional are rewarded by being called to larger, more prestigious congregations. Given the difficulty of observing and measuring pastor performance this represents a sensible solution to the church-pastor principal-agent problem. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1030</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Charles Zech</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:2:p:87-97</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:2:p:87-97</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Investment decisions and managerial compensation design in the presence of product market rivalry</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We consider an economy where firms operate in an imperfectly competitive industry and mutually affect each others' investment opportunities. Each firm is assumed to face a mutually exclusive choice of investing in either a short- or a long-term project. For example, firm i's commitment to a short-term project cuts into firm j's market in the short-term but frees-up firm j's long-term market, and vice versa. Our results show that, even in the absence of an owner-manager conflict, the owner anticipates the product market rivalry and optimally compensates their managers with short- as well as long-term compensation. Although the optimal compensation design induces myopic investment decisions, it is shown to be in the owners' best interest. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Gregory E. Goering</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>T. Harikumar</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:8:p:499-512</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:8:p:499-512</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Strategic managerial incentives under adverse selection</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We extend the strategic contract model where the owner designs incentive schemes for her manager before the latter takes output decisions. Firstly, we introduce private knowledge regarding costs within each owner-manager pair. Under adverse selection, we show that delegation involves a trade-off between strategic commitment and the cost of an extra informational rent linked to decentralization. Which policies will arise in equilibrium? We introduce in the game an initial stage where owners can simultaneously choose between control and delegation. We show that if decision variables are strategic substitutes, choosing output control through a quantity-lump sum transfer contract is a dominating strategy. If decision variables are strategic complements, this policy is a dominated strategy. Further, two types of dominant-strategies equilibrium may arise: in the first type, both principals use delegation; in the second one, both principals implement delegation for a low-cost manager and output control for a high-cost one. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1237</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Michel Cavagnac</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:2:p:71-81</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:2:p:71-81</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Costs, technology and ownership of gas distribution in Italy</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper proposes an empirical study of the Italian gas distribution industry by means of long-term cost function. The analysis highlights the fact that the number of customers is more important than the amount of gas delivered in explaining the variability of distribution costs. Very low economies of scale, high economies of density, and the significant role of the morphologic and demographic variables characterize the nature of the technology. Better performance for private operators indicates that the privatization process should continue and the low degree of economies of scale confirms the benefits of having many operators (yardstick competition). Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Paola Fabbri</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Giovanni Fraquelli</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Roberto Giandrone</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:2:p:95-102</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:2:p:95-102</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Subsidies as incentive mechanisms in sports</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Applying even the most fundamental public choice principles suggests that subsidies to sports team owners will be inversely related to ticket prices. The primary aim of this paper is to demonstrate the impact of such an inverse relationship on the pricing behavior of owners. Theory shows that if either the rent or concessions|parking response by policy makers is elastic (percentage change in subsidy is greater than the percentage change in prices by teams), then the other one cannot be. A (very) cursory look at readily available NFL data lends support to the theory, at least for single-use stadiums. The outcomes here may inform any future analysis that extends the idea into the full-blown analysis of the politics of subsidies and for those interested in the rationing by waiting that often occurs at sports events. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1109</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Rodney Fort</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:301-316</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:301-316</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The impact of performance distress on aggressive competitive behavior: a reconciliation of conflicting views</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Prior research on how ex ante performance impacts competitive behavior has led to conflicting conclusions. Prospect theory, for example, suggests that poor performance promotes aggressive behavior, whereas threat-rigidity theory predicts the opposite. We attempt to reconcile these conflicting views by incorporating a contingency perspective that empirically tests, specifically, how top management team heterogeneity and a favorable industry context moderate the relationship between poor performance and competitive aggressiveness. Our findings suggest that performance-distressed firms managed by heterogeneous top management teams are less likely to compete aggressively. However, contrary to predictions, performance-distressed firms competing in competition-buffered industries are more likely to compete aggressively. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1067</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Walter J. Ferrier</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Cormac Mac Fhionnlaoich</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ken G. Smith</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Curtis M. Grimm</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:4:p:217-227</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:4:p:217-227</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>'Stick to the knitting' vs. 'the mysteriously potent charm of diversification': the Greek evidence</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper provides evidence on the extent, nature of and factors associated with diversification using a novel set of data, referring to both firms and plants, from the Greek manufacturing sector (1992). The paper brings together a strand of hypotheses formulated, and partially tested, in the relevant literature. More specifically, we investigate the relationship between the degree of diversification and firm|industry characteristics by separately examining the behaviour of multiplant and uniplant firms. Certain patterns emerge which are then compared with those that arose in other studies. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Vassilis Droucopoulos</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Theodore Papadogonas</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:7:p:417-425</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:7:p:417-425</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Tax-loss carryforward and futures hedging</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Our research is motivated by the Corn Products vs Arkansas Best Supreme court decisions that brought on the controversy of the tax treatment of gains and losses from futures hedging. The usefulness of a futures contract as risk management tool depends on the tax code. In this paper we address implications of capital treatment of futures positions (disallowing offset for tax purposes) when tax-loss carryover is allowed. Our analysis utilizes a two-period model to capture the inter-temporal effects. We investigate the optimal hedge ratios under these scenarios analytically where possible, and numerically where necessary. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1089</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Donald Lien</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Michael Metz</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:231-250</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:231-250</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Dynamic competition in pharmaceuticals: cross-national evidence from new drug diffusion</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We report on an exploratory examination of the extent of differences across fifteen countries and three therapeutic classes (antihypertensives, antidepressants and antiepileptics) in the rate at which medicines in general and new medicines in particular are promoted and then diffuse, as well as relative new|old drug prices. We find substantial heterogeneity across classes and countries in promotion and diffusion. In terms of diffusion, relative prices of old vs. new drugs, and intensity of detailing physicians, we find that somewhat surprisingly, the US is often “in the middle” relative to other countries, and is not an outlier. However, differences across classes are striking. Overall, new drug quantity elasticities with respect to own price are negative, ranging from about −0.75 to −1.1, while cross-price (new drug quantity with respect to old drug price) are positive but small. Total promotion effects on total utilization are generally positive, particularly antidepressants. Promotion of new drugs positively affects the new drug share, while promotion of old drugs negatively affects the new drug share. Promotion of old drugs is surprisingly substantial in some classes and countries. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1338</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Ernst R. Berndt</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Patricia M. Danzon</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Gregory B. Kruse</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:7:p:605-612</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:7:p:605-612</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>R&amp;D in a strategic delegation game revisited: a note</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this note we reconsider the paper of Zhang and Zhang (1997), published in Managerial and Decision Economics, who analyze a strategic delegation model with R&amp;D spillovers in an imperfectly competitive market. We were motivated to study their setup by a puzzling result given in their paper: delegating the production and R&amp;D decisions to managers is never beneficial for the owners of the firm. When we tried to understand the driving forces of this result, we found however that the findings of Zhang and Zhang (1997) are incorrect. We explain why their derivations are wrong and demonstrate via counterexamples that the main propositions in their paper do not hold. In addition, we show how the correct solution of this R&amp;D model with spillovers can be obtained. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1271</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Michael Kopel</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Christian Riegler</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:713-722</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:713-722</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The dynamics of daily retail gasoline prices</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Previous research has analyzed the behavior of retail gasoline stations in how they adjust their prices. In this paper we analyze the daily movements in prices of four retail gasoline stations located in Newburgh, New York. We find some evidence to support the notion that the behavior is explained by menu costs. There is substantial evidence that the firms adjust their prices asymmetrically, being more inclined to increase than to decrease prices. We conclude that the pricing behavior is being determined by a combination of search costs for the consumers and menu costs for the producers. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1372</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Michael C. Davis</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:627-643</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:627-643</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Corporate value and ownership structure in the post-takeover period: what role do institutional investors play</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Several recent papers show that dissident institutions have more influence with management when the level of institutional ownership in the target firm is high. This paper investigates whether increased institutional ownership and institutional ownership concentration reduce agency costs and thus increase corporate value. We find that corporate value is positively related to institutional ownership but negatively related to institutional ownership concentration. This implies that the linkage between corporate value and institutional ownership is driven by momentum trading and supports the view that the bulk of institutional investors remain passive in regards to monitoring. Whether the relaxation of restrictions on institutional communication and ownership (by individual institutions) would facilitate more efficient managerial oversight remains a debatable point. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Steven L. Jones</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Darrell Lee</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>James G. Tompkins</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:1:p:15-24</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:1:p:15-24</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Explaining the profitability of foreign banks in Shanghai</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper uses survival analysis to examine the factors determining the time taken for branches of foreign banks in Shanghai, China to make a positive rate of return after entering that market. Particular attributes of banks including the parent bank's size, early entry and the number of branches the bank has in China are found to reduce time to profitability. Market conditions in Shanghai, captured by levels of foreign direct investment and Eurodollar interest rates, are also found to have significant effects. A number of managerial implications are drawn from the analysis in light of the greater access to the Chinese banking markets following China's accession to the WTO. To ensure long-term profitability in Shanghai, the foreign bank needs to contain costs and risks in the new markets, formulate an effective market penetration strategy, identify appropriate customer target groups, attract businesses from firms of different countries, seek early entry and undertake more fee-income generating businesses. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1101</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>M.K. Leung</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>T. Young</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>D. Rigby</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:2:p:94-96</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:2:p:94-96</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Corporate Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, edited by Vives, X. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, viii&amp;plus;238 pp., $49.95 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1042</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>J. Harold Mulherin</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:6:p:459-475</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:6:p:459-475</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>99: are retailers best responding to rational consumers? Experimental evidence</dc:title>
  <dc:description>There exist numerous theories that attempt to explain the ubiquitous 99-cent price ending. Most of these theories either do not hold up to inspection or posit irrational consumers who serve as a money pump for firms. We offer an experimental test of Basu's (Econ. Lett. 1997; 54:41-44) rational expectations equilibrium model in which consumers are fully rational. We find partial support for Basu's model. Convergence to the 99-cent equilibrium is faster and more widespread when firms are able to observe the previous pricing decisions of others. By imitating the optimal 99-cent price endings of rational firms, less rational firms display an 'as if' rationality. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1282</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Bradley J. Ruffle</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ze'ev Shtudiner</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:2-3:p:71-84</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:2-3:p:71-84</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Joint patenting amongst companies - exploring the effects of inter-firm R&amp;D partnering and experience</dc:title>
  <dc:description>R&amp;D alliances and previous experience with the sharing of intellectual property rights are expected to have significant effects on joint patenting by alliance partners. Although so far un-researched, this is both an intuitively and theoretically appealing subject because joint patenting could relate to the possible outcome of an important group of alliances. However, the main explanation for differences in joint patenting of R&amp;D partners is found in their experience with the joint patenting process itself. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1078</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Masao Nakamura</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>John Hagedoorn</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Hans van Kranenburg</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Richard N. Osborn</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:4:p:241-243</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:4:p:241-243</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Introduction</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1118</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>J. Rajendran Pandian</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Paul L. Robertson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:8:p:833-847</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:8:p:833-847</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Trust and formal contracts in interorganizational relationships - substitutes &lt;TOGGLE&gt;and&lt;/TOGGLE&gt; complements</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We hypothesize that trust is a moderator of the direct relationship between control and coordination concerns and contractual complexity. Our results suggest that high trust weakens the positive relationship between control concerns and contractual complexity and reinforces the positive relationship between coordination concerns and contractual complexity. By highlighting the dual role of contracts (i.e. a controlling and coordinating function) and the moderating role of trust in this regard, our paper provides a new focus to the current discussion on the relationship between trust and contracts (i.e. substitutes or complements) that may help reconcile some divergent perspectives in the literature. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1321</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Thomas Mellewigt</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Anoop Madhok</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Antoinette Weibel</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:157-169</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:157-169</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Competitor identification and competitor analysis: a broad-based managerial approach</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Managerial myopia in identifying competitive threats is a well-recognized phenomenon (Levitt, 1960; Zajac and Bazerman, 1991). Identifying such threats is particularly problematic, since they may arise from substitutability on the supply side as well as on the demand side. Managers who focus only on the product market arena in scanning their competitive environment may fail to notice threats that are developing due to the resources and latent capabilities of indirect or potential competitors. This paper brings together insights from the fields of strategic management and marketing to develop a simple but powerful set of tools for helping managers overcome this common problem. We present a two-stage framework for competitor identification and analysis that brings into consideration a broad range of competitors, including potential competitors, substitutors, and indirect competitors. Specifically we draw from Peteraf and Bergen's (2001) framework for competitor identification to develop a hierarchy of competitor awareness. That is used, in combination with resource equivalence, to generate hypotheses on competitive analysis. This framework not only extends the ken of managers, but also facilitates an assessment of the strategic opportunities and threats that various competitors represent and allows managers to assess their significance in relative terms. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1059</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Mark Bergen</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Margaret A. Peteraf</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:5:p:367-374</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:5:p:367-374</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The economic causes and consequences of corporate divestiture</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study investigates economic causes and consequences of large corporate divestitures between 1983 and 1987. Prior empirical evidence suggests that firms hold on to poorly performing operating units for many years before divestiture. An agency-cost explanation for 'holding on to losers' has been proposed in the literature, as managers may be unwilling to admit they invested in inappropriate asset choices in the first place. However, a puzzle still remains: why should such a manager ever sell off such a unit? We provide both a possible explanation and empirical evidence that suggests managers hold on to losers as long as they can 'blur' their poor performance under the cover of the remaining operating units of the firm. We find that firms do not sell off poorly performing business units until the firm's other units experience significant underperformance relative to their industry peers. Finally, although there is evidence that the stock market reacts favorably to divestitures, we find that beyond the initial improvement, the firm's performance reverts back to its mean pre-divestiture level.© 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Myeong-Hyeon Cho</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Mark A. Cohen</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:1:p:37-43</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:1:p:37-43</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Factor market effects upon product market equilibrium</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Conventional duopoly models typically assume agents possess specific conjectures concerning other agents' behavior. In this paper equilibrium conjectures are endogenous and are a result of a joint factor market and product market equilibrium. Factor markets affect product markets since potential managers or owners of firms engage in product market competition and compete for corporate control in labor or capital markets. The resulting factor and product market joint equilibrium (FPE) endogenizes conjectures and can thus potentially endogenize market structure. This approach provides economic rationales for both Stackelberg and consistent conjectural equilibria. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Gregory E. Goering</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Michael K. Pippenger</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>R. Kelley Pace</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:6-7:p:291-297</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:6-7:p:291-297</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Deploying, leveraging, and accessing resources within and across firm boundaries: Introduction to the Special Issue</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1191</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Mark Shanley</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Margaret Peteraf</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:1:p:27-41</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:1:p:27-41</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Employee attitudes, customer satisfaction, and sales performance: assessing the linkages in US grocery stores</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Using store-level panel data for a major supermarket company, we investigate the linkages between employee attitudes, customer satisfaction, and sales performance, while controlling for observed and unobserved differences across stores. We find that employee attitudes positively affect customer satisfaction with service but do not affect customer satisfaction with quality or value. Additionally, we find that customer satisfaction with service positively affects sales performance. Our results suggest that employee attitudes affect sales performance through their impact on customer service. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1433</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Daniel H. Simon</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Miguel I. Gómez</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Edward W. McLaughlin</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Dick R. Wittink</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:81-82</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:81-82</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Contract theory, by Bolton, P. and Dewatripont, M. MIT Press: Cambridge and London. 2005, xvi&amp;plus;724 pp., USD 65.00 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1332</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Atin Basuchaudhary</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:8:p:465-466</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:8:p:465-466</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>MARKET STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION POLICY: GAME-THEORETIC APPROACHES, edited by Norman, G. and Thisse J.-F. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, xii&amp;plus;293 pp., $74.95 (cloth). ISBN 0-521-78333-X.</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1034</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Malcolm B. Coate</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:171-186</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:171-186</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Why do gas prices vary, or towards understanding the micro-structure of competition</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Strategic management work on competition considers industry segments or industries for the most part. We argue that real competition occurs at much lower levels of aggregation in many industries: what we term the micro-structure of competition. Micro-structures arise from boundedly rational firms searching imperfectly for business opportunities and boundedly rational consumers searching in a behaviorally determined manner for products and services. This paper lays out the basics of the micro-structural approach to competitive analysis and presents initial propositions from that approach. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1060</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Philip Bromiley</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Chris Papenhausen</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Patricia Borchert</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:355-362</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:355-362</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Hierarchical reporting, aggregation, and information cascades</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Aggregation is commonly associated with loss of information. In contrast, this paper shows that aggregation can actually enhance information down-the-road by deterring information cascades. In particular, when hierarchical tiers forward only aggregate recommendations rather than nitty-gritty details, it increases the uncertainty faced by subsequent tiers. This makes individuals at higher levels more willing to rely on and convey their own views rather than simply rubber stamping suggestions from lower levels. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1267</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Anil Arya</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jonathan Glover</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Brian Mittendorf</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:55-56</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:55-56</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Public policy and the economics of entrepreneurship, edited by Holtz-Eakin, D. and Rosen, H.S. MIT Press: Cambridge, 2004, xiii &amp;plus; 213 pp., USD 30.00|GBP 19.95 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1222</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jerry Ellig</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:1-3:p:143-162</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:1-3:p:143-162</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Business profitability versus social profitability: evaluating industries with externalities, the case of casinos</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Casino gambling is a social issue, because in addition to the direct benefits to those who own and use casinos, positive and negative externalities are reaped and borne by those who do not gamble. To correctly assess the total economic impact of casinos, one must distinguish between business profitability and social profitability. This paper provides the most comprehensive framework for addressing the theoretical cost-benefit issues of casinos by grounding cost-benefit analysis on household utility. It also discusses the current state of knowledge about the estimates of both the positive and negative externalities generated by casinos. Lastly, it corrects many prevalent errors in the debate over the economics of casino gambling. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1004</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Earl L. Grinols</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>David B. Mustard</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:387-389</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:387-389</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A note on output hedging with cost uncertainty</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Using a general framework and a multiple-input technology, we thoroughly investigate the hedging and production decisions under cost uncertainty. In doing so, we show the impact of the cost risk on the optimal output, hedge and hedge ratio. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1299</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Moawia Alghalith</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:115-128</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:115-128</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Credible collusion in multimarket oligopoly</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This article refines an established explanation of how multimarket contact facilitates collusion when firms enjoy reciprocal advantages across markets: When there are reciprocal asymmetries between firms, multimarket contact allows them not only to develop spheres of influence, but also to implement attractively simple strategies that are subgame perfect and weakly renegotiation proof. Hence, collusive equilibria are supported by fully credible punishments. A significant implication is, multimarket contact involving reciprocal differences between firms may be more facilitating to their cooperative efforts than multimarket contact based on other factors. The article discusses existing empirical work as it relates to this implication. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1314</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Timothy L. Sorenson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:1:p:59-62</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:1:p:59-62</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A spreadsheet application of Dorfman and Steiner's rule for optimal advertising</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Charles E. Hegji</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:2-3:p:137-148</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:2-3:p:137-148</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Splitting the pie: rent distribution in alliances and networks</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper addresses the issue of how relational rents, generated through alliances, are distributed to the participating firms. We argue that rent distribution is influenced by factors affecting both jointly generated common benefits and private benefits gained from the alliance relationship. We draw on four perspectives to explain these various effects. The first three, namely the resource dependence perspective, related resources perspective, and structural holes perspective, essentially highlight the private 'exploitation' opportunities that a firm's alliance network presents the focal firm. In contrast, the resource development perspective underscores the private 'exploration' benefits a firm potentially derives from its alliance network. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1391</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jeffrey H. Dyer</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Harbir Singh</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Prashant Kale</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:3:p:167-177</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:3:p:167-177</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>EPA enforcement, firm response strategies, and stockholder wealth: an empirical examination</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We investigate the effect of EPA pollution control enforcement activities and firm response strategies on stockholders' wealth. We find that the market reacts negatively upon learning that the firm has been targeted, and that losing a contest with the EPA is very costly to stockholders. Apparently firms are not expected to recover a significant part of pollution control costs from their customers. Somewhat surprisingly, losses are only weakly related to the presence of (unregulated) foreign competition, suggesting that untargeted domestic competitors may restrain cost recovery. Our analysis also indicates that firms may benefit by cooperating with the EPA; i.e., compliant strategies reduce (but don't avoid) wealth losses. The losses of firms that settle are about 40% less than those of firms that fight and lose, and we find no evidence of value gains for firms that fight and win. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>J.C. Bosch</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>E. Woodrow Eckard</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Insup Lee</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:6-7:p:317-327</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:6-7:p:317-327</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Competitive repertoire simplicity and firm performance: The moderating role of top management team heterogeneity</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We extend Miller and Chen's (Strategic Manage J 1996; &lt;B&gt;17&lt;/B&gt;: 419-439) recent research on the impact of competitive repertoire simplicity on firm performance by exploring the extent to which top management team (TMT) demographic heterogeneity moderates this relationship. These authors found that competitive repertoire simplicity among firms in the airline industry was negatively related to firm performance. By contrast, our findings from a multi-industry study suggest that strategic repertoire simplicity is positively related to performance for firms led by heterogeneous TMTs, and negatively related for less heterogeneous TMTs. Accordingly, this finding advances theory within competitive dynamics and strategic leadership. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1193</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Walter J. Ferrier</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Douglas W. Lyon</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:6-7:p:421-436</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:6-7:p:421-436</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Organizational choice in R&amp;D alliances: Knowledge-based and transaction cost perspectives</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study examines how firms choose organizational form for their R&amp;D alliances. Encouraging cooperation in these alliances is often challenging, given the difficulties in knowledge sharing between partners and protecting the property rights over partner knowledge. Interestingly, knowledge-based and transaction cost perspectives generate different hypotheses on alliance organization choice in this setting. When partner knowledge bases are very different, the risk of unintended transfer or leakage is reduced, yet the need for enhanced communication and knowledge sharing mechanisms remains undiminished. With a sample of 232 R&amp;D alliances, I find more thorough support for the transaction cost hypothesis. Firms more likely select an equity joint venture as partner knowledge bases diverge and knowledge transfer becomes more difficult. When such knowledge bases are very different, however, firms are less likely to choose an equity joint venture over more contractual forms of alliance organization. Thus, these results provide empirical evidence on alliance organization choice and also have important implications for the fundamental question of why firms exist. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1199</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Rachelle C. Sampson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:4:p:201-203</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:4:p:201-203</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Assessing the costs of 'addicted' gamblers</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1175</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Dean R. Gerstein</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Rachel A. Volberg</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Henrick J. Harwood</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Eugene M. Christiansen</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:177-193</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:177-193</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Optoelectronics in Japan: A Market Evaluation of Government High-Technology Policy</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Gary R. Saxonhouse</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:4:p:295-308</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:4:p:295-308</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Managerial Efficiency, Managerial Succession and Organizational Performance</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is used to create a measure of managerial efficiency in an attempt to reassess the conflicting theories concerning the impact of organizational performance on manager succession, and the counter-theories concerning the impact of manager succession on organizational performance. The analysis uses data for 147 college basketball teams from 1984 to 1991. The results indicate that winning, not efficiency, is the key criterion used in determining managerial retention. Yet when managers of losing teams are dismissed the teams tend to do even worse. If, however, the efficiency of the new manager is greater than that of the former, the disruptive effect of succession is minimized. Because administrators appear to focus on winning, not efficiency, they will often select new managers who are less efficient than departed managers. These results are unique to this literature and indicate promise for the use of DEA in analyses of the internal efficiencies of organizations. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>John L. Fizel</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Michael P. D'Itri</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:2-3:p:99-116</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:2-3:p:99-116</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Regulatory reform and managerial choice: an analysis of the cost savings from airline deregulation</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper explores the question of how the differential exercise of managerial choice can facilitate organizational adaptation and improve efficiency over periods of regulatory change. We address this question in the context of the US airline industry, with a detailed decomposition of an airline cost function. Our findings suggest that managers employ choice in unconstrained domains to counteract the effects of constrained or pre-determined choices. This is an adaptive mechanism that helps firms adjust to environmental change or maneuver over a rugged landscape. We view this as a type of dynamic managerial capability for achieving dynamic fit under changing conditions. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1397</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Margaret Peteraf</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Randal Reed</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:3-4:p:145-158</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:3-4:p:145-158</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Towards a behavioral ecology of consumption: delay-reduction effects on foraging in a simulated Internet mall</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Young adults shopped for music compact disks in a five store simulated Internet mall. In stock probability in all stores was constant at 0.80, but each store was associated with either a 0.5, 2, 4, 8, or 16 second to a feedback message indicating whether a particular disk was in stock or out of stock at that time. Working under a successive choice schedule, in Phase I subjects' behavior was in quantitative concordance with the Delay-Reduction Hypothesis (DRH), and in Phase II, when a changeover delay was added, subjects' behavior conformed more closely to the predictions of the DRH. Hyperbolic discount functions provided the best fit to the data. This study extends the synthesis of foraging theory and operant psychology, known as behavioral ecology, to human consumption in an affluent post-industrial culture, and provides the basis for an experimental analysis of human consumption. Extensions to research in consumer behavior, marketing strategy, and behavior on Internet services are proposed. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.979</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Amy K Rajala</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Donald A Hantula</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:93-105</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:93-105</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>If you play well they will come-and vice versa: bidirectional causality in major-league baseball</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The Granger-causality test is applied to the annual attendance and win-percentage data for 29 major-league teams. It is shown that bidirectional causality exists for these teams and that there are some essential differences between the original 10 of 16 franchises that comprised the majors in 1903 and the six that relocated between 1953 and 1961. Some differences and some similarities are also seen in the parameter estimates for both blocs of teams, the relocated teams, and seven long-lived expansion franchises. Finally, the parameter estimates are manipulated to yield noise-free equilibrium estimates for both attendance and performance. In tandem, these two sets of estimates provide fodder for speculation as to the futures of each of the extant 23 franchises considered here. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1308</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Ira Horowitz</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:8:p:339-344</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:8:p:339-344</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Planned obsolescence and marketing strategy</dc:title>
  <dc:description>By using a two-period model of a durable goods monopolist, we investigate marketing activities that have an obsolescence effect on products already sold in the past period. We assume that the monopolist can stimulate consumer demand for second-period products by marketing activities, and analyse not only the case where the level of marketing is determined in the second period, but also the case where it is determined in advance, namely, in the first period. It is shown that the equilibrium level of marketing becomes higher than the efficiency level not only in the former case, but also in the latter case if the obsolescence effect is not so large. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1007</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Atsuo Utaka</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:2:p:137-138</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:2:p:137-138</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Book Review: THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MERGERS, by Coate, M.B. and Rodriguez, A.E., Monterey, CA: Center for Trade and Commercial Policy, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1997</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Francois Melese</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:1-3:p:1-3</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:1-3:p:1-3</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Management and information issues for industries with externalities: the case of casino gambling</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.995</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Earl L. Grinols</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>David B. Mustard</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:4-5:p:311-326</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:4-5:p:311-326</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Employee versus conventionally-owned and controlled firms: an experimental analysis</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Full employee ownership, under which employees enjoy dominant ownership and control rights, is an innovation which alters the relationship between employees and the organization in which they work. Although it has been hypothesized to have a number of positive implications, it has suffered from poor diffusion and survival rates overall, and selection biases have limited the generalizability of field research. We have therefore attempted to develop experimental methods to test hypotheses about the effects of employee ownership on selected economic, social, and psychological outcomes. In our experiments, subjects in employee-owned firms exhibited higher productivity, perceived greater fairness in the pay they received and the method used to pay them, reported higher levels of involvement in their tasks, had more positive evaluations of their supervisors, and showed a greater propensity to interact with and provide assistance to their co-workers than did those in employee-owned firms. Four areas where further research is needed are identified; these will refine our understanding of employee ownership and the conditions under which it will operate as hypothesized. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Norman Frohlich</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>John Godard</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Joe A. Oppenheimer</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Frederick A. Starke</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:6:p:553-567</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:6:p:553-567</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A sociological view of costs of price adjustment: contributions from grounded theory methods</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Economic theory and data sometimes pose problems that cannot be addressed with existing econometric methods. For example, theories of price adjustment costs rely on variables that cannot or have not been observed. In principle, such costs can be measured, but there is little reason to expect they can be measured with existing econometric methods. I argue that the grounded theory methods developed by sociologists can be used to demonstrate the validity of price adjustment costs and to address deeper questions about how firms adjust prices. Properly matched to economic problems, grounded theory may help economists to develop better theory and better test existing theory. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1330</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Mark J. Zbaracki</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:56-56</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:56-56</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The economics of standards, by Blind, K. Cheltenham. Edward Elgar: UK, and Northampton, MA, USA. 2004, 357 pp., US$115.00</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1224</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Richard S. Higgins</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:2-3:p:149-163</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:2-3:p:149-163</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The influence of inertia on contract design: contingency planning in information technology service contracts</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper examines whether the prior relationship between two firms produces an inertial drag that influences contracts used for subsequent exchanges. Using data from the information technology services industry, we examine whether inertia develops during the relationship between firms in how they plan for contingencies. While attributes of the current exchange do play a role, we find that the prior relationship between the firms has a constricting effect on future contracts. Prior relationships can create what we call interorganizational inertia, which leads firms to use the same level of contingency planning in current exchanges that they used in prior contracts. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1390</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Kyle J. Mayer</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Janet Bercovitz</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:7:p:343-343</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:7:p:343-343</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Real estate economics and finance: introduction to the Special Issue</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1023</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>D. Leece</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:3-4:p:123-132</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:3-4:p:123-132</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Conspicuous consumption and the positional economy: policy and prescription since 1970</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In more recent years, the social significance of consumption has increased to such an extent that activity in the so-called 'positional economy' is now seen to threaten prospects for sustainable, long-term economic growth. In particular, the demand for status goods, fuelled by conspicuous consumption, has diverted many resources away from investment in the manufacture of more material goods and services in order to satisfy consumer preoccupations with their relative social standing and prestige. This paper looks at the policies and prescriptions which have been proposed in order to reduce levels of 'conspicuous waste' in the positional sector, and to redirect resources back into more productive economic activity. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.977</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Roger Mason</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:8:p:849-862</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:8:p:849-862</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Contests with investment</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Perfectly discriminating contests (all pay auctions) are widely used as a model of situations where individuals devote resources to win some prize. In reality such contests are often preceded by investments of the contestants into their ability to fight in the contest. This paper studies a two stage game where in the first stage, players can invest to lower their bid cost in a perfectly discriminating contest, which is played in the second stage. Different assumptions on the timing of investment are studied. With simultaneous investments, equilibria in which players play a pure strategy in the investment stage are asymmetric, exhibit incomplete rent dissipation, and expected effort is reduced relative to the game without investment. There also are symmetric mixed strategy equilibria with complete rent dissipation. With sequential investment, the first mover always invests enough to deter the second mover from investing, and enjoys a first mover advantage. I also look at unobservable investments and endogenous timing of investments. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1334</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Johannes Münster</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:1:p:1-14</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:1:p:1-14</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Optimal monopoly market area spanning in multidimensional commodity spaces</dc:title>
  <dc:description>A monopoly firm locates in multidimensional product characteristics' space by setting a price that maximizes its profits. The monopoly market area (MMA) it serves strikes the happy medium between lower price and larger MMA, assuming absence of price discrimination, by setting the price at the MMA margins. The MMA takes different shapes, such as hyperspheres or hypercubes, depending on how customers perceive the product distance from their ideal tastes. Commodity space dimensionality, a measure of customer taste elaboration, has a robust effect on optimization: the optimal MMA stretch increases and price decreases with dimensionality, with different customer sensitivity patterns in place. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1428</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Gábor Péli</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Arjen van Witteloostuijn</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:4-5:p:169-182</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:4-5:p:169-182</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Stories about firms: boundaries, structures, strategies, and processes</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper explores contemporary efforts to enrich the economic theory of firms. Its theme is the search for a postmodern approach to the firm, and it explores how those search efforts are reshaping the narrative of conventional neoclassical economic theory. My main interests are the concepts of firms and markets that emerge from a line of inquiry which views firms as social institutions. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1014</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Mark Addleson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:455-465</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:455-465</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Product differentiation, competition and regulation of new drugs: the case of statins in four European countries</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper examines the determinants of competition in the statins market across four European countries over the 1991-2002 period. Using IMS data from the UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands, the paper analyses the potential existence of competition between branded statins prior to patent expiry. Against a conceptual background of Cournot type quantity competition with product differentiation a demand function is estimated using panel data analysis for the first and second entrants on the market. The results indicate substitutability across the initial market entrants and the subsequent entrant only. This is consistent with potential price sensitivity in the branded market for statins, even when the overall size of market is growing. The results are indicative due to empirical issues surrounding endogeniety of the price variable. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1354</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Panos Kanavos</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Joan Costa Font</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Alistair McGuire</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:5:p:425-441</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:5:p:425-441</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Below the tip of the iceberg: the co-evolution of formal and informal interorganizational relations in the wireless telecommunications industry</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We examine how alliances-formal, contractual interorganizational relations-co-evolve with emergent, informal interorganizational relations. To form alliances, firms must acquire information on potential partners, and the acquisition of this intelligence occurs through both formal and informal channels. Here we evaluate the effects of two of these informal channels: joint participation in cooperative technical organizations (CTOs) and director interlocks. Since director interlocks connect firms through the highest managerial levels while joint CTO participation connects firms through mid-level technical personnel, we examine whether each type of informal tie contributes to alliance formation as well as whether ties at multiple levels serve as complements or substitutes for this purpose. We also examine whether all types of ties-alliances, interlocks and CTO participation-co-evolve endogenously or whether there are more direct causal relationships between and among these various types of networks. We find that both interlocks and CTO participation facilitate alliance formation, yet interlocks only facilitate alliance formation when the common director serves as an officer in one of the firms. An additional distinction between the role of interlocks and CTO participation is that the relationship between interlocks and alliance formation appears endogenous, in contrast to CTO participation, which causally precedes alliance formation. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1403</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Lori Rosenkopf</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Thomas Schleicher</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:2:p:71-82</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:2:p:71-82</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Delegation in a mixed oligopoly: the case of multiple private firms</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Previous research examining mixed duopolies shows that the use of an optimal incentive contract for the public firm increases welfare and that privatization reduces welfare. We demonstrate that these results do not generalize to a mixed oligopoly with multiple private firms. We derive the optimal incentive contract for a public firm that weighs both profit and welfare and show that its use may either increase or decrease welfare depending on the number of private firms and the exact nature of costs. We also identify the conditions that determine whether or not privatizing the public firm facing an optimal incentive contract reduces welfare. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1436</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>John S. Heywood</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Guangliang Ye</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:4:p:191-196</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:4:p:191-196</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Comment on Kindt's paper</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1173</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>William R. Eadington</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:601-610</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:601-610</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Institutional investors and corporate monitoring: a demand-side perspective</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Jonathan R. Macey</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:3:p:255-269</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:3:p:255-269</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Asset specificity, unionization and the firm's use of debt</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper considers the combined influence of asset specificity and unionization on the firm's use of debt. While previous literature tends to examine these effects separately, we find that the interaction of the two is critical. Thus, while asset specificity may reduce debt as in Williamson (1988), the presence of a strong union offsets this. Unionization increases the firm's debt as in Bronars and Deere (1991), but asset generality diminishes this effect. We model and test the interactive nature of these two effects. Using firm-specific unionization data and various proxies for asset specificity, we find support for our model. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Joseph K. Cavanaugh</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>John Garen</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:8:p:515-533</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:8:p:515-533</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A real options perspective on entrepreneurial entry in the face of uncertainty</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper we develop and test theory regarding whether entrepreneurs contemplating starting a new venture account for the value of the option to defer the entry decision. While others have illuminated the theoretical applicability of real options theory to entrepreneurship, empirical evidence in this context is lacking. Consistent with predictions derived from real options theory, we find that high uncertainty in the target industry dissuades entry, and that the irreversibility of the entry decision moderates this relationship. Furthermore, we find that the irreversibility of the investment decision can be influenced by industry-level, firm-level and even individual-level factors. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1115</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jonathan P. O'Brien</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Timothy B. Folta</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Douglas R. Johnson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:392-394</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:392-394</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Venture capital, entrepreneurship, and public policy, edited by Kanniainen, V. and Keuschnigg, C. CESifo Seminar Series, by Sinn, H.-W. MIT Press: Cambridge and London, 2005, xviii&amp;plus;293 pp., USD 40.00 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1265</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Russell S. Sobel</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:129-138</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:129-138</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Understanding the implications of empirical work on corporate growth rates</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper builds on the empirical literature on corporate growth rates - which suggests that corporate growth rates are very nearly random - and asks whether this empirical work is consistent with standard theories of the firm. We examine both static and dynamic optimizing models of firm output choice, before moving on to examine production functions modelling of corporate learning, models of R&amp;D competition and diversification. In all cases, it seems clear that random corporate growth rates are more or less exactly what one would expect these models to predict. However, the literature on Penrose effects - dynamic managerial limitations to growth - and corporate competencies are not easy to reconcile with random corporate growth rates. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1207</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>P. A. Geroski</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:83-91</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:83-91</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The strategic use of managerial incentives in a non-profit firm mixed duopoly</dc:title>
  <dc:description>A mixed duopoly setting is examined where a private non-profit firm (NPO) competes with a private profit-maximizer. The NPO's stakeholders select a contract for their managers. A novel NPO objective function is utilized which takes into account all the likely returns to the NPO's stakeholders (NPO profits and the surplus accruing to the NPO stakeholders) in such a commercial setting. In sub-game perfect equilibria, it is shown that the NPO's managers generally will not be given the NPO's true objective to optimize. It is also shown that aggregate social welfare may increase or decrease due to this managerial contracting behavior or the use of NPO membership fees. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1307</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Gregory E. Goering</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:2:p:103-108</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:2:p:103-108</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Strategic measure of competitiveness for ranked data</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study offers a method of evaluating the stability of ranks of a data vector over time. In particular, we study improvement of a process observed over time where the data is ranked. The degree of competition at a major tennis championship (Wimbledon) as well as how trends in the level of competition have changed over time is studied. A metric for shifts in competitiveness and a new statistical methodology is proposed. The findings suggest that competitiveness at Wimbledon has been extremely high. The study offers implications for the sport of tennis as well as an approach to measuring competitive dynamics that can be applied to other contexts. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1111</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Andrew J. Rohm</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Sangit Chatterjee</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Mohamed Habibullah</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:6:p:355-369</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:6:p:355-369</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Outlet ownership in franchising systems: an agency based approach</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Building on prior agency theoretic explanations of the franchisor-franchisee relationship, this paper introduces the franchise system manager in the traditional dyadic channel. This allows us to link the franchisors internal agency problems of providing incentives to managers to their external agency problems of acquiring and extracting rents from franchisees. I find preliminary empirical support for this approach in a structural equations model estimated on a franchise system data set. I then develop and analyze an agency-theoretic model with agency tradeoffs. An explicit rationale for mixed ownership in franchising emerges from the model, where the share of company owned outlets is endogenously determined as the tradeoff between franchisee rents and managerial compensation. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1073</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Sudhindra Seshadri</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:6-7:p:299-315</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:6-7:p:299-315</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Resources, capabilities, and the performance of industrial firms: A multivariate analysis</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study uses multivariate analysis to assess the basic question asked by resource-based view researchers: Do organizational resources and capabilities account for variations in firm performance? An analysis of survey responses of 93 industrial enterprises in Israel indicates that superiority of an industrial enterprise, in terms of four performance measures (return on sales, return on equity, market share change, and customer satisfaction), can be explained by a set of four core organizational resources and capabilities (managerial skills, organizational culture, organizational communication, and perceived organizational reputation). The results lend significant support to the premise of the resource-based view of strategic management. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1192</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Abraham Carmeli</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Asher Tishler</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:8:p:453-463</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:8:p:453-463</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The determinants of voluntary investment decisions</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper analyses investments by firms into areas of corporate social responsibility, focussing on the decision by firms whether or not to invest in compliance with voluntary environmental standards. Theoretical predictions of the compliance decision are tested using discrete time survival analysis on a large dataset of UK manufacturing firms. The rate of voluntary compliance is found to have increased since the introduction of the International Standards Organization (ISO) scheme. Further, voluntary compliance is found to be negatively associated with rates of return and industry share, and positively associated with capital intensity and industry export intensity. In contrast to theoretical predictions on corporate social responsibility, there is no evidence that investment in intangible assets, either at the firm or the industry level, is positively associated with the compliance decision. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1035</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Wendy Chapple</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Andrew Cooke</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Vaughan Galt</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>David Paton</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:467-480</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:467-480</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Cheater detection and altruistic behaviour: an experimental and methodological exploration</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In a managerial world in which opportunism abounds, the detection of opportunists is an important prerequisite of survival. Recent developments in evolutionary psychology claim to shed light on the cheater detection process: specifically arguing that there is a specialized module in the mind dedicated to this task. These claims are assessed and found wanting in a number of specially designed experiments. Suggestions for future research on this phenomenon are put forward. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Martin G. Evans</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Young Chul Chang</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:3:p:181-193</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:3:p:181-193</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Organisational susceptibility to fraud and theft, organizational size and the effectiveness of management controls: some UK evidence</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper examines the principal determinants of an organization's susceptibility to theft and fraud in the context of a rational economic framework in which the level of protection is determined by the minimization of cost. The empirical study shows that, adjusting for differences in organizational type and industrial sector, both organizational susceptibility and the size of a typical theft or fraud increase with organizational size. Access to resources and the manner in which the theft or fraud is perpetrated are also important determinants of the money lost. However, they are unaffected by management controls or the nature of their violation. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1320</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Paul Barnes</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jill Webb</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:3:p:121-136</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:3:p:121-136</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Alliances and cost declaration</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Our model explores the co-existence of both cooperative and competitive behaviors in an alliance setting. Specifically, when alliance partners cooperatively choose observable contributions given reported costs, their self-interested behavior may lead to misreporting of costs related to these contributions.&lt;P&gt;We show that truthful cost reporting by an alliance firm is valuable, thereby establishing that accurate cost reports are a determinant of successful alliance performance. Next we show that an alliance firm's cost reporting behavior may depend on the type of payoffs it receives from alliance, i.e., a share of profit or revenue, and also on the type of relationship between contributions, i.e., whether they are technical substitutes or complements. While we have focussed on highlighting factors which underlie cost misreporting, this study also may serve as a basis for investigating ways to design contracts to diminish the loss an alliance suffers from cost misreporting of the firms, thus increasing the chance that an alliance will be successful. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1141</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Susan Gensemer</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Kiridaran Kanagaretnam</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:6:p:305-318</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:6:p:305-318</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Organizational performance and managerial turnover</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Involuntary and voluntary managerial job-termination hazard functions are estimated for English professional soccer for the period 1972-1997. A novel feature is the use of match-level data, which reveals aspects of the hazard otherwise concealed by estimation using annual data. Short-term fluctuations in performance strongly influence the involuntary termination hazard. The latter is also heavily dependent on the team's current league position relative to its position when the manager took charge, and on the win ratio over the entire spell. Managerial human capital attributes are found to have a greater influence on the voluntary rather than on the involuntary termination hazard. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Rick Audas</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Stephen Dobson</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>John Goddard</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:3:p:157-161</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:3:p:157-161</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Endogenous R&amp;D spillovers and locational choice with discriminatory pricing</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We present a model of spatial price discrimination where R&amp;D spillovers are endogenous as they depend on firms' location. We establish that both the distance between locations and R&amp;D efforts are an increasing function of the transportation cost coefficient and show that there is a continuum of cases where firms will choose an intermediate location. The managerial implications from the model are discussed using examples of marketing behavior by Internet retailers. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1137</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Claudio Piga</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Joanna Poyago-Theotoky</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:1:p:21-40</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:1:p:21-40</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Are non-binding contracts really not worth the paper?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We experimentally investigate behavior in sequential one-shot transactions which are governed by non-binding contracts. In a second, incomplete information treatment, contracts are binding for some players. While according to traditional game-theoretical analysis no trade is expected in the first treatment, full trade should result in the latter. However, we find that trade is even higher in the non-binding contract treatment. On the one hand, non-binding contracts-although they are cheap talk-do guide behavior, especially at the beginning of a business relationship, while reciprocal reactions prevail later on. On the other hand, in the treatment with binding contracts cooperative behavior appears to be crowded out. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1243</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Bernd Irlenbusch</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:4-5:p:239-250</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:4-5:p:239-250</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Innovation and firm-level persistent profitability: a Schumpeterian framework</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Studies of firm-level profit dynamics tend to attribute the variance in profit persistence to variability in the extent to which imitative pressures are resisted. This monopoly-based explanation of persistent profitability implicitly assumes a one-to-one correspondence between firm-level and product-level profit dynamics. Following Schumpeter, this paper begins to develop a framework for firm-level profit persistence that embraces product innovation, competitor imitation, and, more importantly, the prospect that several product innovations may be embodied within a single firm. Such an approach opens the door for an innovation-based explanation of profit persistence to accompany the monopoly-based arguments that are typically offered. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1018</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Peter W Roberts</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:6:p:469-487</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:6:p:469-487</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Identifying personality traits to enhance trust between organisations: an experimental approach</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We investigate an experimental representatives' trust game which resembles trust relationships between representatives of organisations. Personality traits of subjects are elicited by a personality questionnaire (Cattell's 16 PF-R) which is well established in personnel psychology. For the first time, personality traits are linked to actually observed behaviour in a trust game. Detailed personality profiles are derived and it is shown that they differ significantly between behavioural types. Individuals with low scores in anxiety turn out to be particularly qualified for enhancing trust between organisations. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1415</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>René Fahr</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Bernd Irlenbusch</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:1:p:41-62</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:1:p:41-62</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Optimal response to a next generation new product introduction: to imitate or to leapfrog?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper, we study the choice of technology levels and timing of the introduction of new technologies in a market in which customer sophistication increases over time. Faced with the introduction of a new generation product, a firm can either imitate or leapfrog it. If the new product is introduced optimally, we show that the optimal response is to imitate it. This is because the technology leader's best strategy is to set a technology level that makes imitation the best response. We also derive decision rules for the timing of introduction of new technologies. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1247</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>D. Sudharshan</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ben Shaw-Ching Liu</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Brian T. Ratchford</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:521-522</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:521-522</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The truth about the drug companies, by Marcia Angell, Random House: New York, 2004. xx &amp;plus;305 pp., $24.95</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1361</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>F.M. Scherer</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:4-5:p:327-341</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:4-5:p:327-341</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>An experimental study of a dynamic principal-agent relationship</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The principal-agent problem is often illustrated by the relationship between owners and managers in modern corporations. Our experimental study considers the problem where the owner has to motivate the manager by an employment contract serving the owner'rsquo;s interest. The contract specifies a salary and a share of the firm'rsquo;s profit which depends on the manager'rsquo;s effort and stochastic market events. The owner can only infer the firm'rsquo;s profitability from the dividend payments. The owner may terminate or change the incentive contract in later periods. The experiment relies on a parameter specification for which risk neutral participants would cooperate efficiently, i.e. the owner should design a contract rendering full effort as optimal. However, we observe contracts for which full effort is not optimal and effort choices which are not optimal. We observe trust and reciprocity as important features of behavior which evolve over a multiperiod principal-agent relationship, but do not carry over to the next game with a new partner. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Werner Güth</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Wolfgang Klose</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Manfred Königstein</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Joachim Schwalbach</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:7:p:427-435</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:7:p:427-435</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Equity and arbitration in major league baseball</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Equity theory argues that workers examine their job performance and salaries relative to workers in comparable situations. If compensation is inequitable, workers may adjust their behavior. We test the hypothesis that an arbitration-eligible player in Major League Baseball is more likely to file for arbitration and|or proceed to an arbitration hearing if he feels he is underpaid relative to his comparison other. Bivariate probit is used to increase efficiency and correct for the sample bias in estimating decision models within the two-step arbitration process. The results indicate that equity is a significant predictor of a player's unilateral decision to file but is an insignificant determinant of going to a hearing because of offsetting responses to equity by player and owner. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1090</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>John Fizel</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Anthony C. Krautmann</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Lawrence Hadley</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:2:p:137-137</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:2:p:137-137</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Book Review: POWER STRUCTURE: OWNERSHIP, INTEGRATION, AND COMPETITION IN THE U.S. ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY, by Kwoka, J.E., Jr., Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Henry E. Kilpatrick, Jr</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:6:p:373-385</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:6:p:373-385</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Normative target-based decision making</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper relates normative expected-utility decision making to target-based decision making, and introduces a new quantity, the aspiration equivalent. We show that using the aspiration equivalent as a target provides a new method for choosing between lotteries that is consistent with expected-utility maximization. Furthermore, we show that the aspiration-equivalent target provides a win-win situation for executive-manager delegation. This result furnishes a new link between normative decision analysis and target-based decision making. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1234</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Ali E. Abbas</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>James E. Matheson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:2-3:p:213-229</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:2-3:p:213-229</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A joint Japan-China research project for reducing pollution in China in the context of the Kyoto Protocol clean development mechanism (CDM): case study of the desulfurdized bio-coal briquette experiments in Shenyang and Chengdu</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The Kyoto Protocol agreed on in 1997 allows some flexibility for developed countries in their implementations of their commitments to reduce emissions of CO&lt;INF&gt;2&lt;/INF&gt; and other global warming gases. In particular developed countries may receive emission credits for facilitating international cooperation for developing clean development mechanisms (CDMs) between themselves and developing countries. CDMs must reduce emissions of global warming gases on a sustainable basis in the developing countries involved. Such CDMs are expected to be an important tool for Japan and other developed countries for achieving their Kyoto Protocol commitments to reduce their CO&lt;INF&gt;2&lt;/INF&gt; emissions, but assessments and implementations of alternative CDMs require careful international joint research efforts. In this paper, we discuss our on-going Japan-China joint research to develop and evaluate bio-coal briquette (biobriquette), a new product to replace coal in some regions of China. Coal is a significant source of air pollution in China. The introduction of biobriquette use in China as a possible CDM for Japan is also discussed. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1084</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Masao Nakamura</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Hitoshi Hayami</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Masao Nakamura</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Kanji Yoshioka</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:7:p:399-415</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:7:p:399-415</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Beyond profitability: effects of acquisitions on technical efficiency in the Italian pasta industry</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Unlike traditional studies on the impact of ownership changes-which use either profitability measures or stock prices-this paper investigates the impact of acquisitions on acquired firms' technical efficiency. Using a panel of Italian firms in the pasta industry for the 1981-1997 period, I estimate a stochastic production frontier with exogenous factors affecting efficiency in a translog specification with non-neutral technical progress. The main result is that acquired firms experience, within the 6 years period following the acquisition, an increase in technical efficiency of the order of 10%. This result is statistically significant and proves to be robust with respect to the inclusion of size and calendar year effects as explanatory variables of firms' inefficiency. These findings contribute to the debate on the welfare gains of ownership changes by providing evidence that mergers and acquisitions lead to cost savings, due to the reduction of acquired firms' X-inefficiency. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1088</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Luigi Benfratello</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:2:p:69-82</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:2:p:69-82</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Strategic behavior in a service industry</dc:title>
  <dc:description>A model of service duopoly is formulated, where the arrival of customers and their service time in the firm are stochastic. The firms first choose the service capacity, and given the capacity they then choose the price in a Bertrand competition. Capacity choices have a negative externality on the competitor, since increased capacity in one firm decreases its expected full price (price plus cost of waiting) and leads to a flow of customers from the other firm. If the firms choose capacities strategically, it is optimal to underinvest compared to the non-strategic case, but this result may arise in different ways. By underinvesting the firms commit themselves to longer queues (lower quality) to relax price competition. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1047</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Pekka Ilmakunnas</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:7:p:345-354</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:7:p:345-354</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The option to change the use of a property when future property values and construction costs are uncertain</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper models the decision to change the use of a property when its value in the current use and the new use, as well as construction costs, are uncertain. In the case of development of vacant land, when cash flows and construction costs are lognormally distributed, the development of the property optimally takes place when the ratio of benefit to cost of development reaches some fixed level. In the redevelopment case, the timing problem is found to be more complex, as the cost of exercising the conversion option consists of two parts, the construction costs and the surrendered value of the property in the current use, which may evolve differently over time. In this case, optimal redevelopment will take place for different benefit-cost ratios, depending on the relative sizes of the property values in the different uses and the construction costs. Also, for a given current benefit-cost ratio, the option value will vary significantly, depending on the relative size of the state variables. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1024</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Åke Gunnelin</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:1-3:p:77-96</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:1-3:p:77-96</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Assessing self-reported expenditures on gambling</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Estimates of the proportion of gambling revenues derived from problem gamblers represent an important element in the rational calculus of public gambling policy. However, a critical concern in calculating such estimates is the accuracy of self-reported expenditure data. In this paper, we review an emerging literature on estimating the proportion of expenditures from problem gamblers for different types of gambling, with a focus on the relationship between self-reported estimates and known spending. We then examine recent national survey data pertaining to this matter. After detailing several of the challenges in the effort to assess self-reported expenditures on different types of gambling, we recommend some methodological improvements that can be made in response to these problems. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.999</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Rachel A. Volberg</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Dean R. Gerstein</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Eugene M. Christiansen</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>John Baldridge</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:15-23</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:15-23</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Proxy contest, board reelection, and managerial turnover-yes, the proxy contest outcome matters</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In a previous study based on a matched sample analysis, it is found that in Taiwan top management turnover rate for the listed firms in the presence of a proxy contest is much higher than the ones without a proxy contest. In other words, the hypothesis of job security has gained empirical support. Taking account of the proxy contest outcomes, the present study extends the sample years, i.e. 1994-1999, to further examine the impact of proxy contest on managerial turnover. In conformity with expectations, the major empirical findings can be summarized as follows: the highest turnover rate of top management is observed in the firms of which the dissidents win majority seats; the second highest turnover rate is observed in the firms of which the dissidents win some seats; whereas the lowest turnover rate is observed in the firms of which the dissidents win no seats. Empirical findings of this kind provide further support to the view that proxy contest has played an effective monitoring role in disciplining incumbent management. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1186</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Gili Yen</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ching-Lung Chen</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:8:p:535-538</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:8:p:535-538</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The mystification of operational competitiveness rating analysis</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This note examines the fault of the operational competitiveness rating analysis (OCRA) method. The premise of the OCRA method requires that a single scalar measurement must be applied to inputs and outputs to calculate the performance ratings for production units. This property renders the OCRA method worthless, since simple comparisons of the aggregated inputs and outputs can generate accurate productive efficiency evaluation results for production units if the simple aggregation can be done. To avoid this problem, the OCRA method includes subjective weighting elements for input and output categories, so called calibration constants, into the performance rating computation. This approach of the OCRA method introduces much confusion for productive efficiency evaluation, and it violates the economics axiom of output|input maximization in its application context. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1244</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Shouhong Wang</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Hai Wang</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:8:p:471-486</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:8:p:471-486</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Managerial efficiency and human capital: an application to English association football</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The problem of hidden action in organizations makes direct measurement of managerial performance problematic. But in English association football hidden action is unlikely to be as serious a problem because the owner observes the manager's performance each time the team plays. In this situation production frontier analysis may be used to measure managerial performance and analyze the variation in performance across managers in terms of manager human capital. Having some kind of prior affiliation with the club and achieving international recognition as a player are especially important. Overall, initial experience matters more than specific and general managerial experience. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1098</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Peter Dawson</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Stephen Dobson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:6:p:253-268</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:6:p:253-268</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The impact of privatization and regulation on the water and sewerage industry in England and Wales: a translog cost function model</dc:title>
  <dc:description>After the ten Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) of England and Wales were privatized in November 1989, the successor Water and Sewerage Companies (WASCs) faced a new regulatory regime that was designed to promote economic efficiency while simultaneously improving drinking water and environmental quality. As legally mandated quality improvements necessitated a costly capital investment programme, the industry's economic regulator, the Office of Water Services (Ofwat), implemented a retail price index (RPI)&amp;plus;K pricing system, which was designed to compensate the WASCs for their capital investment programme while also encouraging gains in economic efficiency. In order to analyse jointly the impact of privatization, as well as the impact of increasingly stringent economic and environmental regulation on the WASCs' economic performance, this paper estimates a translog multiple output cost function model for the period 1985-1999. Given the significant costs associated with water quality improvements, the model is augmented to include the impact of drinking water quality and environmental quality on total costs. The model is then employed to determine the extent of scale and scope economies in the water and sewerage industry, as well as the impact of privatization and economic regulation on economic efficiency. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.988</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>David S Saal</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>David Parker</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:6:p:243-252</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:6:p:243-252</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: a managerial perspective</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analytical framework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field. Second, by making use of the framework, we provide new insights into how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed by their employees. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.987</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Nuno Garoupa</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:411-426</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:411-426</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Seven deadly syndromes of management and organization: the view from evolutionary psychology</dc:title>
  <dc:description>It is argued that organizational designs and management processes mediate between the givens of human nature and environmental forces, and that different resolutions have varying consequences for the quality of human experience in organizations. Some of these are plainly bad for people and bad for business. Seven of the most common pathologies of contemporary business are analysed through the evolutionary psychology lens, in terms of their causes and manifestations. The paper concludes by considering how different ways of organizing and managing might run more smoothly with the grain of human nature. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Nigel Nicholson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:1:p:43-55</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:1:p:43-55</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Task assignment, incentives and technological factors</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper, we examine the allocation of tasks between a principal and an agent considering their incentives to provide effort, their different abilities in handling tasks, and transmission costs. We focus our attention on two tasks: the first may be handled by the principal or by the agent, whereas the second is necessarily carried out by the agent. Under a fully decentralised organisation, the agent performs both tasks, whereas, under partial delegation, the principal handles the first task and transfers the outcome to the agent who handles the second task. Assuming technological complementarities, from our analysis it emerges that, if there is imperfect observability of effort, full delegation is better at eliciting effort by the agent in the second task, whereas, in comparison with partial delegation, it lowers effort in the first task. Although with contractible effort, the choice between the two organisational forms depends only on transmission costs and on the relative ability of its members, when moral hazard problems are taken into account, the organisational choice is related to the relative importance played by the two tasks in production. If the agent's task is relatively important in production, full delegation, encouraging a higher level of effort in this task, may be optimal, even if technological factors favour partial delegation. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1434</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Maria De Paola</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Vincenzo Scoppa</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:3-4:p:133-144</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:3-4:p:133-144</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Inappropriate sales in the financial services industry: the limits of the rational calculus?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The paper explores the notion of 'misselling' in the context of financial services. 'Misselling' is treated as a special case of error in the classification of a discrete dependent variable. A simulation study is conducted using the sale of mortgage debt to outright owners of property as an example of how inappropriate sales manifest themselves. This is followed by the actual case of endowment mortgage sales. The results and discussion suggests that 'misselling' can be viewed (i) in the context of empirical regularities and a rationalizable view of the data and|or (ii) as a non rationalizable situation where the 'misselling' becomes 'pathological'. The paper highlights the need for a behavioural perspective, in addition to a more conventional economic treatment of the 'misselling' phenomenon. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.978</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>David Leece</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:3:p:131-150</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:3:p:131-150</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Multi-dimensional signaling with fixed-price repurchase offers</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study presents a signaling model of fixed-price repurchase offers which shows that the proportion repurchased and the premium paid in excess of the stock's full-information value signal both earnings and risk. The model yields four novel implications: high risk firms repurchase smaller proportions at greater premiums, earnings held constant; and high earnings firms make offers for larger proportions at higher prices, but lower premiums, risk held constant. Empirical tests support the implications, even in the presence of alternatives, e.g., free cash flow, optimal leverage, and shareholder heterogeneity. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>William J. McNally</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:6:p:523-530</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:6:p:523-530</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Price rigidity and flexibility: recent theoretical developments</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The price system, the adjustment of prices to changes in market conditions, is the primary mechanism by which markets function and by which the three most basic questions get answered: what to produce, how much to produce and for whom to produce. To the behaviour of price and price system, therefore, have fundamental implications for many key issues in microeconomics and industrial organization, as well as in macroeconomics and monetary economics. In microeconomics, managerial economics, and industrial organization, economists focus on the price system efficiency. In macroeconomics and monetary economics, economists focus on the extent to which nominal prices fail to adjust to changes in market conditions. Nominal price rigidities play a particularly important role in modern monetary economics and in the conduct of monetary policy because of their ability to explain short-run monetary non-neutrality. The behaviour of prices, and in particular the extent of their rigidity and flexibility, therefore, is of central importance in economics. This introductory essay briefly summarizes the eight studies of price rigidity that are included in this special issue. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1331</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Daniel Levy</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:2:p:81-120</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:2:p:81-120</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Price adjustment at multiproduct retailers</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We empirically study the price adjustment process at multiproduct retail stores. We use a unique store level data set for five large supermarket and one drugstore chains in the USA, to document the exact process required to change prices. Our data set allows us to study this process in great detail, describing the exact procedure, stages, and steps undertaken during the price change process. We also discuss various aspects of the microeconomic environment in which the price adjustment decisions are made, factors affecting the price adjustment decisions, and firm-level implications of price adjustment decisions. Specifically, we examine the effects of the complexity of the price change process on the stores' pricing strategy. We also study how the steps involved in the price change process, combined with the laws governing the retail price setting and adjustment, along with the competitive market structure of the retail grocery industry, influence the frequency of price changes. We also examine how the mistakes that occur in the price change process influence the actions taken by these multiproduct retailers. In particular, we study how these mistakes can make the stores vulnerable to civil law suits and penalties, and also damage their reputation. We also show how the mistakes can lead to stockouts or unwanted inventory accumulations. Finally, we discuss how retail stores try to minimize these negative effects of the price change mistakes. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Daniel Levy</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Shantanu Dutta</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Mark Bergen</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Robert Venable</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:7:p:285-304</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:7:p:285-304</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Maintenance contracts for leased goods: their role in creating brand loyalty</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Using a two-period switching cost model, this paper compares rental profit with sales profit in a framework in which duopolists produce horizontally differentiated durable goods. Rental firms use maintenance contracts that stipulate that repeat customers pay a lower fine per unit of damage than do those customers who switch to a rival firm. In the sales regime, firms give loyal customers a discount on their second period prices. If switching costs are zero, sales profit equals rental profit. For positive and identical switching costs, either regime can dominate. As the exogenous rate of depreciation falls, rental profit exceeds sales profit. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.990</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Julie Hunsaker</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:5:p:291-292</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:5:p:291-292</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Commitment in long-term contracts</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The paper deals with a common problem affecting businesses wishing to enter a licensing or franchising agreement in a country with limited rule of law. The contract needs to be self-supporting, which may be achieved by the careful structuring of the timing of payments. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Antony W. Dnes</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:51-54</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:51-54</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>When adding a fuel efficient car increases an automaker's CAFE penalty</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We derive the conditions that cause an automaker's Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) fine to increase when it sells an additional, fuel efficient car. Raising the CAFE standards would broaden the range of fuel economies that produce this effect. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1206</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Steven Tenn</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>John M. Yun</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:1:p:1-18</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:1:p:1-18</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Corporate takeovers, bargaining and managers' incentives to invest</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper analyzes the impact of potential takeovers on the investment decisions of managers. The takeover involves bargaining over the potential surplus between the acquiring firm, the target manager, and shareholders of the target firm. The anticipation of future takeover gains will influence the decision-makers to invest ex ante. Interestingly, both over and underinvestment might prevail, depending on the relative bargaining powers of the parties. The model encompasses specific cases documented in the empirical literature and mergers and acquisitions (M&amp;A) practice. It is, therefore, particularly suited to focus on the desirability of anti-takeover legislation. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Marcel Canoy</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Yohanes E. Riyanto</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Patrick Van Cayseele</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:8:p:613-630</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:8:p:613-630</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Factor substitution in the production of library services: evidence from the North American research libraries</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Economic analysis provides a rigorous foundation for the investigation of production activity, but relatively little attention has been given to service activities. This paper examines the technology of library services. Previous studies of library economics have focused mainly on economies of scale. The model proposed identifies scale economies, together with the substitution relationships among three categories of library staff, which are inferred from estimates of the cost function of 92 research libraries. For all categories of employees there is evidence of substitutability, but the demand for librarians is inelastic and the substitution possibilities weak. Student assistants are relatively strong substitutes for support staff and to a limited degree may be substituted for trained librarians. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1296</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Christopher J. Hammond</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:789-801</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:789-801</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Price variability and price dispersion in a stable monetary environment: evidence from German retail markets</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We investigate the relationship between inflation and price variation using highly disaggregated, weekly price data for consumption goods recorded in Germany during 1995, a low-inflation period. We find a significant positive correlation between the rates of price change and price dispersion, both at the level of individual products and product groups. However, we find no correlation between the rates of price change and price variability. Together with results from similar studies, Tommasi (1993. Optimal Pricing, Inflation, and the Cost of Price Adjustment. MIT Press: London, Cambridge, MA; 485-511) and Parsley (1996. J. Money Credit Banking &lt;B&gt;28&lt;/B&gt;: 323-341), a remarkable pattern emerges: when aggregate nominal shocks are small, only price dispersion is correlated with price changes. As the rate of inflation rises, both variability and dispersion become affected. During hyper-inflation, systematic movements of price dispersion seem to disappear. We conclude that price dispersion is best explained by micro-economic frictions in price adjustment, whereas price variability appears to be related to costly price search and information problems. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1373</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Matthias R. Fengler</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Joachim K. Winter</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:4:p:185-190</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:4:p:185-190</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Wagering war</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1172</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Robert A. Levy</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:4-5:p:227-237</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:4-5:p:227-237</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Internal markets and the theory of the firm</dc:title>
  <dc:description>A growing number of companies are explicitly replacing bureaucratic internal resource allocation with internal markets. But if markets work well within firms, why are there firms at all? Why does not all allocation take place on 'external' markets? This paper seeks to resolve this apparent anomaly by viewing the firm as a membership club rather than as a command structure. Members join the firm and pay its membership fee when the value of the local public goods they receive exceeds the opportunity cost of joining. Some of the most important public goods provided by firms are variously referred to as organizational capabilities, competencies, or routines. These can often be characterized as public goods because they are ultimately based on knowledge, and hence involve a degree of nonrival consumption. A firm survives when its internal environment generates value-creating capabilities, competencies, and routines. The firm will continue to exist as long as the owners of its human and physical capital find it more profitable to transact inside this environment than outside. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1013</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jerry Ellig</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:6:p:343-344</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:6:p:343-344</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Corporate Social Awareness and Financial Outcomes, by Riahi-Belkaoui, A. Westport, CN: Quorum Books, 1999, xiv&amp;plus;194 pp., $65.00 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>James G. Shelton</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:25-37</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:25-37</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Top executive turnovers: Separating decision and control rights</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper examines the relationship between performance and top executive turnovers using a sample of 81 turnovers and matching companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. We find that poor market performance increases the probability of management replacements and that forced layoffs are value-increasing events while voluntary resignations are value-decreasing events. Large shareholders as active monitors, or part of corporate control, are not exhibited in the results. If large shareholders have any influence on CEO turnovers it is not revealed in our data. Indeed, separating control rights from decision rights does not appear to affect managerial turnovers. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1187</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Robert Neumann</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Torben Voetmann</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:3:p:195-211</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:3:p:195-211</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Managerial expertise, learning potential and dynamic incentives: get more for less?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper the impact of ability and learning potential on incentive contracts is analyzed. A central feature of the model is that the true ability will not be revealed. The learning potential of an agent is modeled as the magnitude of impact on the agent's expected ability that learning-by-doing has in a given task. Absent a managerial labor market, depending on an agent's learning potential, a monotone or non-monotone pay structure may be optimal. &lt;P&gt;The second important result is that using agents' ability distributions as inputs to information systems, higher learning potentials lead to less costly information systems, i.e. actions can be implemented at lower costs. Additionally, it is proven that the criteria cost minimization and value maximization are equivalent in the model's context. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1322</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Christian Lukas</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:71-72</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:71-72</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Japanese Technology Management: Introduction to the Special Issue</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Masao Nakamura</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:4-5:p:299-310</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:4-5:p:299-310</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Absolute and relative rewards for individuals in team production</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper examines the use of prizes as an incentive device in team production environments. We reward team members in two different ways. First, heterogeneously endowed individuals are given a monetary prize for high absolute levels of contributions. Secondly, a prize is given for high levels of contributions relative to endowment-token endowments represent abilities to contribute to the team. We find that both prize treatments significantly increase group contributions, but rewarding individuals based on absolute contributions also widens the dispersion between the high-contributor and the remainder of the group. Contributions are highest when the prize is for high relative contributions, and the dispersion in contributions is lower than with a prize for absolute contributions. Furthermore, these prizes could be self-funded since giving prizes creates more system-wide wealth than what the prize costs. These results have implications for work team environments in which prizes given for individual effort towards the group goal could raise overall effort levels. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>David L. Dickinson</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>R. Mark Isaac</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:11-26</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:11-26</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Japanese Equity Market Response to U.S. Administered Protection Decisions</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The standard capital market event study is used to measure Japanese firm-specific effects resulting from action taken by the US in response to alleged dumping of Japanese imports in US markets. Empirical findings are that winners and losers in the process differ predictably from each other and from the market in the way that Japanese investors view them, with differences being most pronounced at the petition filing date and the final stages of both the ITC and Department of Commerce decisions. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Richard K. Harper</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>William L. Huth</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:6:p:503-512</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:6:p:503-512</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The entry and exit decisions of foreign banks in Hong Kong</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper presents a theoretical framework for explaining the entry and exit decisions of a firm, motivated by the differential returns in its home and a host market. Within this framework, the factors underpinning the entry and exit decisions of foreign banks in Hong Kong are examined, using a duration (accelerated failure time) model. It can be seen that a foreign bank, with international experience from having more overseas markets will take a shorter (longer) time to enter (exit) the Hong Kong market. Faster (slower) growth both in home trade with Hong Kong and in the Hong Kong banking sector itself will increase the likelihood of entry (exit). Ceteris paribus, Asian banks enter at a faster rate and survive longer in the Hong Kong market. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1414</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Man K. Leung</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Trevor Young</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Michael K. Fung</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:4:p:177-178</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:4:p:177-178</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Introduction to special issue: Comments on 'costs of addicted gamblers'</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1170</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Paul H. Rubin</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:407-413</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:407-413</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Drug and vaccine pricing and innovation: what is the story?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1351</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Mark V. Pauly</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:379-385</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:379-385</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Under contingent fees, the attorney gets a share of the judgment; under conditional fees, the lawyer gets an upscale premium if the case is won which is, however, unrelated to the adjudicated amount. We compare conditional and contingent fees in a principal-agent framework where the lawyer chooses unobservable effort after she has observed the amount at stake. Contingent fees provide better incentives than conditional fees independently of whether upfront payments are restricted to be non-negative or not. Under contingent fees, the attorney uses her information about what is at stake more efficiently. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1269</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Winand Emons</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Nuno Garoupa</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:3:p:173-174</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:3:p:173-174</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, THE LEARNING CURVE AND PROFITABILITY, by Jackson, D., Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc., 1998, 240 pp., $80.00.</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Thomas R. Gulledge</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:1:p:9-24</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:1:p:9-24</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The role of debt and bankruptcy statutes in facilitating tacit collusion</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Using a two-period model this paper examines the quantity decisions of leveraged duopolists that are vulnerable to bankruptcy in the first period. When the firms have symmetric costs, a bankrupt firm reorganizes under Chapter 11. If a Chapter 11 firm experiences marginal cost relief, each firm produces a collusive output in period one in order to prevent its rival's financial demise. When the firms have asymmetric costs, the less efficient firm is liquidated under Chapter 7 upon bankruptcy. A predatory equilibrium exists, whereby the inefficient firm is driven from the market. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Julie Hunsaker</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:495-503</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:495-503</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The human nature of management consulting: judgment and expertise</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Management consulting is a significant and growing feature of the society of organizations in which we live. We develop an account of 'behavioral management consulting' by applying behavioral decision theory (BDT) to consulting. We apply in particular the representativeness heuristic, confirmatory bias, and the fundamental attribution error. We then scrutinize this account of management consulting in two ways: first, in the light of extant research applying BDT to other fields of expertise, such as accounting; and second, in the light of evolutionary psychology, which has recently cast a skeptical eye on some aspects of BDT. We conclude that the BDT-based account of consulting survives this scrutiny sufficiently to warrant a program of empirical research, and identify priorities for such a program. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Andrew Watson</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Terence Rodgers</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>David Dudek</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:6:p:327-342</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:6:p:327-342</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Skewness preference, mean-variance and the demand for put options</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper compares the mean-variance and the mean-variance-skewness approaches to modelling expected utility. Attention is focused on a problem encountered in risk management: determining the optimal demand for a put option hedging the return on an asset with a negatively skewed return distribution. It is demonstrated theoretically that incorporating positive skewness preference into the decision-maker's objective function typically produces a reduction in the demand for put options when compared with the mean-variance solution. A state-dependent example is provided to illustrate how a mean-variance-skewness objective can result in a significant reduction in the optimal amount of crop insurance demanded when compared with the mean-variance solution. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Geoffrey Poitras</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>John Heaney</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:6:p:619-631</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:6:p:619-631</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Price rigidities, inventories, and growth fluctuations</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We investigate the interactions of price rigidities and storability of goods, and their implications for inflation and growth. The model is an optimising, stochastic general equilibrium one, featuring endogenous growth, the possibility of (short run) excess demand and inflation derived from sluggish and staggered price setting (a version of the 'New Keynesian Phillips Curve'). Analytical short-run dynamics are derived. A notable feature is the predicted short-run comovements between growth and inflation (negative) and between the inventory ratio and growth (positive). Increased price flexibility reduces the persistence of the system but its overall influence on variances is uncertain. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1325</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Chris Tsoukis</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Naveed Naqvi</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:2-3:p:231-239</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:2-3:p:231-239</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Information failure as an alternative explanation of under investment in R&amp;D</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1085</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Masao Nakamura</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Alice O. Nakamura</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Peter Tiessen</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>W. Erwin Diewert</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:8:p:431-438</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:8:p:431-438</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Rent extraction, principal-agent relationships, and pricing strategies: vendor licensing during the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Two-part pricing, price-discrimination, rent creation and extraction, principal-agent theory, and public choice perspectives on public bureaucracies are used to interpret a vendor-license marketing arrangement and controversy arising out of the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, GA. Containing features predicted by principal-agency theory, Atlanta's arrangement with its marketing agent was a response to the behavior of public bureaucracies and a low cost method of converting visitors' consumer surplus to rent, which could be extracted by the marketing agent and then by Atlanta. Atlanta's incentive to enforce vendor property rights was influenced by the nature of the game between Atlanta and prospective vendors. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1032</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Ralph C. Allen</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jack H. Stone</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:1-3:p:97-111</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:1-3:p:97-111</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The impact of riverboat casinos on the demand for gambling at casino resorts: a theoretical and empirical investigation</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We provide conditions under which a casino resort enjoys an increase in demand following the entry of a riverboat casino in a separate geographical market. Gambling is modeled as an 'experience good', whereby consumers are uncertain of the benefit they will receive from the activity prior to engaging in it. The riverboat casino provides nearby consumers with the opportunity to experience gambling without having to incur large transportation costs. Those consumers who discover that they enjoy gambling travel to the casino resort for a vacation next period. Our theoretical results are supported by empirical evidence for casinos in Las Vegas. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1000</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Julie Hunsaker</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:71-76</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:71-76</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Correction of errors in Vetschera's (2004) model of behavioral uncertainty and investment</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Modelling of behavioural uncertainty has been a concern for researchers for some time. This paper briefly reviews modelling related to uncertainty and the focuses on the model presented by Vetschera (2004). A model of decision behaviour has been developed in the paper with regard to investment and cooperation taking into account the uncertainty and lack of information. The model is an important contribution for it focuses on situations that are not usual to the normal principle agent problems. The present review however reveals some errors in the paper. Sometimes errors may appear editorial but the same errors may lead the interested reader or researcher to inappropriate paths, particularly those who may fail to follow an argument or comprehend the underlying meanings of the equations and analytical solutions. In this manner, further work on this important topic may be hindered if researchers accept forms as presented in the paper literally as facts to further work. The main contribution of this paper is that it presents the correct forms of the mathematical aspects and procedures of the Vetschera (2004) paper. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1316</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>G.A. Tularam</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>A.S. Soomro</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:4-5:p:213-226</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:4-5:p:213-226</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A market-process approach to corporate coherence</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We address the notion of corporate coherence recently made prominent by Teece et al. (1994. Understanding corporate coherence: theory and evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization &lt;B&gt;23&lt;/B&gt;: 1-30). We argue that the literature is confused on the meaning of this notion (and similar notions) along a number of dimensions. Drawing on insights from market-process theories, we propose a dynamic understanding of corporate coherence, an understanding that involves the corporate capacity to strike a favorable balance between the production and exploitation of new knowledge. This argument is elaborated drawing on Austrian economics, evolutionary economics, and post-Marshallian economics. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1012</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Nicolai J Foss</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jens Frøslev Christensen</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:6:p:385-385</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:6:p:385-385</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Association of Financial Economists 17th Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, January 7-9, 2000</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Larry Lang</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:1:p:75-93</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:1:p:75-93</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The international drivers of domestic airline mergers in twenty nations: integrating industrial organization and international business</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The domestic airline merger phenomenon of the late 1980s and early 1990s sparked a great deal of Industrial Organization (IO) literature; yet, that literature neglected non-US domestic mergers and potential for international competitive gains. Using an International Business perspective to complement an IO analysis, I argue that factoring international competitive incentives helps explain domestic airline merger activity. A Cournot model of airline competition illustrates that domestic mergers, via enhanced domestic networks and reduced domestic competition, generate international competitive gains. Further, empirical tests-using a structural equations approach on panel data covering interhyphen-national city-pair market segments-support domestic mergers improving international competitiveness. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1248</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Joseph A. Clougherty</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:6:p:319-325</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:6:p:319-325</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Selling prices and profits: what survey data tell about firms' rationality</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper states that the strong biases found in survey expectations do not necessarily distort economic decisions. An econometric analysis of price and profit data suggests that Swiss manufacturers do not base their production decisions on the forecasts they supply to the surveying institution. Instead, production decisions are based on data of past prices. This suggests that in their production management, firms make adjustments for biased marketing projections of selling prices. However, the practice of these adjustments is not optimal since it neglects the valuable information contained in these price forecasts. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Tobias F. Rötheli</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:2:p:121-126</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:2:p:121-126</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Does it pay to venture abroad? Exporting behavior and the performance of firms in Indian industry</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Using contemporary data for a firm-level sample of over 600 Indian firms, this paper investigates the impact that an export-orientation has on the profitability of the firms studied. The results, based on a two-stage least squares method, establish a positive and significant relationship between firms' levels of exports and profitability. For firms from developing and transition economies like India it does pay to venture abroad, and the ability to sell goods overseas has a significant impact on firms' economic performance. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Pradeep K. Chhibber</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Sumit K. Majumdar</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:7:p:573-586</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:7:p:573-586</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Revisiting agency and transaction costs theory predictions on vertical financial ownership and contracting: electronic integration as an organizational form choice</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper provides an organizational economics foundation to guide managers in matching the comparatively more efficient organizational mode with transactional characteristics such as: (1) the degree of (human capital) asset specificity involved in the transaction, (2) the degree of uncertainty surrounding the transaction, and (3) the number of trading partners (suppliers and buyers) in the vertical supply chain. The key role of technology, and more specifically the e-business infrastructure and its effects on organizational mode choice, is highlighted. The main results from this analysis suggest that changes in information technology are changing the nature of transaction costs leading to more efficient management through an electronic integration solution thus favoring contracting and outsourcing than would have been technologically possible when Williamson's Markets and Hierarchies (Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. Free Press: New York, 1975) was published. It is emphasized that the transaction cost economics principles are durable but that the breathless advances in information technology, especially in the past decade, have comparatively favored lower transaction costs of markets over hierarchies. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1275</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Kaouthar Lajili</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Joseph T. Mahoney</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:6:p:401-412</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:6:p:401-412</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Risk tolerance in the present and the future: an experimental study</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We design an experiment to study the consistency of risk preferences between lotteries that are resolved and paid in the present versus in the future. The results show that a substantial fraction of subjects (38.6%) exhibits a greater level of risk aversion for lotteries resolved and paid in the present than in the future. Additional treatments suggest that the effect is neither specific to gambles that are realized immediately, nor is due to steep discounting of future payoffs. Our experiment suggests that risk tolerance increases the farther in the future the gamble is realized. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1278</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Charles Noussair</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ping Wu</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:2:p:51-68</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:2:p:51-68</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Relative performance as a strategic commitment mechanism</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Can managers' personality traits be of use to profit maximizing firm owners? We investigate the case where managers have a variety of attitudes toward relative performance that are indexed by their type. We consider two stage games where profit maximizing owners select managers in the first stage, and these managers, knowing each other's types, compete in a duopoly game in the second stage. The equilibria of various types of competition are derived and comparisons are made to the standard case where managers are profit maximizers. We show that managers' types can be used as a strategic commitment device that can increase firm profits in certain environments. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1045</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Nolan Miller</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Amit Pazgal</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:437-438</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:437-438</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Commentary</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1350</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Tomas J. Philipson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:3:p:247-254</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:3:p:247-254</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Market structure and the value of growth</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In line with theory suggested by Miller and Modigliani (1961), this paper finds generally positive and statistically significant effects of growth on the current market value of the firm over the 1974-90 period. This intuitive result is not surprising, but the lack of a simple link between the valuation effects of growth and market structure considerations is noteworthy. Importantly, the value of future growth options appears to be closely tied to the firm's ongoing investment in advertising and R&amp;D intangible capital. On the other hand, high current market share does not appear to offer any clear advantage in terms of a firm's ability to expand upon current success. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Keith W. Chauvin</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Mark Hirschey</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:4:p:205-216</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:4:p:205-216</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Incentives and job redesign: the case of the personal selling function</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Changes in the internal and the external environment of organizations are causing many of them to redesign individual jobs as team functions. Sales organizations, in particular, are responding to increased selling costs by redesigning the selling function to include a support person. The basic idea here is to let the support person perform important but relatively low-skilled tasks, such as lead generation, so that the salesperson's valuable time is freed up to perform important and relatively high-skilled tasks, such as product promotion. However, this trend gives rise to several interesting questions. Specifically, we ask: How are the incentives offered to the salesperson affected by the introduction of the support person? To what extent will the support person be utilized? And, how will the job be conducted under the new design? We find that the level of incentives and job redesign are related, albeit in a complex manner. We also find that the firm will not always fully utilize the support person, nor will the salesperson always fully delegate the low-skilled task to him. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Alex Thevaranjan</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Kissan Joseph</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:3:p:197-199</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:3:p:197-199</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Book Review: TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR., by Chernow, R., New York: Random House, 1998</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>W.F. Shughart</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:8:p:348-349</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:8:p:348-349</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Regulation Without the State&amp;emsp14;.&amp;emsp14;.&amp;emsp14;.&amp;emsp14;the Debate Continues, by Blundell, J. and Robinson, C. Foreword by M. Ricketts. IEA Reading 52. London: Institute for Economic Affairs, 2000, xv&amp;plus;93 pp., £10.00 (paper).</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1005</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Chris Wesley Paul</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:3:p:115-130</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:3:p:115-130</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Product market objectives and the formation of research joint ventures</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper we extend the existing literature on research and development (R&amp;D) investments and research joint ventures (RJVs) in two important ways. First, we analyze and compare the case where firms collude in the product market to the benchmark case of competition in the output market. Second, we allow firms to form coalitions endogenously as a separate stage in the game. We develop profit functions that depend on the partition of firms into joint ventures and the nature of product competition between venture partners. Our results illustrate the restrictive nature of some assumptions made in the literature. Typically multiple RJVs of different sizes form in equilibrium. In general, RJVs should not be promoted if they entail product market collusion. Given the information available to policy-makers, it is unlikely that an R&amp;D policy more refined than analyzing and allowing RJVs on a case-by-case basis is feasible. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Patrick Greenlee</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Bruno Cassiman</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:1:p:35-46</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:1:p:35-46</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The demand for game day attendance in college football: an analysis of the 1997 Division 1-A season</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper develops a predictive model which includes game, team and university specific factors that are likely to influence game day demand for Division 1-A college football. Attendance during the 1997 regular season is used as the dependent variable. Tobit estimates of two separate equations reveal that the quality of both teams, traditional rivalry and membership of specific conferences have a significant influence on demand. In addition, colleges with lower enrollments and a higher percentage of off-campus students attract smaller crowds. The presence of a nearby professional football team also detracts from a college team's drawing power. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1100</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Donald I. Price</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Kabir C. Sen</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:1:p:61-61</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:1:p:61-61</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Special issue Managerial and Decision Economics</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Earl L. Grinols</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>David B. Mustard</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:1:p:21-32</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:1:p:21-32</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The decision to finance account receivables: the factoring option</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Factoring is a financial service enabling enterprises to sell their accounts receivable to a factoring company in exchange for cash. The market for factoring in the UK has been growing at substantial rates and most banking institutions are now actively involved in providing this service. Little research on the factoring market currently exists and so this paper'seeks to profile the determinants influencing decision making in the UK factoring industry. Using data from an interview-based survey, this paper establishes that the decision to purchase an enterprise's accounts receivable is influenced by the enterprise's size, type of product or service it offers, industry, sector, age, type of customers, financial statement, the management team, operational suitability, collectability and credit notes. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1046</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Khaled Soufani</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:2-3:p:277-292</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:2-3:p:277-292</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>What determines the profitability of foreign direct investment? A subsidiary-level analysis of Japanese multinationals</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This article identifies key factors that determine the profitability of Japanese firms abroad by using panel-data regression models on new, large-scale, subsidiary-level data over the 1990-1996 period. The results show that the determinants of subsidiary profits differ across host regions, suggesting that the economic and institutional factors specific to host regions influence significantly the profit performances of overseas subsidiaries. While the size effect on the subsidiary profitability is present in all the regions, other effects, such as experience, local supplier networks, local sales and macroeconomic conditions affect the performance of subsidiaries in a different manner by region. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1392</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Mariko Sakakibara</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Hideki Yamawaki</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:8:p:675-677</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:8:p:675-677</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Prophet of innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and creative destruction, by McCraw, T. K., Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge and London, 2007, xi&amp;plus;719pp., USD 35.00 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1430</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>William F. Shughart</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:8:p:475-497</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:8:p:475-497</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Experimental evidence on trading behavior, market efficiency and price formation in double auctions with unknown trading duration</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The reasons for the highly efficient market outcomes observed under the double auction remain unclear. This paper presents a series of experimental financial markets designed to investigate the importance of unknown trading period duration on trading behavior and the convergence tendencies of such markets. Using panel data techniques the results support the conclusions that individuals generally display more aggressive trading strategies, trading earlier in a period, and that markets exhibit reduced levels of informational efficiency when unknown duration is present. Markets with imperfect information structures are also studied and, in a unique result, are associated with significantly slower rates of trade, as traders become more cautious over their trading strategies. Investigation of the price formation process provides evidence that the pricing error varies over time and the estimation of a fixed effects model provides unique support that learning effects and unknown trading period duration influence the price formation process. Future refinement of theoretical models of the price formation process or institutions of exchange should recognize the effect of unknown trading period duration on market behavior, along with potential learning effects. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1236</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Darren Duxbury</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:353-355</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:353-355</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Commentary</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1345</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Joseph Golec</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:453-454</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:453-454</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Commentary</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1353</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Tomas J. Philipson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:4:p:197-200</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:4:p:197-200</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Kindt's paper epitomizes the problems in gambling research</dc:title>
  <dc:description>For many readers, the casino gambling issue of Managerial and Decision Economics&lt;SUP&gt;1&lt;/SUP&gt; will be their first exposure to economic research on casino gambling. Based solely on a reading of the MDE issue, one might get the impression there is overwhelming evidence that legal casino gambling is 'bad.' But readers should be skeptical of what they read, as there is no such consensus in the literature. Indeed, the literature is fraught with methodological problems and inconsistencies. Professor Kindt's article (2001), in particular,&lt;SUP&gt;2&lt;/SUP&gt; exemplifies some of the problems that have been plaguing gambling research since the mid-1990s. Ordinarily, a reaction to an article like Kindt's would be unwarranted, since many of his arguments are supported only by newspaper articles. However, it is perhaps worthwhile to point out a few of the problems with Kindt's work, and with gambling research in general, so that research can advance, instead of digressing, as it has with the publication of the special issue of MDE. My comments focus on three issues in Kindt's paper. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1174</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Douglas M. Walker</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:1:p:31-41</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:1:p:31-41</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Corporate groups, liquidity, and overinvestment by Belgian firms quoted on the Brussels stock exchange</dc:title>
  <dc:description>For a sample of large Belgian non-financial firms quoted on the Brussels stock exchange, it is found that investment of firms borrowing on an internal capital market is not determined by internal cash flow, while cash flow has a significant effect on investment for the other firms in the sample. Further analysis indicates that the cash flow effect is caused by overinvestment, not by financing constraints. No evidence is found that firms borrowing on an internal capital market in turn transfer surpluses of funds to other group members by investing in financial fixed assets. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Marc Deloof</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:7:p:451-460</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:7:p:451-460</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Corporate governance, ownership structure and corporate efficiency: the case of Ukraine</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The goal of this paper is to examine the effects of different ownership structures and of the quality of corporate governance on the Farrell measure of efficiency. Data Envelopment Analysis and Limited Dependent Variable Estimations are applied to the set of Ukrainian joint-stock companies listed on the main Ukrainian stock exchange, First Securities Trading System. Domestic ownership of the organization is found to enhance efficiency the most, whereas managerial ownership has a detrimental effect on efficiency. Foreign owned firms are relatively inefficient; however foreign ownership is found to have a positive and significant effect on corporate governance quality. Concentrated ownership rights (including state ownership) improve efficiency, possibly reflecting country-specific factors. The quality of corporate governance is found to have a positive impact on the efficiency of domestically owned firms. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1258</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Vitaliy Zheka</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:8:p:439-446</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:8:p:439-446</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Macroeconomic news and the returns of financial companies</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This research is concerned with the response of the NASDAQ Financial 100 index to macroeconomic news. The paper employs the newly developed technique of &lt;B&gt;generalized&lt;/B&gt; impulse response analysis to examine how macroeconomic shocks affect the performance of the financial sector. The results identify the magnitude and persistence of the response of financial companies stock returns arising from shocks to the stance of monetary policy, real output, inflation, and risk. The findings add to the literature on the determinants of financial sector stocks and on the relationship between the stock market and the macroeconomy. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1093</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Bradley T. Ewing</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:159-160</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:159-160</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Reply to 'the paradox of inelastic sports pricing'</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1300</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Rodney Fort</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:5:p:285-294</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:5:p:285-294</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The myth of racial discrimination in pay in the United States</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The analyses of the General Social Survey data from 1974 to 2000 replicate earlier findings from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth that racial disparity in earnings disappears once cognitive ability is controlled for. The results are robust across many alternative specifications, and further show that blacks receive significantly greater returns to their cognitive ability than nonblacks. The trend data show that there was no sign of racial discrimination in the United States as early as 1970s. The analyses call into question the necessity of and justification for preferential treatment of ethnic minorities. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1229</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Satoshi Kanazawa</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:3:p:213-228</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:3:p:213-228</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>New Institutional Economics' contribution to strategic groups analysis</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Rather than consider the two broad strands of strategic group research-performance-based and behavior-based studies-as competing approaches, we argue that they relate to complementary levels of analysis. We present a four-level framework for analyzing structures within industries drawn from New Institutional Economics (NIE) which covers different approaches to strategic group formation from institutional isomorphism and embeddedness through to the firm-level effects of certain resource deployments. We apply an institutional approach to a case study of the Australian banking industry and supplement this with a quantitative approach based around key strategic variables. This analysis suggests that distinct groups have emerged due to the institutional environment and the different regulatory environments experienced by various banks in the industry. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1323</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Stephane Tywoniak</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Peter Galvin</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jennifer Davies</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:8:p:550-552</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:8:p:550-552</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Moneyball: The art of winning an unfair game, by Lewis, M. New York and London: Norton, 2003, xv &amp;plus; 288 pp., USD 24.95 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1220</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>William Shughart</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:817-832</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:817-832</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Non-price rigidity and cost of adjustment</dc:title>
  <dc:description>There has been increasing interest in understanding how firms undertake non-price adjustment activities, especially in situations where prices may be rigid despite changes in market conditions. Using scanner price data for over 4500 different food products from a large US supermarket chain, we document periods of rigidity in product additions and deletions: new products are less likely to be introduced, and existing products are less likely to be discontinued during holiday periods than throughout the rest of the year. We argue that this is due to higher costs of undertaking these kinds of product assortment activities during holiday periods. We discuss how this relates to the exiting literature on non-price adjustment and price rigidity. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1379</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Georg Müller</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Mark Bergen</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Shantanu Dutta</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Daniel Levy</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:7:p:305-312</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:7:p:305-312</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Demonstrating Cournot and Collusive equilibria using computer spreadsheets</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.984</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Charles E. Hegji</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:1:p:1-13</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:1:p:1-13</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>An economic analysis of the use of student evaluations: implications for universities</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper, we develop an analytical model of joint maximizing behavior on the part of students and professors to develop policy rules for universities who use student evaluations as tools for increasing professor effort and, thereby, student knowledge. More precisely, we examine the potential benefits of student evaluations, the consequences of over-emphasizing them and the optimal level of emphasis that should be placed on them. This exercise allows us to determine conditions under which student evaluations would result in an increase in teaching effort and student knowledge, and environments where it would result in professors manipulating grading schemes to obtain higher student ratings, i.e., grade inflation. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1099</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Kiridaran Kanagaretnam</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Robert Mathieu</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Alex Thevaranjan</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:2-3:p:241-256</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:2-3:p:241-256</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Position, leverage and opportunity: a typology of strategic logics linking resources with competitive advantage</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The resource-based view's (RBVs) contribution toward understanding competitive advantage remains unfulfilled. A reason is the confounding of the concept of resources with RBVs strategic logic. We disentangle these by developing a typology of strategic logics (i.e., leverage, position, and opportunity) that specify alternative theoretical pathways linking resources with competitive advantage. We clarify their market assumptions, relevant performance objectives, and managerial challenges. Besides introducing the logic of opportunity, we indicate the central insight that competitive advantage stems from the linkages among resources, not just their attributes. Thus, while VRIN resources may be useful for creating advantage, they may be neither necessary nor sufficient for competitive advantage to ensue. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1386</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Christopher B. Bingham</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Kathleen M. Eisenhardt</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:6-7:p:471-482</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:6-7:p:471-482</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Habitual late payment of trade credit: an empirical examination of UK small firms</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Quantitative and qualitative data are examined in an analysis of habitual late payment of trade credit by UK small firms. Multivariate logistic regression is employed to test the influence of variables expected to discriminate between small firms which pay late habitually and those which never or only occasionally pay late. Case studies extend quantitative analysis by validating interpretation of the results and providing explanations for unexpected outcomes. The results provide strong evidence of a financing demand for habitual late payment. There is a positive relationship between habitual late payment and difficulty obtaining bank finance and late payment by debtors and a negative relationship with the use of long term sources of finance. The influence of relationships between customer and supplier is shown to be complex. A concentrated supplier base is shown to be positively associated with late payment and case studies provide evidence that this is because increased knowledge of suppliers' credit management procedures is used to pay late without penalties. The implications of this result for the large number of firms that do not enforce their statutory right to interest on late payment are highlighted. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1128</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Carole Howorth</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Beat Reber</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:7:p:547-554</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:7:p:547-554</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Social norms, coordination and collaboration in heterogeneous teams</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper considers the coordinating role of social norms in a heterogeneous team of workers. We define an optimal unit of production as a form of organisation involving several teams and members, with the following properties: (i) a social norm operating to coordinate individual efforts; (ii) a team with heterogeneous skills, enabling generation of synergies. Our model suggests that competences of the best worker are transferred to his or her peers. This collaborative process enhances team efficiency but only if there is an implicit ex ante coordinating device based on social norms that discourage free riding. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1417</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Marilyne Antonetti</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Alexandra Rufini</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:491-502</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:491-502</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Generic competition and market exclusivity periods in pharmaceuticals</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper we examine generic competition and market exclusivity periods for pharmaceuticals experiencing their initial generic entry between 1995 and 2005. We find that generic competition has increased over several dimensions. First, an increasing number of drugs are subject to generic entry, including drugs with relatively modest annual average sales. Second, drugs with larger sales attract more generic entrants and have shorter market exclusivity periods than smaller selling drugs. Third, blockbuster drugs with annual sales in excess of $1 billion have experienced significant decreases in their market exclusivity periods in recent years. We also find that Hatch-Waxman Act patent challenges have negatively affected market exclusivity periods over the 1995 to 2005 period. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1356</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Henry G. Grabowski</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Margaret Kyle</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:55-60</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:55-60</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Information Revelation via Takeovers in Correlated Environments</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper studies the informational content of takeover bids in correlated environments and provides an explanation for the empirical result that industry rivals of takeover targets exhibit positive share-price reactions on the announcement of a bid. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Rudolf Kerschbamer</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:6-7:p:419-438</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:6-7:p:419-438</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The trade credit decision: evidence of UK firms</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Trade credit finance and credit management are gradually gaining the research attention an area of such importance merits. One area, still far from resolved, is why trade credit is extended by non-financial firms to customers. This paper seeks to identify the generic forces behind the trade credit offer and to explore the empirical support for 20 propositions on credit motives derived from the literature and the implications of such motives to credit policies.&lt;P&gt;The paper reports findings from a survey of senior finance officers involved in credit management in large UK companies. It assesses the degree to which theoretical explanations for granting trade credit are experienced in practice and whether observed differences attaching to credit motives among firms are associated with variations in credit policies and debtor days.

The study found strong empirical support for seven propositions linked to competitiveness, pricing, investment and financing, and weaker support for a number of other theoretically-derived motives for trade credit extension. Factor analysis suggested a more insightful approach to classifying trade credit motives, covering investment in customers, customer's operating and financial benefits, supplier's marketing|operational benefits and market pressure to conform. In addition, two factors-customer relations and pricing flexibility-were extracted as motives for varying credit terms. Consistent with our hypothesis average debtor days were found to be significantly higher for those firms emphasising the financing, investment, and pricing flexibility propositions. These findings, and implications for future research, are explored. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1049</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Nam Sang Cheng</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Richard Pike</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:5:p:255-264</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:5:p:255-264</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A new relative skill measure for games with chance elements</dc:title>
  <dc:description>An interesting aspect of games is the relative extent to which a player can positively influence his results by making appropriate strategic choices. This question is closely related to the issue of how to distinguish between games of skill and games of chance. The distinction between these two types of games is definitely interesting from a juridical point of view.&lt;P&gt;In this paper we present a modification of an existing measure of the skill level of a game, which has served as a juridical tool for the classification of games. The main difference is that this new definition does not automatically classify incomplete information games without chance moves as games of skill. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1147</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Marcel Dreef</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Peter Borm</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ben van der Genugten</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:6:p:333-337</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:6:p:333-337</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Cartelizing effects of horizontal shareholding interlocks</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Some models of industries with horizontal shareholding interlocks are generalized. First, we consider industries where firms exhibit different technologies and more general market demand functions. The cartelizing effects of financial interlocks are examined using both the Lerner index and the Herfindahl-Hirshman index. Furthermore, the model is extended to consider multiproduct oligopolies. We find a compact expression for the Lerner index and study the cartelizing effects of such an industry. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1010</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Ugo Merlone</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:8:p:411-429</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:8:p:411-429</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Modeling regional electric power markets and market power</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper develops a nonlinear, mathematical programming model for estimating production decisions in an open access, regional power market. Our approach allows one to estimate competitive power market equilibrium prices, which in turn offers empirical conclusions about marginal generation facilities, transmission interconnection congestion, and most importantly, load pockets and market power. Sensitivity analyses are conducted by subjecting the model to changes in production costs, peak hour demand, power imports, and transmission interconnection price assumptions. We then consider the issue of a firm's ability to exercise market power and the implications it may have on regional equilibrium power prices. The Louisiana power market is used as a case study for our work. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1031</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Robert F. Cope III</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>David E. Dismukes</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Rachelle F. Cope</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:27-31</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:27-31</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Two-stage Budgeting as an Economic Decision-making Process for Spanish Consumers</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Two-stage budgeting as an economic decision-making process for consumers is illustrated by its application to new data. After showing that the Spanish observed behaviour is consistent with utility maximization, we estimate, for each stage, the elasticities of a dynamic AIDS model, which allow us to explain the economic decisions of consumers. The main findings show that all goods are normal and display decreasing demands, as theory predicts. In particular, transport, in the first stage, and the purchase of personal vehicles, in the second, show the highest expenditure effects. Moreover, transport and public transport display the highest Marshallian own-price elasticities. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>José Alberto Molina</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:4:p:209-217</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:4:p:209-217</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Comment on Kindt's paper</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1177</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>R. Randall Bridwell</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:6:p:387-395</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:6:p:387-395</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Entry of foreign banks in Shanghai: implications for business strategies in an increasingly competitive market</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper uses a simple mean-variance choice model as the basis of a duration analysis of the factors determining the decision of a foreign bank to establish a branch in Shanghai, the fast developing financial centre in China. Bank attributes, namely region of origin, parent bank size, the number of international branches and their branch network in China, have a significant impact on the time to entry. A country's share of total foreign direct investment in Shanghai also significantly affects the entry decision. The attributes facilitating entry also provide the foreign bank with a competitive advantage in its foreign currency transactions in Shanghai. However, with the ensuing market liberalisations after China's WTO accession, the entrants' competitiveness may not be sustained in the local currency market, especially following the proactive business strategies of Chinese banks and the protectionist measures of the government. It is expected that only a small number of the entrants will be able to emerge as big market players in the growing domestic currency market in Shanghai. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1235</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>M.K. Leung</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>T. Young</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:5:p:414-416</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:5:p:414-416</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Book review: The economic laws of scientific research, by Kealey, T., Houndmills, Hampshire: Macmillan Press and New York: St Martin's Press, 1996</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>William F. Shughart II</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:2-3:p:145-158</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:2-3:p:145-158</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Sex, power, and dominance: the evolutionary psychology of sexual harassment</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Among the effects of sexual integration of the workplace has been an increase in the opportunities for, and incidence of, sexual harassment. Sexual harassment, and women's responses to it, can be understood as reflections of the different evolved sexual psychologies of the sexes. Among the issues discussed are whether the abusiveness of work environments should be viewed from the perspective of the 'reasonable person' or the 'reasonable woman,' whether sexual harassment is really 'about power' rather than about sex, and whether harassment that takes a sexual form is necessarily 'because of' the sex of the victim. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1289</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Kingsley R. Browne</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:4:p:293-306</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:4:p:293-306</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Modelling employment durations of NHL head coaches: turnover and post-succession performance</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Match-level National Hockey League (NHL) data are used to identify factors likely to trigger the departure of a team's coach, and to measure the short-term impact on subsequent match results. There is a statistically significant link between individual match results and the job departure hazard for up to 15 games prior to the point of departure. The hazard depends on the team's current standing within its conference relative to a pre-season forecast, recent performance in the Stanley Cup, the coach's age and previous employment with his present team as a player. After controlling for a mean-reversion effect, teams that changed their coach within-season are found to perform worse subsequently than those that did not, but the negative effect is short-lived. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1259</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Rick Audas</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>John Goddard</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>W. Glenn Rowe</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:41-55</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:41-55</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Preliminary evidence on the appointment of institutional solutions to franchisor moral hazard-the case of franchisee councils</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Besides franchisee opportunistic behavior, franchisor moral hazard is a central concern in franchise chains. Economic literature thus far focused on the sharing of franchisee revenues as an incentive for curbing franchisor malfeasance. In this paper, we ask whether and how the obligations of chains may be enforced through institutional arrangements like franchisee councils. Consistent with expectations, the appointment of a council empirically turned out to be more likely as decision rights-a proxy for the scope of moral hazard-were increasingly allocated to companies' management. We found this relationship to be negatively moderated by the contractual share parameter. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1312</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Olivier Cochet</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Thomas Ehrmann</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:6:p:511-526</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:6:p:511-526</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Benefit packages and individual behavior: choices over discrete goods with multiple attributes</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Managers and employers use an array of rewards to attract and retain quality employees. An increasingly significant component of the overall compensation is the employee's benefits package. Flexible packages offer more choice but also incur higher decision costs. We conduct an experiment on choices over stylized benefits packages where discrete 'goods' have multiple attributes affecting the payoff function. We investigate the degree to which these complications affect choices. Eighty subjects play an individual-choice decision-cost game where they are implicitly asked to solve a complex programming problem. Our main results are that: (a) individual subjects respond to the relative tradeoff between the attributes, (b) some combinations of the attributes (apparently) entice subjects to search more and thus earn more, and (c) most subjects appear to adopt a heuristic that approximates the optimal solution. Further, subjects appear to value the right to make choices, as they rarely choose a fixed payoff option with a known payoff and low decision cost, even when the fixed payoff is 80% of the maximum possible under the decision-making task. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1285</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Mark Van Boening</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Tanja F. Blackstone</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Michael McKee</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Elisabet Rutstrom</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:8:p:569-582</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:8:p:569-582</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The limits to the growth of multinational firms in a foreign market</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Theories of growth for firms have suggested that slow managerial growth is a major constraint why firms cannot grow faster. This paper is built on such a view and explores the factors that may influence the growth rate of Japanese firms in a given US industry. It is found that Japanese firms that allocated more internal and international managerial resources (proxied by expatriates) to their US operations tended to achieve higher growth rates. Japanese firms that were geographically diversified and those that spread their international investment projects evenly over time also achieved higher growth rates. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1129</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Danchi Tan</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:1:p:19-30</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:1:p:19-30</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Cost and productivity</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study develops an analytical model capable of decomposing both intertemporal and multilateral cost variation. It begins by attributing cost variation to a price effect and a quantity effect. Then the quantity effect is decomposed into a productivity effect and an activity effect. The productivity effect in turn decomposes into a cost efficiency effect and, in the intertemporal context, a technical change effect. This paper also shows how the intertemporal and multilateral cost decompositions can be implemented, using linear programming techniques. These techniques offer certain advantages over conventional econometric techniques whenever a substantial portion of cost variation is due to variation in cost efficiency. The two cost decompositions are illustrated with a pair of benchmarking exercises based on a panel of 93 US electric power generating companies, in which variation in cost efficiency does play a key role. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>E. Grifell-Tatjé</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>C.A.K. Lovell</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:4-5:p:205-223</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:4-5:p:205-223</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Demand shocks, advance production and market power: some lessons about markets from the laboratory</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper summarizes some recent research pertaining to laboratory markets, and then discusses some of the implications of this research for applied economics and policy. Three results are discussed: (a) in one-sided markets where sellers' post-prices price-tracking response to demand shocks is very poor; (b) despite the prominence of the Cournot model as a centerpiece for applied research, it is very difficult to construct an environment where Cournot outcomes are observed; (c) market power, or the capacity of sellers to unilaterally deviate from the competitive prediction, is a prominent characteristic in short-run price-setting contexts. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Douglas D. Davis</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>K. Ramagopal</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:5:p:209-210</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:5:p:209-210</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Modern competitive analysis, 3rd edn, by Oster, SM. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, x&amp;plus;434 pp., $54 (cloth).</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.989</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Luke Froeb</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:8:p:488-490</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:8:p:488-490</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Privacy and the Commercial Use of Personal Information, by Rubin, P. H. and Lenard, T. M. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, xxiii &amp;plus; 100 pp., USD 75.00; GBP 52.00 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1095</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Bruce H. Kobayashi</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:1:p:41-54</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:1:p:41-54</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The Savanna Principle</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Why do microeconomic theories (such as decision theory and game theory) often fail to predict human behavior despite their mathematical elegance and deductive rigor? I suggest that such empirical failures stem from the theory's misconception of how the human brain functions. Drawing on evolutionary psychology, I propose the Savanna Principle, which posits that a hypothesis about human behavior fails to the extent that its scope conditions and assumptions are inconsistent with the ancestral environment, and its experimental corollary, that the Savanna Principle holds (and the hypothesis fails) to the extent that the conditions of the experiment resemble the ancestral environment. I suggest that the Savanna Principle and its corollary might together explain the relative empirical failure of noncooperative game theory and public choice theory, and the relative success of network exchange theory and competitive price theory tested in double auction markets in experimental economics. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1130</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Satoshi Kanazawa</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:2-3:p:79-97</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:2-3:p:79-97</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Customer preference discontinuities: a trigger for radical technological change</dc:title>
  <dc:description>What factors cause a mature industry to re-enter a period of technological turbulence? This paper addresses this question by developing a model of technological evolution that incorporates both technological trajectories and a new concept: preference trajectories, which are cycles of incremental and discontinuous change in preferences. Preference discontinuities turn out to play an important role in triggering technological transitions in an industry. I illustrate the model with an historical study of the typesetter industry, which underwent three major technological transitions, each of which was driven by preference discontinuities. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1389</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Mary Tripsas</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:3-4:p:111-122</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:3-4:p:111-122</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Latent demand and the browsing shopper</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This article explores ways of making sense of unplanned purchases on shopping expeditions without seeing shopping as lacking any systematic foundations or reflecting some kind of pathology. The analysis employs both introspection and inputs from cognitive science and focuses on shifts from planned search to browsing in response to promotional cues encountered whilst navigating malls that are designed to promote browsing behaviour. Browsing is examined both in terms of its socio-psychological foundations and with respect to a variety of kinds of latent demand. The economic psychology of attention is examined as are a variety of factors that bring browsing processes to a close. The paper concludes with a discussion of the significance of the analysis in terms of the path dependence of economic systems. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.976</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Peter E Earl</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jason Potts</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:6:p:591-603</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:6:p:591-603</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Costly price adjustment and the optimal rate of inflation</dc:title>
  <dc:description>I analyse the optimal rate of inflation when prices are costly to change. As the costs of price adjustment are the main friction in the model, effects of inflation stem from the accounting role of money. Inflation increases relative price variability and reduces the average product of labour. This productivity distortion may be offset by a reduction in the desired real price. In general, the optimal rate of inflation is zero. This is consistent with early studies in monetary literature (LeBlanc, 1690, Jevons, 1875, Fisher, 1911 and Marshall, 1923), which concentrated on the role of money as a unit of account and argued that the goal of monetary policy should be price stability. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1324</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jerzy D. Konieczny</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:6:p:211-221</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:6:p:211-221</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Foreign direct investment and global sourcing choices of firms in the US</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper investigates factors affecting the global sourcing choices of firms in the US: (1) US investment abroad; (2) foreign direct investment in the US; (3) wage-productivity ratio; and (4) transaction cost. I found that there is a statistically significant association between the country of sourcing choices and foreign direct investment. Both the wage-productivity ratios and transaction costs are not statistically significant at the conventional significance level, but their regression coefficients show proper signs. The paper also examines the patterns of foreign direct investment among countries and compares transaction costs by income group. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.983</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Hong Y Park</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:6:p:455-469</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:6:p:455-469</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Schumpeterian competition and environmental R&amp;D</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Companies' emissions-reducing R&amp;D investments increase in response to Schumpeterian competition-R&amp;D rivalry among large firms-in the context of evolving emissions regulation. Estimation supports a theoretical role for emissions standards: to reduce negative externalities caused by hazardous air emissions, government can set standards that cause firms to accept the uncertainty of R&amp;D. Furthermore, the pressure of R&amp;D competition causes firms to increase their R&amp;D investment. The paper uses primary data about manufacturers' emissions-reducing R&amp;D. Responses to a questionnaire-mailed to the companies in the Business Week R&amp;D Scoreboard sample for 1993-provide the new data about R&amp;D to reduce the toxic air emissions of chemicals targeted in Title III of the 1990 Clean Air Act. The Act stimulated R&amp;D investments by establishing the government's commitment to develop standards-which are still evolving-for the toxic chemicals. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>John T. Scott</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:4-5:p:201-203</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:4-5:p:201-203</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Laboratory economics and managerial decision making</dc:title>
  <dc:description>OID="af1" CNY="CA"&gt;McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Stuart Mestelman</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:4-5:p:277-298</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:4-5:p:277-298</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Laboratory experiments in corporate and investment finance: a survey</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper the small but growing field of experimental Corporate and Investment Finance is reviewed. Excluded is the large and influential experimental asset market literature. Topics covered include experimental examination of agency problems, the interaction of risk and information choices, laboratory tests of asset pricing theories, experimental examination of financing and dividend decisions in the presence of asymmetric information between managers and investors and tests of game theoretic models of corporate takeovers. In general, studies that allow interactions among participants are more successful at corroborating Finance theories, emphasizing the importance of markets for communicating information among participants. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>C. Bram Cadsby</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Elizabeth Maynes</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:5:p:267-280</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:5:p:267-280</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Applying data visualization and knowledge discovery in databases to segment the market for risky financial assets</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper uses the techniques of knowledge discovery in databases (KDD) and data visualization as a methodology to uncover significant clusters in the ownership of risky financial assets. Partitioning by medoids and data visualization identifies two significant clusters among risky asset holders. Cluster one is comparatively young, low wealth, high income consumers, with mortgage debt and regular savings patterns compared with a segment of older, low income, high wealth irregular savers with outright ownership of property. The analysis reveals that previous economic research into portfolio choices may have missed some important interactions and that specific, in addition to generic product needs, can vary with the lifecycle. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>D. Leece</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:5:p:413-414</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:5:p:413-414</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Book review: Privatizing Transportation Systems, edited by Hakim, S., Seidenstat, P. and Bowman, G., Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Wayne K. Talley</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:113-127</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:113-127</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Examining the Penrose effect in an international business context: the dynamics of Japanese firm growth in US industries</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Penrose (1959) theoretically developed the research proposition that the finite capacities of a firm's internally experienced managers limit the rate at which the firm can grow in a given period of time. One empirical implication that follows logically from this line of reasoning is that a fast-growing firm will eventually slow down its growth in the subsequent time period because its firm-specific management team, which is posited to be inelastic at least in the short run, is unable to handle effectively the increased demands that are placed on these internally experienced managers due to increased complexity as well as the time and attention that the new managers require from these internally experienced managers. Consequently, inefficiency in the firm's current operations will follow if the firm maintains its high rate of growth. The research proposition that a firm cannot remain operationally effective if it maintains high rates of growth in successive time periods, and that consequently those firms with foresight typically will slow down their growth in the subsequent time period is known as the 'Penrose effect' in the research literature, and this effect of dynamic adjustment costs has been examined and corroborated in a few empirical research studies. However, researchers have not yet examined the Penrose effect in an international business context.&lt;P&gt;The current paper examines the Penrose effect in an international business context by exploring under what conditions Japanese firms achieve high growth in consecutive time periods in the entered US industries. The empirical results indicate that, consistent with Penrose's (1959) resource- based theory prediction, Japanese multinational firms that entered in US industries where the extent of knowledge tacitness, globalization, and unionization was high, rapid expansion growth in one time period had negative impacts on growth in the subsequent time period. Thus, dynamic adjustment costs limit the rate of the growth of the firm and the development of dynamic capabilities in this international business context, which suggests that the Penrose effect may be widely applicable to international business and corporate strategy. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1212</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Danchi Tan</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Joseph T. Mahoney</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:13-26</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:13-26</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Efficient organization of information processing</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The paper examines the application of the concept of economic efficiency to organizational issues of collective information processing in decision making. Information processing is modeled in the framework of the dynamic parallel processing model of associative computation with an endogenous setup cost of the processors. The model is extended to include the specific features of collective information processing in the team of decision makers which may lead to an error in data analysis. In such a model, the conditions for efficient organization of information processing are defined and the architecture of the efficient structures is considered. We show that specific features of collective decision making procedures require a broader framework for judging organizational efficiency than has traditionally been adopted. In particular, and contrary to the results available in economic literature, we show that there is no unique architecture for efficient information processing structures, but a number of various efficient forms. The results indicate that technological progress resulting in faster data processing (ceteris paribus) will lead to more regular information processing structures. However, if the relative cost of the delay in data analysis increases significantly, less regular structures could be efficient. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1305</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jacek Cukrowski</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Manfred M. Fischer</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:1:p:47-48</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:1:p:47-48</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Investing for Sustainability: The Management of Mineral Wealth, by Hannesson, R. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, ix&amp;plus;109 pp., $66.50 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1037</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>David N. Laband</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:3:p:173-182</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:3:p:173-182</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The link between board composition and board objectives: an empirical analysis on Flemish non-profit schools</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Flemish non-profit schools have no legally imposed composition rules with respect to their board of directors. Hence, large variation exists in their size and composition. We argue that these differences in board composition can result in different policies followed by the board. To empirically test this hypothesis we question the board's chairpersons of Flemish non-profit schools about the objectives set forward by the board. Ordered probit regressions on the importance attached to different educational objectives provide support for our hypothesis and thus alert policy makers to account for the linkages between objectives and board characteristics when formulating legislation with respect to school board composition. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1443</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Cind Du Bois</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ralf Caers</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Marc Jegers</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Rein De Cooman</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Sara De Gieter</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Roland Pepermans</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:6:p:531-552</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:6:p:531-552</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The frequency and costs of individual price adjustment</dc:title>
  <dc:description>How often do the nominal prices of individual goods change? What is the nature of costs of price adjustment? How big are these costs? Answering these questions may be important for constructing macroeconomic models that are useful for monetary policy analysis. The empirical literature reveals that many prices do change infrequently, in part because of physical costs of price adjustment. However, infrequent price adjustment also seems to be related to costs of decision making, to relationships between buyers and sellers, and to strategic behavior among sellers, all in ways that are not yet well understood. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1329</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Alexander L. Wolman</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:803-815</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:803-815</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Hierarchical delays as a source of nominal price rigidities: evidence from the microcomputer industry</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The non-market clearing models of New Keynesian macroeconomic theory rely heavily upon sticky prices to generate business cycle activity following monetary shocks. The dominant theoretical explanations for sticky prices assume a degree of market power in the representative firm (e.g. Mankiw, 1985. Quarterly J. Econ. &lt;B&gt;100&lt;/B&gt;(2): 529-538). Thus, an important element of empirical research is the exploration of sticky prices within more competitive industries. The importance of this analysis is in establishing the potential degree of price stickiness in a representative firm employed in a macroeconomic model. Among the many theoretical explanations of nominal rigidities are the existence of hierarchical delays (Blinder, 1991. Amer. Econ. Rev. &lt;B&gt;72&lt;/B&gt;: 334-348) and decision costs (Tommasi, 1992. Optimal Pricing, Inflation, And The Cost of Price Adjustment, 485-511). Both theories rely on the simple notion that managerial inefficiency, high costs of making decisions and sluggish transmission of information lead to price stickiness. This paper investigates the market for microcomputers in the United States from 1993 to 1995 finding strong evidence of nominal price rigidities attributable to hierarchical delays. Alternate explanations for these rigidities are explored and rejected. These prices are sticky in a monopolistically or workably competitive industry, which provides important additional support for the New Keynesian interpretation. Ordinary least squares, a Poisson count and negative binomial count models are employed in establishing the existence of hierarchical delays. Conclusions are offered regarding the appropriate selection of the characteristics of the representative firm in macroeconomic models. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1371</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Michael J. Hicks</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:139-148</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:139-148</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Problem-solving and competence creation in the early development of new firms</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper aims to identify how entrepreneurial responses to 'barriers' can give rise to opportunities for new firms. The poor predictive record of studies analysing success attributes and favourable initial factors as determinants of new firm growth reflects the diversity of entrepreneurial responses to problems of growth, as illustrated by three case studies of new companies which were able to overcome adverse initial conditions despite the lack of early 'success attributes'. They did so by finding alternative opportunities and by achieving resource economy, resource leverage and resource creation, aided by strategic relationships formed with other players. Spurred by the problems they encounter, entrepreneurial firms revise their business conjecture and engage in innovative activities, their business model evolving through trial and error. Creative responses to unexpected developments by entrepreneurial decision makers have implications for research methodology and business support. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1208</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Oliver Hugo</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Elizabeth Garnsey</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:5:p:295-305</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:5:p:295-305</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Structuring residual income and decision rights under internal governance: results from the Hungarian trucking industry</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The paper offers a property rights and monitoring cost explanation for the allocation of residual income and decision rights between the carriers and truck drivers under internal governance. First, by applying the property rights theory, we argue that the structure of residual income rights depends on the importance of noncontractible (intangible) assets of the truck driver to generate residual surplus. The more important the truck driver's intangible knowledge assets, the more residual income rights should be transferred to him. Second, we controlled for the monitoring costs as an additional explanatory variable of the allocation of residual income rights. According to agency theory, the variable proportion of the driver's income should be higher where monitoring costs are higher. Third, we investigate the relationship between residual income and residual decision rights under internal governance. If the contractual relation is governed by an employment contract, residual decision and residual income rights may be substitutes because, under fiat, a certain incentive effect of the governance structure may result either from the allocation of high-powered incentives or the transfer of residual decision rights to the driver. These hypotheses were tested by using data from the Hungarian trucking industry. The data provide partial support for the hypotheses. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1241</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Josef Windsperger</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Maria Jell</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:2:p:83-88</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:2:p:83-88</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Just-cause provisions, severance pay, and the efficiency wage hypothesis</dc:title>
  <dc:description>A simple model of employment contracting is employed to examine the effectiveness of just-cause provisions in alleviating employer opportunism in two types of efficiency wage contracts-standard contracts, in which wages exceed the worker's marginal contribution, and deferred wages, which are paid after a period of tenure in the firm. It is argued that just-cause employment policies are necessary and sufficient to prevent employer opportunism when standard efficiency wages are utilized. However, just-cause policies are not sufficient to deter employer opportunism when employment contracts are of the delayed-payment type. In these contracts, other contractual provisions, such as severance provisions, are also necessary. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Harvey S. James</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Derek M. Johnson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:7:p:313-314</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:7:p:313-314</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES: WHAT'S NEXT?, edited by Peltzman, S. and Winston, C. Washington, DC: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 2000, ix&amp;plus;199 pp., $39.95 (cloth), $16.95 (paper).</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.994</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Christopher Garbacz</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:3:p:209-222</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:3:p:209-222</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Technological opportunity and the relationship between innovation output and market structure</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study examines influences of technological opportunity on the relationship between market structure and the innovation output of different-size firms. A simultaneous-equations model is specified and estimated separately for technologically progressive and technologically unprogressive industries.&lt;P&gt;The study finds that innovation activities of small firms and large firms bear different relationships to market structure, in part resulting from interindustry differences in technological opportunity. In technologically progressive industries, innovation output (especially of small firms) is lower in the presence of high concentration and is increased substantially by high R&amp;D intensity. Large-firm innovation output has a positive effect on industry concentration, but only in technologically unprogressive industries. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1205</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>C. Timothy Koeller</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:153-175</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:153-175</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Does Culture Matter in Inter-Firm Cooperation? Research Consortia in Japan and the USA</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Collaborative research consortia allow firms to pursue scale and scope economies in research, finance large costly proposals, share risks, avoid unnecessary duplication, internalize the externalities created by research spillovers, and allow the use of firm-specific complementary skills and resources. In this study we examine the evolution of cooperative research organizations in the USA and Japan. We explore the factors which influence the emergence of alternative forms of cooperation. Specifically, we examine the role of culture and the institutional environment in molding the organization of cooperation between firms in R&amp;D and the consequences of such cooperation. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Masao Nakamura</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ilan Vertinsky</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Charlene Zietsma</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:113-129</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:113-129</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Target Costing Performance Based on Alternative Participation and Evaluation Methods: A Laboratory Experiment</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper deals with the motivational impacts of alternative participation and performance-evaluation methods on the cost- reduction performance of product designers in the product development process. Alternative participation methods for establishing the target cost consist of the participative and the nonparticipative approaches. Also, the alternative performance-evaluation methods include evaluations based on only the controllable item measure and on both controllable and uncontrollable items measures. To test the hypothesis which are proposed with respect to the above impacts, a laboratory experiment was conducted on 120 subjects. When participation and performance evaluation factors are considered separately, the cost-reduction performance of product designers is improved if they can participate in the target-setting process and are evaluated by their controllable item information. In investigating their joint influence, it is found that the combination of the participative method and controllable item and nonparticipative and uncontrollable item information have improved cost-reduction performance. Among all the independent variables, controllable item information is the most dominant variable as it has the strongest influence on cost reduction. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Yasuhiro Monden</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Mahmuda Akter</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Naoto Kubo</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:1:p:33-44</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:1:p:33-44</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Recognizing large donations to public goods: an experimental test</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Private charities often publicise generous individual contributions or contributors, possibly to encourage others to give. In contrast, public good experiments used to study voluntary giving commonly tell participants only of total contributions. This paper reports an experimental test of the effect on contributions of supplying additional selective information. A control treatment is run that reveals only total contributions over ten one-shot decision rounds. This is compared to a second treatment that also informs subjects of the maximum contribution made in their group after each round. In a third treatment, subjects are further given the opportunity to make costly rewards to the maximum contributor. Revealing generous contributions appears to raise average contributions slightly. Surprisingly, adding the ability to reward large contributors does little to generate further increases, though it significantly raises the variance of contributions. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1044</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jeremy Clark</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:6:p:344-345</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:6:p:344-345</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Foundations of organizational strategy, by Jensen, M.C., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998.</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>William J. Carney</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:6:p:347-349</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:6:p:347-349</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Marketing strategy and uncertainty, by Jagpal, S., New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, xvii&amp;plus;334 pp., $55.95 (cloth).</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Wolfgang Grassl</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:4:p:335-345</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:4:p:335-345</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A subjectivist approach to strategic management</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Acknowledging the shortcomings of contemporary research on the economics of strategy, this paper proposes a subjectivist approach to strategic management. This subjectivist perspective is originated in German economics and found its base in the Austrian school of economics. Based largely on the works on Max Weber, Alfred Schutz and Ludwig von Mises, this paper develops a subjective interpretation framework which is applied to various fields of strategic management: entrepreneurship, organisation, vertical integration, innovation, marketing and advertising. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1125</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Tony Fu-Lai Yu</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:6:p:355-363</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:6:p:355-363</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A model of management teams</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We present a simple model of management teams where the time it takes to make decisions is related to the size of the committee. We characterize the situations where larger or smaller sizes of the management team are desirable depending on the covariance structure of the signals that the managers observe. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Eduardo Ley</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Mark F.J. Steel</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:485-490</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:485-490</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Benefits and costs of newer drugs: an update</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In previous work, we found strong evidence to support the hypothesis that the replacement of older drugs by new drugs resulted in reductions in total medical expenditures. In this study, we update and extend our previous study of the effect of drug age-years since FDA approval-on total medical expenditure, in several respects: (1) the unit of analysis is a medical condition, rather than a prescription; (2) the sample is much larger, including data for 3 years, rather than 1 year; (3) we obtain estimates for the Medicare population as well as for the entire population; and (4) within the Medicare population, we examine the effect of drug age on Medicare expenditure as well as on expenditure by all payers.&lt;P&gt;The estimates indicate that, in the entire population, a reduction in the age of drugs utilized reduces non-drug expenditure 7.2 times as much as it increases drug expenditure. For example, reducing the mean age of drugs used to treat a condition from 15 years to 5.5 years is estimated to increase prescription drug spending by $18 but reduce other medical spending by $129, yielding a $111 net reduction in total health spending. Most of the savings are due to reductions in hospital expenditure ($80) and in physician office-visit expenditures ($24).

In the Medicare population, a reduction in the age of drugs utilized reduces non-drug expenditure by all payers (i.e. Medicare and various forms of Medicare supplemental insurance, Medicare for dually eligible individuals and Medicare beneficiaries' out of pocket payments) 8.3 times as much as it increases drug expenditure; it reduces Medicare non-drug expenditure 6.0 times as much as it increases drug expenditure. About two-thirds of the non-drug Medicare cost reduction is due to reduced hospital costs. The remaining third is approximately evenly divided between reduced Medicare home health care cost and reduced Medicare office-visit cost.

We also show that Medicare enrollees with private prescription drug coverage tend to use newer drugs than those without such coverage: the mean age of drugs used by Medicare enrollees with private Rx insurance is about 9% lower than the mean age of drugs used by Medicare enrollees without either private or public Rx insurance. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1355</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Frank R. Lichtenberg</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:7:p:398-399</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:7:p:398-399</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Are Predatory Commitments Credible? Who Should the Courts Believe? by Lott, J.R. Jr., Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999, x&amp;plus;173 pp., $29.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-22-649-3555.</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Donald J. Boudreaux</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:6:p:605-617</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:6:p:605-617</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Explaining hump-shaped inflation responses to monetary policy shocks</dc:title>
  <dc:description>According to conventional wisdom, the output effects of a monetary policy shock commence within months of the shock, while most inflationary effects lag significantly. We demonstrate a simple model that can explain the conventional wisdom and is consistent with profit maximizing price setting decisions by firms, based on the assumption that renegotiating existing contracts is costly. Thus, firms jointly choose both their price and the expected length of time for which that price will hold each time they re-contract. We show that such a 'sticky contracting' assumption, combined with menu costs, generates a hump-shaped inflation response to monetary policy shocks. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1326</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>James Yetman</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:4:p:309-323</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:4:p:309-323</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Unraveling the resource-based tangle</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Resource-based theory (RBT) is a prime example of a theory that integrates a management perspective with an economics perspective. As such, its challenge is to keep its arguments logically consistent and clear, despite the risk of their becoming entangled, due to competing and possibly conflicting theoretical influences. We argue, in this paper, that to meet this challenge, it is essential to understand the limits to the domain of RBT. Unless RBT is understood as a resource-level and efficiency-oriented analytical tool, its contribution cannot be understood and appreciated fully. Incorporating aspects of economic theory that fall outside this domain will not increase its power and will only add to the confusion.&lt;P&gt;Continued efforts to increase the analytic precision of RBT and to elaborate its economic logic, however, are worthwhile pursuits. To these aims, then, we provide a sharper definition of competitive advantage, linking this term to value creation and to demand side concerns. Similarly, we provide an economically meaningful definition of value and more precise definitions of critical resources and of economic rents. This allows us to trace a clearer trail of logic, consistent with both the management and the economics perspectives, leading from critical resources to the generation of rents. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1126</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Margaret A. Peteraf</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jay B. Barney</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:6:p:381-382</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:6:p:381-382</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The Effects of Competition: Cartel Policy and the Evolution of Strategy and Structure in British Industry, by Symeonidis, G. Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2002, x&amp;plus;542 pp., $55.00; £37.95 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1072</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Paul A. Pautler</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:1:p:56-57</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:1:p:56-57</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The economics of transaction costs, edited by Rao, P.K., Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, xvi&amp;plus;197 pp., GBP 50.00 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1140</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Ram Mudambi</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:679-700</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:679-700</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Follow the leader: price change timing in Internet-based selling</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Internet technologies should lessen information asymmetry, prompting competitive price reactions, but this does not seem to be happening in Internet-based selling. We study empirical regularities of price change timing for music CD vendors and booksellers to assess several theoretical explanations. Our sample includes 123, 680 daily prices for 169 products and 53 firms. Bertrand competition is insufficient to explain our observation that sellers do not shift prices this way. Tacitly collusive responses to competitors' price changes are observed rather than price changes solely in response to demand or cost shifts as would be expected with Bertrand competition. We find evidence of business rules for strategic pricing associated with tacitly collusive pricing and Edgeworth competition. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1375</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Robert J. Kauffman</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Charles A. Wood</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:4:p:219-220</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:4:p:219-220</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Comment on Kindt's paper</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1178</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Valerie C. Lorenz</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:1:p:45-47</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:1:p:45-47</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The Informant: A True Story, by Eichenwald, K. New York: Broadway Books, 2000, xv&amp;plus;606 pp., $26.00 (cloth), $14.95 (paper)</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1039</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>William F. Shughart II</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:7:p:379-395</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:7:p:379-395</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The impact of signal dependence and own ability awareness on herding behaviour: a tale of two managers</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This model examines the case of managers whose signals, when informative, are perfectly correlated as in the Scharfstein and Stein model &amp;lsqb;1990. The American Economic Review 80(3): 465-479&amp;rsqb;. This has a herd increasing impact as it introduces a positive reputation externality. On the other hand, it is also assumed that managers have perfect knowledge of their own ability, an assumption with herd reducing implications. Combining these two offsetting, in terms of herding, assumptions, it is found that a smart manager who plays first will sometimes, but not always, truthfully announce his|her private information. On the other hand, a smart manager who plays second will always report his|her true signal, while a dumb manager who plays second may herd, either on the first manager's action and|or on the prior. It is also found that the more likely a dumb manager who plays second is to herd on the first manager's action, the less likely is a smart manager who plays first to herd on the prior. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Xeni Dassiou</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:8:p:447-459</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:8:p:447-459</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The existence of gender-specific promotion standards in the U.S.</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper is motivated by the claim that promotion probabilities are lower for women than men. Using data from the 1984 and 1989 National Longitudinal Youth Surveys, this paper tests this claim and two related hypotheses concerning training and ability. It is found that females are less likely to be promoted than males, and females receive less training than males. The relationship between promotion and gender varies across occupations, however, suggesting that the alleged glass ceiling faced by women and other minorities in the workplace is not uniform across all labor markets. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1097</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Kathy A. Paulson Gjerde</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:357-370</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:357-370</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Determinants of drug prices and expenditures</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The process by which pharmaceuticals are bought and sold is exceedingly complex. The major reason is that most consumers do not pay directly for the drugs they consume. Intermediaries are generally present who purchase pharmaceuticals from their manufacturers and have them provided to their subscribers or affiliates. The products themselves, however, are generally supplied by the same pharmacies used by cash purchasers. The purpose of this paper is to describe and examine these markets. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1346</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>William S. Comanor</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Stuart O. Schweitzer</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:2:p:83-90</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:2:p:83-90</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The informational content of the shape of utility functions: financial strategic behavior</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Recently, Pennings and Smidts (2003) showed a relationship between organizational behavior and the global shape of the utility function. Their results suggest that the shape of the utility function may be related to 'higher-order' decisions. This research examines the relationship between financial strategic decisions and the global shape of the utility function of real decision makers. We assess the shape of utility functions of portfolio managers and show that the global shape is related to their strategic asset allocation. The findings demonstrate the informational content of the shape of utility functions in the context of financial strategic behavior. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1439</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Joost M.E. Pennings</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Philip Garcia</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:7:p:565-574</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:7:p:565-574</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Indicators and indexes of directional output loss and input allocative inefficiency</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We extend Grosskopf et al.'s method and create an output loss indicator using directional output distance functions that allows non-radial efficiency gains in output. We compare our new output loss indicator with an indicator of input allocative inefficiency and derive the necessary and sufficient condition for equivalence between the two indicators. We also present an output loss index and corresponding input allocative inefficiency index and consider how indexes are related. Then we extend our analysis to productivity change and derive the necessary and sufficient condition for an output loss change indicator to be equivalent to an indicator of input allocative inefficiency change. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1419</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Hirofumi Fukuyama</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>William L. Weber</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:394-396</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:394-396</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>After Enron: lessons for public policy, edited by Niskanen, W. A. Lanham, MD: Rowman &amp; Littlefield, 2005, x &amp;plus; 397 pp., USD 34.95 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1298</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Michael Reksulak</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:5:p:411-416</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:5:p:411-416</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>An economic analysis of Japanese distribution systems</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We investigate Japanese distribution systems by using a successive monopoly model in which the dealer can increase demand for the commodity. We compare the Tatene system (TS) with the open price system (OPS), and show that in cases where the dealer's power of sales promotion is small (large), the total profits obtained through TS become larger (smaller) than those of the OPS. This result justifies the actual change from TS to OPS from an economic point of view. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1114</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Atsuo Utaka</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:1:p:43-54</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:1:p:43-54</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The status of the core in the airline industry: the case of the European market</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Andreas Antoniou</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:3:p:163-171</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:3:p:163-171</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Hostile-vs.-white-knight bidders</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We examine the hypothesis that white knights enter control contests to spend free cash flow instead of paying it out to shareholders. Tobin's q is used to measure management's inclination to invest in negative NPV investments. We find that historically, white knights have over-invested and their acquisition of the target is one more negative NPV investment. Alternatively, hostile bidders' past investment decisions have increased shareholder wealth. Furthermore, white knights' returns upon the announcement of their bid have a significant negative relationship with free cash flow, implying that their bid reveals information about white knights management's investment decisions. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Carolyn Carroll</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>John M. Griffith</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Patricia M. Rudolph</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:469-479</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:469-479</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The cost of biopharmaceutical R&amp;D: is biotech different?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The costs of developing the types of new drugs that have been pursued by traditional pharmaceutical firms have been estimated in a number of studies. However, similar analyses have not been published on the costs of developing the types of molecules on which biotech firms have focused. This study represents a first attempt to get a sense for the magnitude of the R&amp;D costs associated with the discovery and development of new therapeutic biopharmaceuticals (specifically, recombinant proteins and monoclonal antibodies &amp;lsqb;mAbs&amp;rsqb;).&lt;P&gt;We utilize drug-specific data on cash outlays, development times, and success in obtaining regulatory marketing approval to estimate the average pre-tax R&amp;D resource cost for biopharmaceuticals up to the point of initial US marketing approval (in year 2005 dollars). We found average out-of-pocket (cash outlay) cost estimates per approved biopharmaceutical of $198 million, $361 million, and $559 million for the preclinical period, the clinical period, and in total, respectively. Including the time costs associated with biopharmaceutical R&amp;D, we found average capitalized cost estimates per approved biopharmaceutical of $615 million, $626 million, and $1241 million for the preclinical period, the clinical period, and in total, respectively. Adjusting previously published estimates of R&amp;D costs for traditional pharmaceutical firms by using past growth rates for pharmaceutical company costs to correspond to the more recent period to which our biopharmaceutical data apply, we found that total out-of-pocket cost per approved biopharmaceutical was somewhat lower than for the pharmaceutical company data ($559 million vs $672 million). However, estimated total capitalized cost per approved new molecule was nearly the same for biopharmaceuticals as for the adjusted pharmaceutical company data ($1241 million versus $1318 million). The results should be viewed with some caution for now given a limited number of biopharmaceutical molecules with data on cash outlays, different therapeutic class distributions for biopharmaceuticals and for pharmaceutical company drugs, and uncertainty about whether recent growth rates in pharmaceutical company costs are different from immediate past growth rates. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1360</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Joseph A. DiMasi</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Henry G. Grabowski</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:251-265</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:251-265</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>'Branded Generics' as a strategy to limit cannibalization of pharmaceutical markets</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper demonstrates how, by introducing a generic version of its previously patented product, a branded firm can influence the equilibrium in the generic segment of the market for the product. This in turn can increase the firm's profits from selling the branded version. We then use structural estimates from previous literature to calculate the magnitude of the effects in the generic and branded segments. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1339</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>David Reiffen</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Michael R. Ward</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:8:p:863-877</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:8:p:863-877</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Corporate investments and growth options</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Real options theory models certain corporate investments as investments in growth options, yet there is little direct evidence on whether firms actually capture growth option value from these investments. In the current paper, we attempt to bridge this empirical gap, and we also examine the conditions under which the growth option value embedded in such investments is enhanced. Results from a sample of manufacturing firms during 1989-2000 reveal that investments in research and development and joint venture (JV) investments contribute to firms' growth option values. We also show that, among JVs of different ownership structures, only minority JVs increase growth option value. Our findings affirm options theory's assertion that real options can help firms capture valuable upside opportunities, they highlight the value of examining contingencies that drive option value, and they also point to the challenges firms face in realizing the unique benefits the theory emphasizes. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1335</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jeffrey J. Reuer</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Tony W. Tong</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:611-626</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:611-626</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Explaining the shape of corporate law: the role of competition</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper reviews the effects of competition among jurisdictions for corporate chartering business on the shape of corporate law in the USA. It finds that competition has led to substantial uniformity, tempered by a dynamic process that introduces innovations from multiple jurisdictions. The speed with which changes are adopted depends on the identity of the sponsoring interest group. Corporate lawyers play a major role in the US corporate law production, but are hampered by collective action problems that are somewhat ameliorated by sponsorship of model legislation by the American Bar Association. Corporate managers appear to be the most effective sponsors, because changes they sponsor are adopted at a more rapid rate. The paper concludes that this competition for charters, influenced both by efficient capital markets and a desire to retain local chartering business, tends to compete away special interest benefits in corporate law. A comparison of the shape of corporate laws in Europe, where no competition exists, with US laws shows that groups such as management, labor and creditors have obtained significantly more benefits than in the USA. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>William J. Carney</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:4-5:p:225-238</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:4-5:p:225-238</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>What have we learned from emissions trading experiments?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Emissions trading is a form of environmental regulation in which a regulatory body specifies the total allowable discharge of pollutants, divides this cap into individual permits assigned to individual polluters, and allows trading of the resulting permits. Laboratory experiments, in which paid subjects participate in controlled markets, can be used to test both proposals for emission trading and the theories on which they are based. This paper surveys the laboratory research that has investigated the efficiency of emission trading programs, the role of alternative instruments and institutions, the effects of allowing firms to carry inventories of permits, and the extent to which market power can be exercised. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>R. Andrew Muller</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Stuart Mestelman</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:1:p:1-20</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:1:p:1-20</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Industry clustering of initial public offerings</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Extant empirical evidence has documented both a temporal variation in the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) and an industry clustering effect in these offerings. This article attempts to provide insights into this phenomenon by: (i) identifying industry conditions that influence IPO clustering, (ii) analyzing differences in characteristics of clustered versus non-clustered IPOs, and (iii) studying the impact of IPO clustering on long-run operating performance. We find that IPO clustering is more likely to occur in high-growth fragmented industries that are characterized by strong investment opportunities, favorable investor sentiment, and which require high levels of investments in R&amp;D. Further, we document a negative relation between post-IPO operating performance and whether the IPO firm goes public in its industry cluster period. We conclude that the relatively poor post-IPO operating performance of firms that go public in industry cluster periods likely reflects industry overinvestment arising from too many firms within that industry chasing the same investment opportunities. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1245</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Bharat A. Jain</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Omesh Kini</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:3:p:271-272</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:3:p:271-272</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Book review: The ownership of enterprise, by Hansmann, H., Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>William F. Shughart</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:563-586</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:563-586</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Shareholder litigation: share price movements, news releases, and settlement amounts</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Under SEC Rule 10b-5, shareholders can sue a corporation that they believe has materially misled them about the firm's prospects. Recent legislation calls for reform of the rules governing shareholder class action litigation. Writers for the business press and experts testifying before the US Congress have argued that such litigation is largely frivolous in that attorneys target firms with highly volatile stock return histories, and litigated price drops are caused by return sensitivity to contemporaneous market movements. Further, they argue that the legal structure surrounding shareholder litigation produces excessive settlements based on the target firms' fear of large jury verdicts. &lt;P&gt;This paper examines volatility and market sensitivity for both sued and nonsued firms. The approach is different from that of earlier papers in several ways. First, rather than selecting an arbitrary period prior to the lawsuit filing date, we examine both the financial performance and news-release characteristics of sued firms during the alleged misleading information period (MIP) of the suit: that is, during the period in which investors allege the firm misled the market. Second, we divide the lawsuit sample into categories depending on the allegations in the suit and the proximity of the MIP to the disclosure that caused the suit. Third, sued and nonsued firm samples are larger than those in earlier papers; for example, our sued firm sample includes 491 observations. Comparison group samples have also been broadened to include industry, size, past behavior of sued firms, and firms acquitted of the charges.

We find that sued firms are more likely to experience episodes of very poor price performance than the population of nonsued firms. Sued firms exhibit higher systematic risk than the population of nonsued firms. Prior to the alleged misleading information period, sued firms experience abnormal positive returns for about 3 years. However, during the misleading information period, sued firms experience significant negative abnormal return. Sued firms issue more positive news in the MIP than matched groups of nonsued firms. Finally, we find that settlement values are significantly positively related to the seriousness of allegations in the suit, the length of time during which the shareholders allege they were misled, and to the overly optimistic tone of announcements about the firm during this misleading information period. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>James D. Beck</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Sanjai Bhagat</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:3:p:199-200</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:3:p:199-200</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Book Review: THE SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, by Nelson, R.R., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>R.N. Langlois</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:6:p:383-384</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:6:p:383-384</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>OPERATIONS RESEARCH: METHODS, MODELS, AND APPLICATIONS, edited by Aronson, J.E. and Zionts, S., Quorum Books, Westport, CT, 400 pp., $65.00 (cloth).</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>J.H. Dulá</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:1:p:37-55</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:1:p:37-55</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The role of productive efficiency on entry and post-entry performance under different strategic orientation: the case of the Greek plastics and rubber industry</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The present study formulates and empirically tests the hypothesis that the post-entry performance and growth of new firms is affected by the way in which crucial resources are combined during the decision-making process to enter the industry or not. Further, the study empirically tests the hypothesis that multifaceted productive efficiency influences both the entry decision and the entrants' post-entry performance. The proposed analytical framework allows for testing these hypotheses under different strategic orientations assumed to be followed by entrants. Results of the estimated partial observability model provide support to these hypotheses in almost all of the examined cases. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1399</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Kostas Tsekouras</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Dimitris Skuras</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Irene Daskalopoulou</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:6:p:491-506</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:6:p:491-506</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>'Green money' in the bank: firm responses to environmental financial responsibility rules</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Financial responsibility rules are an increasingly common form of environmental regulation. Currently, the operators of landfills, underground petroleum storage tanks, offshore rigs, and oil tankers must demonstrate the existence of adequate levels of capital as a precondition to the legal operation of their businesses. Environmental financial responsibility ensures that firms possess the resources to compensate society for pollution costs created in the course of business operations. In addition to providing a source of funds for victim compensation and pollution remediation, financial responsibility is thought to motivate better decision-making, particularly regarding the management of long-term risks. This article describes firms' strategic responses to financial responsibility rules and their implications for the promise of financial responsibility as a complement to conventional environmental regulation. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>James Boyd</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:3-4:p:93-94</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:3-4:p:93-94</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The behavioural economics of consumption: an introduction to the special issue</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.981</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Gordon R. Foxall</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:8:p:447-448</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:8:p:447-448</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Winners, losers and Microsoft: competition and antitrust in high technology, by Liebowitz, S.J. and Margolis, S.E. Foreword by Jack Hirshleifer. Oakland, CA: The Independent Institute, 1999, xiv&amp;plus;288 pp., $29.95 (cloth).</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Francois Melese</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:6:p:421-431</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:6:p:421-431</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Firm ownership patterns and motives for voluntary pollution control</dc:title>
  <dc:description>From the viewpoint of standard theory, firms have sometimes seemed to overcontrol pollution. However, Gordon (1990) and others have noted that the more diversified investors are the greater the degree of internalization of externalities. This paper explores the implications of diversification for the firm's choice of pollution in comparison with alternative explanations of voluntary pollution control, such as profit-seeking through regulatory influence, and altruism. The paper also addresses issues arising from the spatial aspects of pollution, and the relationship between stockholder and managerial incentives for pollution control. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Jon D. Harford</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:363-378</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:363-378</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>CEO compensation and the seasoned equity offering decision</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Empirical research on seasoned equity offerings indicates that the decision to make an SEO typically engenders a decline in firm value, as investors interpret this decision as a signal of poor financial health or that the stock is overpriced. Here, we add to the literature by analyzing the short-term market reaction to SEO announcements and the chief executive officer's link to firm performance (i.e. the proportion of CEO equity-based compensation). Results support the hypothesis that investors are more likely to view the announcement of an SEO as a last resort source of capital when the proportion of CEO equity-based compensation is high. In such cases of high equity-based compensation, our findings indicate that the SEO announcement provides an incremental signal of financial distress above that provided by financial statements. We also find this relationship (last resort signal) to be stronger when large information asymmetries exist between management and investors. Thus, managers should consider the ramifications of executive compensation structure when considering whether to make an SEO. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1268</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Joseph F. Brazel</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Elizabeth Webb</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:7:p:269-284</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:7:p:269-284</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Firm resources and joint ventures: what determines zero-sum versus positive-sum outcomes?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this study, we are concerned with the resources that are brought to joint ventures, and whether or not the way in which those resources are combined can improve parent-firm performance. We are also interested in whether or not the exposure of valuable resources through the permeable membrane of the joint venture can have an adverse effect on performance. These questions are explored using a sample of 74 domestic, dyadic joint ventures, and our findings suggest that the strategy can have zero-sum and positive-sum outcomes. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.991</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>James A. Wolff</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Richard Reed</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:8:p:639-655</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:8:p:639-655</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Optimal dynamic pricing for sports games with habitual attendance</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the optimal pricing decisions of a sports team that maximizes lifetime profits in sports markets where game attendance is habit-forming for sports fans. The long-run equilibrium price and attendance level are found to be greater than the counterparts of the static framework, respectively. The infinite horizon model shows that the pricing strategy of the firm brings about an upward-crossing of two different dynamic price paths where the price path with stronger habit formation initially stays below, catches up, and ultimately rises above the price path with weaker habit formation. It is worth noting that the upward-crossing phenomenon is not fully understood in a finite-period model. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1427</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Dong C. Won</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Young H. Lee</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:8:p:315-328</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:8:p:315-328</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Do firm and state antitakeover provisions affect how well CEOs earn their pay?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The relationship between CEO pay-adjusted firm performance and firm-specific antitakeover amendments and state antitakeover laws is examined. The findings suggest that the potential entrenchment resulting from the reduced threat of external control provided by antitakeover provisions may allow the CEO to deliver a lower level of firm performance relative to their compensation. At first glance, the state antitakeover provisions appear to be insignificant in the presence of firm-specific amendments. However, further analysis reveals they can play an important role, in some cases reinforcing the effects of the firm-specific amendments. With respect to the firm-specific amendments, the negative relation is associated with the presence of blank check preferred stock and poison pill amendments. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.992</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Scott W. Barnhart</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Michael F. Spivey</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>John C. Alexander</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:3-4:p:159-165</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:3-4:p:159-165</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>On the benefits of collaboration: consumer psychology, behavioral economics and relational frame theory</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Consumer behavior is a pervasive feature of the human circumstance, and its study has long been pursued by behaviorally oriented psychologists, among whom may be counted John B. Watson. Relatively few behaviorists have addressed these issues, however, with the result that the field of consumer behavior is crippled by dualistic propositions and weak methodologies (Foxall GR. 1992. The consumer situation: an integrative model for research in marketing. Journal of Marketing Management &lt;B&gt;8&lt;/B&gt;: 383-404; 1998. Radical behaviorist interpretation: generating and evaluating an account of consumer behavior. The Behavior Analyst &lt;B&gt;21&lt;/B&gt;: 321-354). As such, the field is ready for a reformulation of its basic premises and the adoption of more rigorous, experimental procedures. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.980</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Rene Quiñones</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Linda J. Hayes</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Steven C. Hayes</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:8:p:549-550</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:8:p:549-550</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Reinventing the bazaar: A natural history of markets, by John McMillan. New York: W. W. Norton, 2002, x &amp;plus;278 pp., USD25.95 (cloth), ISBN 0-393-05021-1</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1219</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Paul Rubin</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:649-656</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:649-656</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Small price changes and menu costs</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We find that while some individual price changes are indeed 'small', the average price change of different products within a store in any given month is not. Moreover, the smaller the price change of an individual product, the larger the average price change of the remaining products sold by the store. We argue that these findings are consistent with extensions of menu cost models of price-setting behavior to multiproduct firms when these firms have high average costs and low marginal costs of changing prices. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1383</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Saul Lach</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Daniel Tsiddon</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:3:p:163-174</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:3:p:163-174</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Causes and effects of multimarket activity from theory to empirical analysis</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper some of the results emerged in the empirical literature on diversification are put into perspective against the background of a simple integrative model of multiproduct firms. By letting diversification strategies depend on the simultaneous play of four factors (demand relationships and technological links between goods, collusion within a market and across markets), the latter provides an illustrative framework which is useful to discuss how effectively the issue of ambiguous findings has been tackled in applied works. In some cases scholars have devoted substantial effort in order to build tests which can successfully discriminate among the different views on the causes and effects of diversification, while in other circumstances empirical investigations have been conducted with much less care. Other then criticising some of the methods used in the past, the paper provides a number of suggestions that can help guiding future empirical work on corporate diversification. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1143</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Davide Vannoni</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:2:p:139-140</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:2:p:139-140</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Book Review: VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN CABLE TELEVISION, by Waterman, D. and Weiss, A.A., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Alden F. Abbott</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:7:p:537-547</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:7:p:537-547</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Marketing|inventory interactions in the characterization of retailer response to manufacturer trade deals</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper presents a characterization of a profit-maximizing retailer's response to a manufacturer trade deal that encompasses both marketing and operations concerns. Price pass-through behaviour is based on demand being realized over time, at a given rate, thereby allowing for the introduction of inventory-related costs. The analysis establishes a direct and positive link between the incidence of forward buying and the incidence of more-than-100% price pass-through policies. As a result, unless restricted by anti-hoarding policies, the profit-maximizing retailer's strategy tends towards large price reductions, but only for a small fraction of the units acquired at the discounted price. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1272</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>F. J. Arcelus</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>G. Srinivasan</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:8:p:429-436</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:8:p:429-436</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Uncertain tax rules and futures hedging</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper considers the optimal futures hedging decision under uncertain tax treatment. If the Corn Products (CP) rule applies, gains or losses from futures trading can offset business gains or losses. However, under the Arkansas Best (AB) doctrine, offsetting is not allowed. We show that the risk neutral firm will not trade futures contracts if the probability the CP rule prevails is small. When the probability is sufficiently large, the firm will assume an underhedge. A risk averse firm is likely to trade, even if the AB rule prevails. As long as the CP ruling is not a sure thing, the firm will engage in underhedge. The effects of average business profits, the volatility of business profits, and risk aversion on the optimal futures position are provided. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Donald Lien</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:5:p:393-402</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:5:p:393-402</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The profitability-risk tradeoff of just-in-time manufacturing technologies</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Qualitative survey studies and a recent quantitative study by Callen et al. (2000) indicate that JIT manufacturing is more profitable than conventional non-JIT manufacturing. This study tests the hypothesis that the excess profitability of JIT manufacturing just compensates for the additional operational risks of JIT technology relative to conventional manufacturing. An often-suggested alternative hypothesis is that JIT manufacturing dominates conventional manufacturing in reducing costs and increasing revenues and that risk is not an issue. The multivariate results unambiguously reject the hypothesis that excess JIT profits are compensation for additional risk. We find that profitability is inversely related to risk, especially for JIT plants. We also find that the JIT plants in our sample are more profitable than non-JIT plants even after adjusting for risk, consistent with the dominance argument. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1104</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jeffrey L. Callen</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Mindy Morel</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Chris Fader</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:1-3:p:17-63</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:1-3:p:17-63</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The costs of addicted gamblers: should the states initiate mega-lawsuits similar to the tobacco cases?</dc:title>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.997</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>John Warren Kindt</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:5:p:241-257</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:5:p:241-257</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The substitutability of brands</dc:title>
  <dc:description>A behavior analytical interpretation of consumer brand choice is proposed. The brands studied are of fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) which are functionally substitutable but differentiated by marketing activity ('branding'). If functional equivalence was the sole basis of brand substitutability, consumers would either practice single brand purchasing or allocate purchases approximately indifferently (and approximately equally) among competing brands. Brand shares would tend at equilibrium toward equal size. But consumers typically buy several brands of those available, while brand shares vary markedly. The observed patterns of consumer choice are consistent with the predictions of matching theory if brands are assumed to be imperfect substitutes that provide qualitatively different reinforcers. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Gordon R. Foxall</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:7:p:421-429</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:7:p:421-429</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Enron, corporate governance and deterrence</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper, I investigate the lessons from the financial scandals surrounding companies like Enron and WorldCom. These companies have generated concerns leading to the legal reform of corporate governance in America, and to the revision of voluntary, self-regulatory codes in Europe. The passage of time since the Enron debacle shows that critics were too quick to criticize, since the required adjustments have more the nature of minor adjustments to regulations. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1255</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Antony W. Dnes</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:6:p:379-380</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:6:p:379-380</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives, by Posner, E.A. and Adler, M.D. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2001, v &amp;plus; 351 pp., $39.00 (cloth); $20.00 (paper)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1070</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Francois Melese</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:681-692</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:681-692</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>State antitakeover legislation and firm financial policy</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In the wake of numerous hostile corporate takeover attempts in the 1980s, many states enacted antitakeover legislation, often as a direct response to a particular takeover effort in the specific state. A number of empirical studies assess the impact of such statutes on firm value using traditional event methodology. While the event type research may capture the immediate market assessment of the impact of such legislation, the legislation can affect longer term financial policies of the affected firms. Theorists have speculated that firms less exposed to a takeover threat are more likely to pursue a longer term investment strategy, that leverage may substitute for or complement other existing takeover defenses, and that protected firms may require additional external monitoring. The results of this study indicate that protected firms increase both capital expenditures and R&amp;D relative to assets and sales. Further, there are increases in dividends but only small changes in leverage. Firms with antitakeover amendments in place prior to the legislation show lower increases in capital spending and R&amp;D, and modest evidence of a greater tendency to increase debt levels. While these results indicate that the laws influence subsequent firm strategy, that does not necessarily mean that these changes in policy improve firm value. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>William N. Pugh</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>John S. Jahera</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:4:p:259-269</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:4:p:259-269</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Simultaneous determination of inventories and accounts receivable</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The study presents a model based on 3375 observations from industrial firms in Pakistan, and the three-stage least square (3SLS) technique has been applied for the estimation. The results indicate that the economic order quantity (EOQ) of inventories is not a constant magnitude; it is a variable closely associated with 'time trend'. While the 'buffer stock' element can be estimated through the constant term of an equation. Receivables from customers show a negative correlation with liquid assets and the cost of production. Receivables are also shown to act as substitute for closing inventories. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1221</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Ayub Mehar</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:505-520</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:505-520</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Status in organizations: where evolutionary theory ranks</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper briefly examines status amongst individuals in contemporary workplace organizations from an evolutionary perspective. The core thesis of this paper is that social and cultural explanations for status fail to adequately explain the pervasiveness of status in organizational contexts. An evolutionary perspective on status is introduced, which explicitly includes biological as well as social and cultural factors in an explanation of the pervasiveness of the construct. This approach is supported by a brief discussion of the evidence converging on the role of biological factors impacting upon status, and discussion of the possibilities for an evolutionary approach to research on status in organizations. An example is also provided of the type of new research that an evolutionary approach can generate. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Deborah A. Waldron</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:2:p:63-74</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:2:p:63-74</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Inflation, output and stock prices: evidence from Latin America</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Research in economics and finance documents a puzzling negative relationship between stock returns and inflation rate in markets of industrialized economies. The present study investigates this relationship for the developing markets of Peru and Chile. Fama's model of linkages between inflation and real economic activity constitutes the theoretical framework of this paper. The study tests whether the negative relationship between equity returns and inflation is a result of a 'proxy effect', namely, a negative relationship between inflation and real economic activity. The evidence for Peru and Chile does not provide strong support for Fama's hypothesis. It is shown that the negative relationship between the real stock returns and unexpected inflation persists after purging inflation of the effects of the real economic activity. The long-run equilibrium between stock prices and general price levels is weak, as indicated by the findings of the Johansen and Juselius co-integration tests. However, in both economies, stock prices and general price levels seem to show a strong long-run equilibrium with the real economic activity. These findings suggest that in the long-run, Fama's propositions A and B are supported for Peru and Chile. The disparity between traditional regression and co-integration test results suggest that it may be prudent to re-examine the proxy effect in the framework of a long-run relationship before denying its validity. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Bahram Adrangi</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Arjun Chatrath</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Todd M. Shank</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:73-85</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:73-85</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Inventory Reduction and Productivity Growth: A Comparison of Japanese and US Automotive Sectors</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study assesses the inventory and productivity performance of the Japanese and US automotive industries in recent decades. Within each country we distinguish between vehicle assemblers and parts suppliers. In Japan, assemblers and suppliers made dramatic inventory reductions and productivity gains, particularly during the 1970s. By comparison, we find an unbalanced pattern for the United States: American assembly plants have been streamlined, but parts suppliers have stagnated. In both countries our findings suggest a strong association between inventory reduction and productivity growth © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Marvin B. Lieberman</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Shigeru Asaba</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:5:p:181-189</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:5:p:181-189</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Survivorship in the US hospital services industry</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Over the last two decades, changing state and federal regulations and increased price competition have dramatically changed the environment in which hospitals compete. This paper uses observations drawn at 5-year intervals from 1973 to 1993 for each of the 50 states to examine the specific effect of these factors on the size distribution of hospitals. It finds that Certificate of Need (CON) laws and rate review regulations have tended to favor large hospitals. The paper also finds that hospitals have responded to increased payer price sensitivity by seeking a medium bed-size capacity. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.969</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Rexford E. Santerre</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Debra Pepper</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:87-100</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:87-100</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Japanese-American Joint Restructuring of National Steel Corporation</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In 1984, NKK corporation, a leading Japanese steel maker, acquired from the National Intergroup Inc. (NII), an American holding company, its 50% equity interest in National Steel Corporation (NSC), the fourth largest integrated steel firm in the US. In spite of the US economic recovery that began in 1992, NSC continued to operate in deficit and in June 1994 NKK brought in a new management team consisting of six American executives and one Japanese executive. Since the third quarter of 1994, NSC has turned its financial performance around. In this paper, using Bayesian estimation procedures, we estimate the join point or the time at which the productivity of NSC's major production lines experienced an upward shift; if the join point occurs after an appropriate gestation period of the new management team, NSC's recovery may be said to be due to the efforts by the new management team. After confirming that indeed this is the case, we discuss how the management team achieved the turnaround. The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the background. In the third section Bayesian procedures for estimating a join point are presented. In the fourth section we discuss restructuring at NSC and the Japanese Total Quality Control system. Conclusions are given in the final section. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Yoshi Tsurumi</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Hiroki Tsurumi</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:8:p:537-547</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:8:p:537-547</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A note on equity ownership and corporate value in Greece</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study attempts to investigate whether corporate performance is affected by the ownership structure, using data from companies quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange for the period 1996-1998. Given such an objective, the basic hypothesis examined, is that corporate performance as measured by Tobin's Q ratio is a function of ownership and other control variables. Our econometric approach relies on the use of a combination of time series and cross section data (panel-data analysis), a procedure that avoids many statistical problems. After examining the role of each identifiable shareholder, we find a positive relationship between institutional investors and corporate performance. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1181</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>G.A. Karathanassis</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>A.A. Drakos</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:3:p:99-113</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:3:p:99-113</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A comparison of two voting models to forecast election into The National Baseball Hall of Fame</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We present a comparison of two voting models to forecast election into The National Baseball Hall of Fame by the Baseball Writers Association of America. Although both voting models provide similar predictions on which eligible players should be elected into the Baseball Hall of Fame, we believe that the voting model that uses individual performance variables rather than a single performance index is marginally better because it allows the data to determine the relative importance of the individual performance variables included in the single performance index. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1050</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>David W. Findlay</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Clifford E. Reid</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:2-3:p:71-77</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:2-3:p:71-77</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Frontiers of strategic management research: introduction to the special issue</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1387</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Catherine A. Maritan</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Margaret A. Peteraf</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:6:p:433-442</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:6:p:433-442</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>EPA's toxic release inventory: stimulus and response</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Jeffrey C. Terry</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Bruce Yandle</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:6:p:489-502</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:6:p:489-502</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Building micro-foundations for the routines, capabilities, and performance links</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Micro-foundations have become an important emerging theme in strategic management. This paper addresses micro-foundations in two related ways. First, we argue that the kind of macro (or 'collectivist') explanation that is presently utilized in the capabilities view in strategic management-which implies a neglect of micro-foundations-is incomplete. There are no mechanisms that work solely on the macro-level, directly connecting routines and capabilities to firm-level outcomes. While routines and capabilities are useful shorthand for complicated patterns of individual action and interaction, ultimately they are best understood at the micro-level. Second, we provide a formal model that shows precisely why macro-explanation is incomplete and which exemplifies how explicit micro-foundations may be built for notions of routines and capabilities and how these impact firm performance. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1413</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Peter Abell</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Teppo Felin</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Nicolai Foss</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:8:p:535-548</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:8:p:535-548</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Business portfolio restructuring, prior diversification posture and investor reactions</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study examined firm performance in market reaction to two types of business portfolio restructuring announcements: refocusing and repositioning. We predicted that market performance effects for these two types of strategic restructurers would be moderated by prior diversification posture. The theory behind these expectations was built on a general premise that restructuring strategy would be more favorably viewed by the market as performance enhancing when it offered greater potential for organizational transformation. Results showed strong support for our conclusion that prior diversification posture poses a significant contingency factor in restructuring firms' strategic choices. Further, the market tended to respond more favorably with this sample to repositioning restructuring choices. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1116</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Robin T. Byerly</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Bruce T. Lamont</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Terrill Keasler</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:6:p:371-378</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:6:p:371-378</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Time-to-market, window of opportunity, and salvageability of a new product development</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The time-to-market in the presence of a window of opportunity is analyzed using ;a probabilistic model, i.e. a model where the completion time of new product development is a random variable characterized by a gamma distribution. Two cases are considered: the first, a case where the discounted return-on-investment exceeds the return expected from a conservative investment-e.g. investment in bonds-termed 'the profitable case'; and the second, a case where the discounted return-on-investment just balances the cost of new product development, termed 'the salvageable case'. The model constructed is focused on the financial aspects of new product development. It allows a decision-maker to monitor, as well as terminate, a project based on its expected value (at any time prior to completion) by computing the mean time-to-market that provides profit, investment salvage, or loss. The mean time-to-market computed by the model may be compared with that estimated by the technology development team for decision-making purposes. Finally, in the presence of a window of opportunity and for the specific cases analyzed, we recommend to always keep the expenditure rate lower than the expected return rate. This will provide the decision-maker a salvageable exit opportunity if project termination is decided. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1074</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>A. Messica</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>A. Mehrez</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:1-12</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:1-12</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Rural Internet access: over-subscription strategies, regulation and equilibrium</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper presents an analysis of the Internet access market using a game theoretic model. In particular, we consider the Nash equilibrium of the service providers and examine their behavior on network investment and output level. We calibrate this model to fit the industry structure and data found in rural markets. In the first part of the paper, we examine the Internet industry structure and its characteristics. Based on the industry structure, we create a Cournot duopoly model, in which real world cost and revenue projections are used to find Internet access market equilibrium. In conclusion, we analyze social welfare of the equilibrium. These analyses allow us to explain the motivation for the rural ISPs' behavior, such as over-subscription and under-investment and to present an analytical framework for Internet industry policy makers. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1306</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>SeungJae Shin</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Martin B. Weiss</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jack Tucci</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:4:p:343-344</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:4:p:343-344</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Pythagoras's Petulant Persecutors</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Ruggiero et al. (1997) argue that the 'Pythagorean Theorem' is an inappropriate basis for evaluating baseball managers and has an illogical arithmetic property that can result in a manager's evaluation being dependent upon the strength of his team. Their argument in the former regard is based on their failure to recognize that the existence of an ex post identity does not preclude the development of a related ex ante hypothesis; their argument in the latter regard is based on their conviction that their criterion for evaluating managers is correct and any other criterion is incorrect. The present remarks clarify these issues. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Ira Horowitz</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:8:p:437-445</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:8:p:437-445</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A geometric treatment of discriminatory pricing among spatially competitive suppliers, with antitrust applications</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Richard S. Higgins</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:693-708</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:693-708</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Management optimism and corporate acquisitions: evidence from insider trading</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this study we integrate evidence about managers' personal beliefs about their firms' prospects into an analysis of managerial decisions on acquisitions and takeover resistance. We examine insider trading (a proxy for personal beliefs) around significant corporate acquisitions and find little cross-sectional differences in the trading patterns of all managers around an acquisition. In general, the insiders do not change their trading patterns in the period when their firm is making an important corporate acquisition. We still obtain this result after controlling for the announcement-day abnormal return. We also find that while managers of firms that do not become takeover targets themselves and of firms that are eventually targets of friendly bids earn positive abnormal returns in the period after their trade, this is not true for managers of firms that are later subject to a hostile bid. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Ekkehart Boehmer</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jeffry M. Netter</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:2:p:109-117</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:2:p:109-117</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The surprising benefits of a parallel universe</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Suppose that the successful completion of a project requires performing n tasks, each of which has a probability of success p. The paper establishes under what conditions it may be profitable to engage in parallel multi-tasking, i.e. tackling each task by following two independent routes. It is found that for ∀n&gt;1 parallel multi-tasking is profitable for a wide range of parameters when costs are linear and is always profitable for convex costs. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1441</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Manfredi M.A. La Manna</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:751-762</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:751-762</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The frequency and size of price adjustment: microeconomic evidence</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper presents direct, non-parametric microeconomic evidence on pricing behavior and evaluates the findings in light of theories of nominal price rigidity. The main issues examined include the durability of price quotations and the size of price changes. The analysis is based on a unique high-frequency panel data set of consumer prices recorded in 1993-1996 in Hungary. The results indicate that price adjustment patterns in the sample are primarily consistent with implications of two-sided (S,s) pricing models. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1381</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Attila Rátfai</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:6:p:343-354</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:6:p:343-354</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>What makes a blockbuster? Economic analysis of film success in the United Kingdom</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper, we attempt to evaluate whether a film's commercial performance can be forecast. The statistical distribution of film revenues in the UK is examined and found to have unbounded variance. This undermines much of the existing work relating a film's performance to its identifiable attributes within an OLS model. We adopt De Vany and Walls' approach and transform the revenue data into a binary variable and estimate the probability that a film's revenue will exceed a given threshold value; in other words, the probability of a blockbuster. Furthermore, we provide a sensitivity analysis around these threshold values. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1069</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Alan Collins</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Chris Hand</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Martin C. Snell</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:2:p:119-133</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:2:p:119-133</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A real-option rationale for investing in excess capacity</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Excess capacity is expensive, yet persistent excess capacity is widely observed in the corporate sector. Using a real-option approach to capacity planning, this paper shows that under certain conditions it is optimal to invest in long-term (even permanent) excess capacity. This results from the asymmetric nature of operating flexibility resulting from excess capacity-the ability to increase output under favorable demand shocks. The model is used to identify conditions under which excess capacity is more likely to be optimal. The implications are generally consistent with existing empirical evidence from studies on excess capacity and capacity utilization. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1446</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Sudipto Sarkar</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:737-749</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:737-749</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Price rigidity and market power in German retailing</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper presents empirical evidence on the interplay important topics of consumer price rigidity and market power in the German food retail industry. In particular, the analysis addresses the causal relationship between market structure-collusion-and pricing behaviour highlighted in the industrial organization literature. Extensive analysis of retail scanner data across beef and pork products reveals considerable differences in price rigidity across store types. Supermarket pricing behaviour is evaluated with respect to all price changes retail sales action and price adjustments indicating that food discounters exhibit the highest degree of rigid prices. Retail concentration, as an important explanatory factor of price stickiness is investigated via the analysis of retail market power employing a conjectural-variation approach. The analysis of market conduct in the marketing of beef and pork products indicates simultaneous oligopolistic and oligopsonistic behaviour of retail firms. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1370</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Sascha A. Weber</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Sven M. Anders</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:521-535</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:521-535</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Human nature and judicial interpretation of equal employment law</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Regional differences in judicial rulings on equal employment law are explored in the context of social identity theory. The notion of a human tendency to join status-based groups, socially identify with prominent group members, adopt the groups' shared mental models, and behave in ways to extend group influence, provides a good fit with judicial rulings observed in two US Federal Circuit Courts, the 7th and the 9th. To the extent such tendencies are natural and thus common across diverse populations, considerable specificity in policy language may be needed to offset interpretational localization emanating from regional belief systems held by locally prominent high status groups. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Janet Spitz</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:6:p:477-495</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:6:p:477-495</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Information aggregation in a catastrophe futures market</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We experimentally examine a reinsurance market in which participants have differing information regarding the probability distribution over losses. The key question is whether the market equilibrium reflects traders maximizing value with respect to their different priors, or whether the equilibrium is one based on a common belief incorporating all participants' information. When assuming subjects are expected value maximizers, we reject both full information aggregation and no information aggregation equilibria. We discover, as in past individual choice insurance experiments, that buyers under-assess the probabilities of large loss states, or alternatively, subjects assign larger utility values to losses than to comparable gains. After accounting for these decision theoretic concerns, the non-aggregation of information hypothesis explains the data better than full information aggregation. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1283</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jason Shachat</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Anthony Westerling</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:1-13</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:1-13</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Sewer plant operating efficiency, patronage, and competition</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Sewer treatment plants in New York State, US, are studied for efficiency and economies of scale. Substantial economies of scale are found. The degree of inefficiency for each plant is then computed and this inefficiency is related to the degree of market concentration in that county. The result found is that greater concentration induces a reduction in efficiency. This is argued to be consistent with the Tiebout Hypothesis. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1185</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Lawrence Southwick</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:4:p:279-294</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:4:p:279-294</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The Structuring of Interfirm Exchanges in Business Know-How: Evidence from International Collaborative Ventures</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study investigates the effect of transaction cost considerations on the apportionment of residual bearing, and the assignment of managerial control between two firms involved in the exchange of business know-how. Data were collected from contractual agreements between multinational enterprises and indigenous firms that formed collaborative ventures in developing countries. A simultaneous-equation model was employed to test hypotheses that were derived under a theoretical framework based on the new institutional economics. The empirical results are supportive of the hypotheses. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Tailan Chi</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Thomas W. Roehl</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:3:p:171-180</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:3:p:171-180</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Do stable strategic time periods exist? Towards new methodological and theoretical insights</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper investigates a fundamental issue in the current research on strategic groups: the existence or non-existence of the so-called 'stable strategic time periods' (SSTPs). Our study provides new evidence by adding new methodological and theoretical insights. The research setting is the Spanish banking industry over a 15-year period, 1983-1997. Unlike all prior longitudinal research that found SSTPs, the multi-method procedure that we used in this study (i.e. equality of variance and covariance matrix and mean vector of strategic variables and a subsequent grouping analysis performed through the MCLUST) has led us to reject the existence of SSTPs in the industry under study. Based on these original findings, we conclude by suggesting a proposition which should be corroborated in future empirical studies on strategic groups. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1319</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Juan Manuel de la Fuente-Sabaté</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Julio Rodríguez-Puerta</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>José David Vicente-Lorente</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>José Angel Zúñiga-Vicente</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:441-455</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:441-455</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Humans as factors of production: an evolutionary analysis</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper is an application of Darwinian analysis to the study of humans as inputs to the production process. Biologists believe that the only factor capable of explaining the extraordinary level of human intelligence is selection pressure from competition with other proto-humans. This selection pressure would have been from two sources. First, there would have been pressure within human groups to become more successful and leave more offspring. Second, there would have been selection pressure between groups, as through warfare and other forms of group competition. This second type of pressure would have provided evolutionary incentives for individuals to be able to cooperate in groups with others, which in turn depends on the ability to avoid cheating, or defection in a prisoner's dilemma setting. There would also have been feedback effects: increasing intelligence would have increased the value of cooperation, and increasing cooperation would have in turn increased the value of intelligence. This selection pressure can explain human abilities to form large extra-familial and extra-ethnic groups for productive activity. In other words, Becker's 'discrimination coefficients' are remarkably small for humans. We provide an evolutionary game theoretic model of cooperation. We argue that humans may be selected for flexibility across generations, so that more honest societies will induce parents to train children to avoid defection, thus leading to a further increase in the proportion of honest persons in the society. We conclude that had humans had different 'tastes' for cooperation, then firms might be radically different than they are. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Paul H. Rubin</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>E. Somanathan</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:247-259</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:247-259</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Altruism, agency, and the competitiveness of family firms</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The core belief among agency theorists is that when a firm is both owned and managed by family members, its governance structure is efficient. We argue that this belief over-simplifies the complexity of exchanges that occur among the family firm's decision agents, and does not conform to reality. We develop an alternative agency view of family firm governance that accounts for agency problems that are understated in extant agency models. These problems are rooted in the firm's ownership structure, as well as the altruistic relationships that exist between the firm's decision agents. We conclude with four propositions that address the competitive implications of this alternative view. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1064</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>William S. Schulze</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Michael H. Lubatkin</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Richard N. Dino</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:4:p:271-281</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:4:p:271-281</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Tax asymmetry and futures hedging under liquidity constraints</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper examines the optimal futures hedging decision of a firm facing uncertain income that is subject to asymmetric taxation with no loss-offset provisions. All futures contracts are marked to market and require interim cash settlement of gains and losses. The firm is liquidity constrained in that it is forced to prematurely close its futures position on which the interim loss incurred exceeds a threshold level. The liquidity risk created by the interim funding requirement of a futures hedge is shown to proffer the firm perverse incentives, thereby making an under-hedge optimal. This under-hedging result holds irrespective of whether the firm is risk neutral or risk averse. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1223</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Kit Pong Wong</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:5:p:383-389</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:5:p:383-389</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Testing the convergence hypothesis for Greece</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The question of whether there is a tendency for regional convergence has become a central topic for economic research. This paper considers the issue of convergence across Greek regions, following the theoretical basis of the neoclassical model of economic growth. Our analysis finds no evidence of convergence and supports the hypothesis of dualism across the southern and the northern parts of the country. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Costas Siriopoulos</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Dimitrios Asteriou</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:1-3:p:125-132</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:1-3:p:125-132</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The feasibility of regulating gambling on the Internet</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Internet gambling presents substantial new challenges to governments and regulatory agencies. Existing approaches to betting, lotteries and gaming are limited by the nature of Internet technology, and the international nature of the activity. Particular aspects of Internet gambling are considered, and the conclusion is reached that prohibition is an ineffectual alternative, and that licensing of gambling services providers is the appropriate approach. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1002</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Roger Clarke</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Gillian Dempsey</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:5:p:399-411</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:5:p:399-411</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The virtue of human universals and cooperation: a review essay of Matt Ridley's The Origins of Virtue</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In reviewing Matt Ridley's The Origins of Virtue we do five things. (1) We discuss and challenge the basic assumptions of the Standard Social Sciences Model which permeates management scholarship. (2) We present some alternatives to this model, particularly evolutionary psychology. (3) We look at how these alternatives provide a framework for understanding cooperation. (4) We enumerate some of the difficulties (both real and imaginary) with evolutionary psychology. (5) Finally, we suggest that management scholars work more closely with scholars from the many other disciplines that are developing solid theories of cooperation. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Lívia Markóczy</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jeff Goldberg</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:3:p:141-156</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:3:p:141-156</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>An economic analysis of matrix structure, using multinational corporations as an illustration</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper applies a comparative institutional perspective to the organizational design called matrix structure. After discussing the motivations for a multidimensional form of organization, the paper compares the transaction cost characteristics of the matrix (MX-form) structure with those of the well-known multidivisional (M-form) structure. This analysis reveals three advantages and three disadvantages of the matrix structure as well as two conditions affecting the efficacy of a matrix. Examples from multinational corporations are used throughout the paper to illustrate the analysis. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Tailan Chi</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Paul Nystrom</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:5:p:349-365</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:5:p:349-365</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The effects of corporate antitakeover provisions on long-term investment: empirical evidence</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper's empirical results indicate that the average effect of antitakeover provisions on subsequent long-term investment is negative. The interpretation of these results depends on whether one thinks that there was too much, too little, or just the right amount of long-term investment prior to the antitakeover provision adoption. We use agency theory to devise more refined empirical tests of the effects of antitakeover provision adoption by managers in firms with different incentive and monitoring structures. Governance variables (e.g. percentage of outsiders on corporate boards, and separate CEO|chairperson positions) have an insignificant impact on subsequent long-term investment behavior. However, consistent with agency theory predictions, managers in firms with better economic incentives (higher insider ownership) tend to cut subsequent long-term investment less than managers in firms with less incentive alignment. Furthermore, managers in firms with greater external monitoring (due to higher institutional ownership) also tend to cut subsequent long-term investment less than managers in firms with less external monitoring. Thus, the decrease in subsequent long-term investment is significantly less for firms where the managers have greater incentives to act in shareholders' interests. Finally, there are interesting effects of the control variables. First, high book equity|market equity firms cut total long-term investment more. Second, firms that were takeover targets or rumored to be takeover targets cut long-term investment more. These results suggest that inefficient firms cut long-term investment more when an antitakeover provision is adopted. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>James M. Mahoney</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Chamu Sundaramurthy</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Joseph T. Mahoney</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:4-5:p:163-168</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:4-5:p:163-168</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Strategy and the market process: introduction to the Special Issue</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1019</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Richard N. Langlois</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:8:p:657-674</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:8:p:657-674</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Network effects with quality change: an empirical analysis of the Japanese mobile telecommunications market, 1995-2001</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study assesses the role of network effects under rapid quality change in the Japanese mobile telecommunications market by utilizing a simple framework based on a discrete choice model of product differentiation. The results indicate the existence of network effects in the Japanese mobile telecommunications market during the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, changes in the value of mobile telecommunications services mainly depend on quality changes; the contribution of network effects is negligible. Additionally, over time, network effects make a diminishing contribution to improving consumers' valuations. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1432</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Mitsuru Sunada</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:6:p:377-382</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:6:p:377-382</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Thanks for the memories: baseball veterans' end-of-career salaries</dc:title>
  <dc:description>It is well-established that a baseball player's salary is based on his performance, experience, star status, bargaining power, mobility and his team's ability to pay. This paper focuses on veteran players who are on the brink of retirement and on the determinants of their salaries. It is found that a veteran's end-of-career peak salary depends upon how his career performance, that his most recent performance is irrelevant unless he has spent his entire career with one team, and that the average veteran's salary peaks after 9 years in the Majors. A corollary inference is that general managers recognize and reward player performance over the long haul in comparison with others who have played at that player's principal position, and with a nod to how history will evaluate that player. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Ira Horowitz</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Christopher Zappe</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:3:p:127-135</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:3:p:127-135</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>An econometric study of the decisions of a town planning authority: complementary &amp; substitute uses of industrial activities in Hong Kong</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This is a contribution to the research on the interface between urban economics and urban planning at the micro level on the one hand and economic development at the macro level on the other hand by a study of the relationship between the performance of the development application mechanism and economic development. This study is conducted in the light that neither urban economics nor urban planning research has utilized useful development control information that can help better understand the spatial and linkage aspects of the industrial sector in economic development. A probit study of a relatively large population of statistics (with 1728 observations) concerning planning applications for uses in lands under industrial zoning in Hong Kong is conducted in terms of 5 refutable hypotheses about the role of the planning authority in respect of land uses that are neutral to, complementary to and substitutes of industrial uses in a local context where major structural changes are occurring in the economy. The hypotheses are derived from standard price theory. The test discovers that, consistent with the theory of substitute goods, that the probabilities of mixed industrial|office and pure office uses in industrial zones being approved were dependent on the rise and fall of the manufacturing sector (measured in terms of labor share). However, those for ancillary office use, a use that theoretically should be complementary to industrial activities, were independent of the state of the manufacturing sector. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1054</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Lawrence W.C. Lai</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Winky K.O. Ho</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:731-745</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:731-745</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Stock-price reaction to equity issues of utilities: the influence of regulatory climate</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Regulation of public utilities is pervasive in any modern economy. Regulation is designed to overcome the deficiencies of market discipline. The decisions of a regulatory agency have impacts for all parties concerned, namely, consumers, management, investors, and community. The economic impact of a regulatory agency has been deeply analyzed. Many researchers have studied the stock-price reaction to announcements of new issues of industrial and utility companies. We examine the stock-price reaction to the announcements of new equity of utilities attempting to operationalize several theoretic models explaining this reaction. Using an event-study method, this examination is conducted while explicitly controlling for the regulatory climate under which these utilities operate. The main findings are: (1) the reaffirmation that the price reaction of stocks of utilities is negative; and (2) no significant influence of regulatory regimes on the price reaction was detected. The second finding is quite unanticipated Some speculative explanations are offered for the absence of impact of regulatory climate. It appears that stock market participants are sophisticated enough to do their own 'due diligence' and do not consider the overseeing by state public service commissions as relevant for stock valuation. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Greg Filbeck</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Raymond F. Gorman</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Gautam Vora</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:481-493</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:481-493</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Women and taxis and dangerous judgments: content sensitive use of base-rate information</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study shows that the use or nonuse of base-rate information in probability estimation depends not just on the form of the problem, but also on the content about which the base-rate information is given. When the information is stated about characteristics of types of humans, it is used and recalled better than if the information is about arbitrary things. It is speculated that the content specificity is a consequence of the human mind's attentiveness to stereotypes. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Lívia Markóczy</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jeffrey Goldberg</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:1:p:15-26</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:1:p:15-26</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Institutional constraints on organizations: the case of Spanish car dealerships</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We study the effect of organizational choice and institutions on the performance of Spanish car dealerships. Using outlet-level data from 1994, we find that vertically integrated dealerships showed substantially lower labor productivity, higher labor costs and lower profitability than franchised ones. Despite these gaps in performance, no vertically integrated outlet was separated until 1994, yet the few outlets that were eventually separated systematically improved their performance. We argue that the conversion of integrated outlets into franchised ones involved significant transaction costs, due to an institutional environment favoring permanent, highly unionized employment relations. In line with this argument, we find that the observed separations occurred in distribution networks that underwent marked reductions in worker unionization rates, following the legalization of temporary labor contracts. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1429</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Benito Arruñada</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Luis Vázquez</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Giorgio Zanarone</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:4-5:p:265-279</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:4-5:p:265-279</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Linking hypercompetition and strategic group theories: strategic maneuvering in the US insurance industry</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Focusing on the dynamics of strategic maneuvering, this paper draws parallels between the accumulated perspectives of strategic group theory and ideas drawn from evolutionary economics and from a recent strategy-oriented book on hypercompetition (D'Aveni RA. 1994. Hypercompetition: Managing the Dynamics of Strategic Maneuvering. The Free Press: New York). Using insurance industry data, the paper first uses the methodological framework of strategic groups to define competitive positioning and the identity of close competitors. It then develops a Markovian model to analyse two important aspects of strategic maneuvering over time: the level of firm movement, and the determination of optimal maneuvering paths and their related long-term performance. The results provide insights into industry competitive dynamics and rivalry. First, there is clear evidence of strategic maneuvering over the entire time period studied and a higher level of maneuvering in the long run. Second, for some competitive scenarios, there are optimal maneuvering trajectories that optimize a firm's long-term economic performance. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1015</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Avi Fiegenbaum</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Howard Thomas</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ming-Je Tang</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:8:p:527-534</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:8:p:527-534</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Analysis of Internet topology with a three-level components model</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The vertical structure of the Internet is considered as having three-level components: backhyphen-bone-level interconnection, mid-level transit, and local-level access. This paper considers single and cross mergers between an integrated provider and an entrant in the different area. As a result of these mergers, cross entry, in which both integrated providers merge with the retail entrants in the other areas, is more socially desirable than single entry, in which only one firm merges, which is, in turn, preferred to no entry. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1242</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Takanori Ida</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:79-80</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:79-80</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Handbook of sports economics research, edited by Fizel, J. Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2006, Viii&amp;plus;280pp., USD 75.95 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1311</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>John Charles Bradbury</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:149-158</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:149-158</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>An econometric analysis of trends in research joint venture activity</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Edith Penrose noted that firms may need to rely on research joint ventures (RJVs) to acquire access to resources that can help them achieve and sustain a competitive advantage. We estimate an econometric model of the propensity of firms to disclose their intention to engage in RJVs, in order to explain the recent precipitous decline in RJVs filed with the US Department of Justice. We find that RJV activity is inversely related to the competitive position of US firms in global high-technology industries and that the establishment of the US Commerce Department's Advanced Technology Program (ATP) induced a structural change in the propensity of firms to engage in RJVs. Thus, two factors may explain the recent downturn in RJVs: a substantial improvement in US global performance in high-technology markets and a sharp decline in ATP funding. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1209</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Albert N. Link</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>David Paton</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Donald S. Siegel</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:3:p:137-140</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:3:p:137-140</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Fixed cost, marginal cost, and the decision to buy or make</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The paper builds a formal model of the costs and benefits of producing intermediate goods internally as compared to buying partially produced inputs on the open market. The model centers on the link between the purchase of assets specific to a production process and the mean and variance of profits from the purchase. The central point of the paper is that even though purchases of assets specific to a production process can have an ambiguous impact on profits of the decision to make, the purchase of such assets has a tendency to reduce the variability of profits. This trade-off is at the heart of decision to buy or make. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1138</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Charles E. Hegji</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:6-7:p:365-381</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:6-7:p:365-381</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>From corporate strategy to business-level advantage: Relatedness as resource congruence</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper, we study resource congruence, the degree to which the expenditure profile of a focal lines of business (LB) resembles others in its parent's portfolio. Taking each individual LB as a focal point, we examine the degree to which its resource allocation profile resembles or differs from the profiles of the other businesses in the corporation. We argue that business lines are most efficient and profitable when their resource allocation patterns are highly similar to those of the parent's other businesses, a condition we term resource congruence.&lt;P&gt;The results show that the more closely LB is aligned with its parent's dominant logic-that is, the more congruent it is-the better it performs and the lower its costs relative to competitor LBs in the focal LB's industry. Improved performance and cost are not found when a LB is embedded within similar two-digit standard industrial codes (SICs) as those of other LBs within its parent's portfolio. Even though the SIC classification system has been used as a measure of 'output' relatedness based on similarity of product and customer market characteristics, the results suggest that resource congruence (and resource-based views of the firm) are better predictor of synergies and competitive advantage at the business level than is output relatedness. We also suggest that theories of managerial capability, dominant logic, and monitoring can explain our discovery of spillover and congruence effects that are not explained by economies of scope or resource sharing-based explanations alone. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1196</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Richard A. D'Aveni</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>David J. Ravenscraft</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Philip Anderson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:6-7:p:417-418</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:6-7:p:417-418</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Guest editor's introduction</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1135</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jonathan Crook</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:2:p:127-135</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:2:p:127-135</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Interest rate risk and utility risk premia during 1982-93</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>S. Keith Berry</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:4:p:293-315</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:4:p:293-315</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Executive compensation and firm performance: adjustment dynamics, non-linearity and asymmetry</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The relationship between executive compensation and firm performance is a field of intense theoretical and empirical research. The purpose of this study is to gain additional insights into the nature of this relationship by examining empirically the relatively unexplored areas of its dynamics of adjustment, as well as its non-linearity. The findings of this study show strong evidence in support of the view that (a) executive compensation is characterized by a dynamic process of adjustment, and (b) the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance is non-linear and asymmetric. Additionally, the structure of asymmetry is found to be dependent on the measure of performance. Convexity characterizes the asymmetry of the relationship between executive compensation and market returns, while concavity distinguishes the asymmetry of the relationship between executive compensation and accounting returns. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1368</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Giorgio Canarella</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Mahmoud M. Nourayi</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:7:p:575-591</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:7:p:575-591</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Pricing by state-owned enterprises: the case of postal services</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Sappington and Sidak develop a model of state-owned enterprise (SOE) pricing behavior in which firms maximize a weighted average of revenues and profits. The model predicts that SOEs will lower prices in more-elastic markets and raise them in less-elastic markets if the weight they place on profit is positive. The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 relaxed the institutional constraints on pricing by the US Postal Service, which allows a test of the Sappington-Sidak model. The model's predictions are broadly confirmed. Congress passed the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act in 2006, which may help address some anticompetitive concerns in this industry. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1420</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>R. Richard Geddes</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:4:p:175-187</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:4:p:175-187</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Share, price and category expenditure-geographic market effects and private labels</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Focusing on the interaction between national brands and private labels, this paper has two main empirical contributions: (i) a simultaneous system of demand (share), price and expenditure equations is estimated, and (ii) differences in the structure of the local geographic market are incorporated into the analysis. The former represents an important step in understanding the complete nature of private label and national brand interaction, while the latter is important for understanding the impact of the local retail environment on market behaviour. IRI scanner data from 1991 and 1992 are used to estimate a five-equation system across 135 food product categories and 59 geographic markets. The results suggest that concentration at both the manufacturer and retailer level can significantly affect private label and national brand price. However, while increased retailer concentration is associated with higher national brand and private label prices, higher manufacturer concentration is associated with higher national brand but lower private label prices. Increases in national brand advertising has the effect of raising national brand price and share, but lowering private label price and share. This is consistent with previous research and suggests that advertising and local market conditions play a significant role in the ability of national brands to price at a premium over private labels. Finally, marketing decision variables, such as display activity and private label distribution, can have an important impact on total category expenditure. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>William P. Putsis Jr.</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ronald W. Cotterill</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:1:p:23-36</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:1:p:23-36</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Strategic inventory in capacitated supply chain procurement</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We study the strategic role of inventory in a sequential two-period procurement setting, where the supplier's capacity in the first period is limited and the retailer has the option to hold inventory. We compare the equilibrium under a dynamic contract, where the decisions are made at the beginning of each period, and a commitment contract, where the decisions for both periods are made at the beginning of the first period. We show that there is a critical capacity level below which the outcomes under both types of contracts are identical. When the first period capacity is above the critical level, the retailer holds inventory in equilibrium and the inventory is carried due to purely strategic reasons; as capacity increases, so does the strategic role of inventory. The supplier always prefers lower capacity than the retailer, and the difference between supplier-optimal and supply-chain optimal capacities, and the corresponding profits, can be significant. Finally, we find that the retailer's flexibility to hold inventory is not always good for the participants or for the channel. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1398</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>P&amp;inodot;nar Keskinocak</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Kasarin Chivatxaranukul</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Paul M. Griffin</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:1:p:57-70</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:1:p:57-70</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Matching rules</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Institutions often utilize matching rules to achieve cooperative outcomes. However, the equilibrium induced by a matching rule may not be socially optimal. After presenting the case in which matching rules yield privately and socially optimal levels of cooperation, this article identifies the conditions which generate inefficient cooperation. Matching rules undershoot (i.e. parties cooperate less than is socially optimal) in one group of cases. In a second, more puzzling case, matching rules overshoot (i.e. parties that interact under a matching constraint are induced to cooperate more than is socially optimal). This paper identifies the conditions for such occurrences. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1400</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Vincy Fon</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Francesco Parisi</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:329-351</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:329-351</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Effects of profit-reducing policies on firm survival, financial performance, and new drug introductions in the research-based pharmaceutical industry</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We introduce a computational model of the evolution of a value-maximizing research-based pharmaceutical firm and parameterize it using estimates of R&amp;D costs, profit distributions, and candidate attrition rates. We use the model to estimate how the probability of surviving and covering the costs of R&amp;D depends on R&amp;D scale and the policy regime. In the model, even small reductions in profitability have substantial impacts on firm success and innovation, but the effects may not be visible to consumers for many years. Smaller and newer firms are most vulnerable to reductions in the rewards for innovation. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1344</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Darren Filson</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Neal Masia</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:587-599</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:587-599</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The causes and consequences of accounting fraud</dc:title>
  <dc:description>One of the fundamental purposes of corporate accounting is to facilitate the monitoring of managers. Since managers are instrumental in the production of accounting numbers, and since it is costly to monitor their behavior in this regard, firms sometimes report fraudulent accounting numbers. This paper tests several hypotheses concerning why some firms, and not others, commit accounting fraud. This is accomplished through examination of a sample of 62 firms charged with disclosure violations by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during the period 1981-1987. We also examine whether directors of companies that commit accounting fraud are disciplined in the managerial labor market. &lt;P&gt;We adopt the perspective that the decision to commit fraud is governed by the expected costs and benefits of this behavior (This approach to the study of fraud has been used elsewhere, e.g. Darby and Karni (1973); Michael R. Darby and Edi Karni, “Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud”, Journal of Law and Economics &lt;B&gt;16&lt;/B&gt; (April 1973), 68-88. For a brief discussion of the economics of fraud, see Edi Karni (1989) “Fraud” in The New Palgrave: Allocation, Information, and Markets, edited by John Earwell, Murray Milgate, and Peter Newman, New York: W.W. Norton, 117-119). Accordingly, a theory of accounting fraud requires an understanding of how these costs and benefits vary across firms. Those costs and benefits can be varied by external forces, through institutions such as equity markets and independent auditors, or internally through the design of monitoring and reward systems. We will divide our attention between the external and internal forces that change the costs and benefits of accounting fraud. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Mason Gerety</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Kenneth Lehn</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:6:p:367-372</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:6:p:367-372</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Price-matching policy with imperfect information</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The model of price-matching policy emphasizes on the importance of information imperfection. The demand is derived based on the assumptions that consumers have different reservation prices and different preferences over location. When a firm undercuts its competitor's price, it changes the demand structure of the market. The result shows that price-matching policies are anticompetitive, but they do not facilitate monopoly price. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1233</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Wen Mao</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:8:p:513-525</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:8:p:513-525</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The limits of the wage impact of discrimination</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In spite of almost 40 years of active enforcement efforts by the EEOC, as well as the strong intervention by the plaintiff bar, the most popular benchmark by which we measure the influence of prejudice on wages paid to female and minority workers has changed very little. This paper maintains that to a large extent this seeming immunity of discriminatory wage gaps to the legal remedies provided by Title VII results from the mismeasurement of those effects. An alternative to the standard Oaxaca decomposition of the wage gap is offered which allows us to put plausible ranges around the true impact of antidiscrimination laws. Not only does this reduce the residual impact of the discrimination that appears to withstand Title VII remedies, it also suggests that the pre-Title VII impact of discrimination on wages accounted for little of the gap observed at the time of its passage. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1238</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Elizabeth Becker</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Cotton M. Lindsay</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:8:p:461-473</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:8:p:461-473</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Economies of scale and market power in policing</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The objective of this paper is to use a simultaneous equations method for estimating police production and demand to determine whether or not there are economies of scale in policing. In addition, the effect of market power on productivity, using the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, is to be measured. The estimation yields the result that there are diseconomies of scale with respect to the amount of crime beyond about 22 000 people in the policing jurisdiction and diseconomies of scale in numbers of police beyond about 36 000 people. Efficiency is also reduced where there is greater market power. This is conjectured to be the public sector equivalent of taking market power profits. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1230</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Lawrence Southwick</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:6-7:p:437-452</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:6-7:p:437-452</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Reach out or reach within? Performance implications of alliances and location in biotechnology</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The extensive literature on geographical clusters has argued that firms stand to gain from the knowledge spillovers and the easy availability of skills in regional agglomerations. At the same time, the research on strategic alliances, particularly in technology-intensive industries, views alliances as vehicles for the transfer of technology and knowledge. Does membership in a geographical cluster or a network of alliances-an alliance cluster-benefit firms equally? More importantly, does it matter whether firms form alliances with firms within their geographical cluster, or do they do better by reaching out beyond their cluster? In this paper, we investigate these and other related questions in the context of technology-intensive industries such as biotechnology and argue that the high-level knowledge sensing and acquiring needs of firms in such industries may require combinations of both kinds of knowledge-access mechanisms. We use the BioScan database to obtain 648 alliances for the period 1985-1998 among 248 public companies, and complement it with COMPUSTAT data to examine the effect of clustering and alliances on market value. Our results suggest that merely being part of geographical clusters is not enough, and nor is it adequate for firms to join alliance clusters. Rather, firms gain by forming alliances both within and beyond their geographical clusters, which highlights the complexities of acquiring technology-intensive knowledge and suggests that the acquisition of knowledge in technology-intensive settings is best achieved through mechanisms both formal and informal, both proximate and distant. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1200</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Akbar Zaheer</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Varghese P. George</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:4-5:p:183-199</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:4-5:p:183-199</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Firm strategy, innovation and consumer demand: a market process approach</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Despite recent advances by economists such as Porter and those associated with the resource-based school, the economics of demand rarely features in discussions of business strategy. Porter and the resource-based school take the characteristics of demand as given, and place almost exclusive emphasis on the role of supply-side factors in formulating strategy. Scholars in strategic marketing, by contrast, recognize the importance of demand factors, but do not analyse them from an economic standpoint. Moreover, none of the important schools of strategic management attempts to explore the relationship between supply and demand in much analytical depth. In this paper, we adopt a market process approach to strategy formulation as a preliminary step towards rectifying these problems. First, we explore the factors that affect the economics of demand, particularly in innovative situations. Second, we adapt Lancaster's attribute analysis to show how the interaction between supply and demand can be represented from a market process perspective. On the basis of our efforts, we conclude that further work in these areas would benefit students of both strategic management and economics. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1016</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Paul L. Robertson</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Tony F. Yu</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:6:p:299-303</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:6:p:299-303</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The effect of the 1971 advertising ban on behavior in the cigarette industry</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The 1971 ban on TV and radio advertising of cigarettes offers a unique opportunity to uncover the industry response to a change in the mix of advertising. Following the ban, advertising expenditures were shifted away from TV and radio towards print media. Accounting for the impact of this event within a supply and demand framework, the empirical results show that advertising had an insignificant effect on demand during the pre- and post-1971 periods; however, advertising did stimulate competition in the industry prior to the 1971 ban. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Craig A. Gallet</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:545-561</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:545-561</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: the stock market casts its vote…</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In December 1995, Congress overrode a presidential veto to enact the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. This legislation was aimed at curbing abuses in class action securities litigation, and providing firms with relief from frivolous lawsuits brought on the basis of stock price volatility. While the intent of lawmakers in drafting this legislation was clear, the impact of the Reform Act for shareholders of firms that are likely targets of securities litigation was uncertain. In particular, it was unclear if the cost savings from reduced litigation would outweigh the potential losses due to decreased protection from fraudulent managers, and it was also unclear if the impact of the legislation would differ for firms with different governance structures. This paper provides an economic answer to these questions by analyzing the stock market's response to the initial passage, the veto, and subsequent veto override of the Reform Act. We examine the stock price performance of firms in four industries-biotechnology, computers, electronics, and retailing-that are likely to be affected by securities litigation reform. We document a significantly negative stock price response to rumors of the presidential veto and a significantly positive response to the subsequent House override vote, indicating that investors agreed with Congress that the positive effects of the Act predominate. We also examine reactions across subsets of firms with different levels of institutional ownership, different levels of insider ownership and with different board structures, and find evidence that the positive factors outweigh any increased susceptibility to managerial fraud or inability to bring meritorious suits, even among firms with weak internal governance structures. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>D. Katherine Spiess</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Paula A. Tkac</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:7:p:587-594</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:7:p:587-594</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>International tenders and futures hedging</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper examines the optimal bidding and hedging decisions of a risk-averse firm that takes part in an international tender. The firm faces multiple sources of uncertainty: exchange rate risk, risk of an unsuccessful tender, and business risk. The firm is allowed to trade unbiased currency futures contracts to imperfectly hedge its contingent foreign exchange risk exposure. We show that the firm shorts less (more) of the unbiased futures contracts when its marginal utility function is convex (concave) as compared with the case that the marginal utility function is linear. We further show that the curvature of the marginal utility function plays a decisive role in determining the impact of currency futures hedging on the firm's bidding behavior. Sufficient conditions that ensure the firm bids more or less aggressively than in the case without hedging opportunities are derived. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1276</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Donald Lien</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Kit Pong Wong</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:8:p:643-653</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:8:p:643-653</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Optimal pricing strategy for foreign market entry: a game theoretic approach</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Given that pricing plays an important role in a company's international competitive strategy, researchers have long argued the need for theory building in the area of international pricing. This study develops an optimal pricing strategy for foreign market entry using a game theoretic framework. The proposed model assumes two firms, a local incumbent and a foreign entrant, competing in a market. Consumers know the quality of the incumbent's offering, but do not know how it compares to that of the foreign entrant's. Based on these assumptions, and using the theory of inference making, we propose an upward price distortion by the entrant firm as an optimal entry strategy under incomplete information. The paper presents a game theoretic derivation to establish that the game has a unique intuitive separating equilibrium where the entrant firm stands to gain by engaging in upward price distortion to signal high quality to consumers. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1297</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Young-Han Kim</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Praveen Aggarwal</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Young-Myung Ha</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Tai Hoon Cha</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:1:p:29-40</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:1:p:29-40</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Coupons and price discrimination in vertically-correlated markets</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This research analyzes the non-cooperative and cooperative strategies with respect to manufacturer and retailer coupons. In a model with one manufacturer selling its product to one retailer, it is found that the retailer can achieve third-degree price discrimination equilibrium in retail markets by issuing coupons to demanders with higher elasticity. Although facing only one retailer, the manufacturer can also achieve the same third-degree price discrimination equilibrium by issuing coupons directly to demanders of higher elasticity. However, when only one firm issues the coupon, both manufacturer and retailer coupons can help alleviate the channel profit loss due to double marginalization. If the manufacturer and the retailer non-cooperatively issue coupons, then the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes are equivalent to those under the successive third-degree price discrimination. Moreover, cooperative strategies between the manufacturer and the retailer can eliminate double marginalization, achieve the vertical integration effect, and lead to higher profits, consumer surpluses, and social surpluses than non-cooperative coupon strategies. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1132</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jin-Li Hu</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Yu-Hsiu Chiou</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Hong Hwang</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:537-539</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:537-539</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Book review: Staying human in the organization: our biological heritage and the workplace, by Bernhard, J.G. and Glantz, K., Westport: Praeger, 1992; and Emotions in command: a naturalistic study of institutional dominance, by Salter, F.K., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Barbara Decker Pierce</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Roderick White</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:7:p:595-604</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:7:p:595-604</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Wage versus efficient bargaining in oligopoly</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper combines internal bargaining between firms and their employees with a situation of imperfect competition, in particular a Cournot-oligopoly. Wage bargaining is compared with simultaneous negotiations on wages and employment (efficient bargaining). It turns out that for a large range of parameter values a prisoner's dilemma concerning profits exists. The dominant strategy is efficient bargaining, while the joint profits are maximized with wage negotiations. A simplified example considers economic welfare and utility of the unions. Different welfare measures are considered like the usual IO measure of consumer and producer surplus as well as others. The term 'efficient bargaining' is not justified (at least for the present example) if the profits and the rents of the unions are considered, as these are maximized with wage bargaining. However, consumer and producer surplus are highest with efficient bargaining. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1277</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Kornelius Kraft</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:1:p:1-11</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:1:p:1-11</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Does it matter that the prosecutor is also the judge? The administrative complaint process at the Federal Trade Commission</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Firms seeking to merge face antitrust scrutiny from either the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Unlike the DOJ, the FTC litigates its cases in front of its own administrative law judges (ALJs), and then hears the appeal itself, rather than using federal district courts. This study focuses on the formal decisions made by the FTC after an ALJ has conducted a full trial for a particular case. We find that while the 'merits' of a matter, as implied by the case law, affect the FTC's decision, institutional factors also have an impact. In particular, the firm's chances of prevailing in litigation are influenced by the number of commissioners who both vote to prosecute and then vote as a judge as well as the political affiliations of the commissioners. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Malcolm B. Coate</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Andrew N. Kleit</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:2:p:90-91</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:2:p:90-91</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>What Price Fame?, by Cowen, T., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000, 248 pp., $22.00 (cloth).</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Robert B. Ekelund</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:67-82</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:67-82</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Edith Penrose, organisational economics and business strategy: an assessment and extension</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The aim of this paper is to expound Penrose's contribution to the theory of the firm, and examine the contribution of her thinking to economics and business strategy, as well as to discuss some limitations and provide some generalizations of Penrose's work. We also discuss implications for managerial practice and public policy. We claim that Penrose's contribution was seminal. In recognizing the significance of organization to generate new knowledge she went well beyond the bounds of even her own agenda; from a theory of the growth of firms, to a theory of the generation of organizational knowledge and beyond. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1215</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Christos Pitelis</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:6:p:223-241</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:6:p:223-241</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>When (not) to indulge in 'puffery': the role of consumer expectations and brand goodwill in determining advertised and actual product quality</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We analyze why some firms advertise product quality at a level different from the actual quality of a product. By considering the interacting effects of product quality and advertising, we develop a dynamic model of consumer expectations about product quality and the development of brand goodwill to determine the optimal values for the decision variables. The model parameters are determined based on prior literature and we use numerical techniques to arrive at the solution. We then derive conditions under which a firm will find it optimal to overstate or understate product quality. The results suggest that quality may be overstated in markets characterized by high price sensitivity, low quality sensitivity, low brand loyalty, and high source credibility, suggesting the need for vigilance on the part of consumers, upper level managers and regulatory authorities in such market conditions. This is important because current regulatory resources are insufficient to reduce deceptive advertising practices (Davis JJ. 1994. Ethics in advertising decision-making: implications for reducing the incidence of deceptive advertising. Journal of Consumer Affairs &lt;B&gt;28&lt;/B&gt;: 380-402). Further, the law of deceptive advertising prohibits some advertising claims on the ground that they are likely to harm consumers or competitors (Preston IL, Richards JI. 1993. A role for consumer belief in FTC and Lanham Act deceptive advertising cases. American Business Law Journal &lt;B&gt;31&lt;/B&gt;: 1-29). Also, Nagler (1993. Rather bait than switch: deceptive advertising with bounded consumer rationality. Journal of Public Economics &lt;B&gt;51&lt;/B&gt;: 359-378) shows that deceptive advertising causes a net social welfare loss and a public policy effectively preventing deception will improve social welfare. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.985</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Praveen K. Kopalle</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>João L. Assunção</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:467-468</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:467-468</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Commentary</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1357</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Tomas J. Philipson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:3:p:189-195</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:3:p:189-195</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Whom to license patented technology</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper examines the optimal licensing policy of a patent holder when potential licensees differ in their capacities in absorbing the patented technology. If two-part tariffs with non-negative royalties and fixed fees are feasible, the patent holder finds it optimal to license the strong firm exclusively whether or not an exclusive licensing of the weak firm deters the strong firm from entering the market. Hence, the potential trade-offs between strategic gains associated with licensing to weak competitors and efficiency gains associated with licensing to efficient competitors do not exist when two part tariffs are available. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Sang-Seung Yi</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:2:p:47-61</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:2:p:47-61</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Separating contract from governance</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper contends that there is an important distinction between governance structure and contractual form, and that organizational boundaries, defined by governance structures, need not explain contractual form. The basic idea is that governance refers to the general environments and instruments that structure and 'govern' specific terms of trade negotiated in 'contracts'. Problems of verifiability and observability of contractual performance are hypothesized to drive the differential effects on governance structure and contractual form. Specifically, transaction cost factors known to result in employment as a general governance structure do not automatically result in contracts characterized by the payment of fixed-wages. Instead, incentive pay and the delegation of decision-making authority to workers may be preferred by firm owners. The paper proposes that the relationship between a firm and a worker involves a two part decision-making framework in which one choice is the type of governance that structures the second choice regarding the specific characteristics of the contract linking the worker to the firm. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Harvey S. James Jr</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:6-7:p:439-455</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:6-7:p:439-455</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Trade credit and customer relationships</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Trade credit is an important economic phenomenon, and a variety of theories have been put forward to explain the decisions firms make on credit extension. The ways in which credit can be used as a strategic tool to support corporate objectives has not, however, been fully discussed. The results presented here provide some support for the extant theory on trade credit extension and for recent empirical papers in this area (e.g. Ng et al., 1999; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). However, our results suggest that trade credit granting has a set of subtle and complex motivations over and above those predicted by standard theory. In particular trade credit extension can be used as a many-faceted marketing|relationship management tool and|or as a means of signalling information to the market or to specific buyers about the firm, its products and its future prospects|commitment. Much of credit extension can be seen as customer focused; for example, encouraging frequent purchasers which offer the potential for relationship development or accommodating customers' demand for credit to help finance their production period. The requirements|bargaining power of large customers can influence a firm to extend more credit. Firms will vary terms in anticipation of capturing new business, to attract specific customers and in order to achieve specific marketing aims. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1041</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Barbara Summers</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Nicholas Wilson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:5:p:403-410</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:5:p:403-410</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Productive efficiency of English football teams-a data envelopment analysis approach</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper investigates how close to their potential English Premier League Clubs play. Using a deterministic Data Envelopment Analysis Approach, the productive efficiency of 20 teams in the 2000|2001 season is measured and weaknesses of individual teams are disclosed. The sensitivity of results is analyzed with regard to different model specifications and variable combinations. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1105</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Dieter J. Haas</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:3:p:175-190</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:3:p:175-190</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Employee motivation, external orientation and the technical efficiency of foreign-financed firms in China: a stochastic frontier analysis</dc:title>
  <dc:description>By using a stochastic frontier model, we have identified several firm-specific attributes as determinants of technical efficiency in foreign-financed manufacturing firms in southern China. The empirical results suggest a strong association between efficiency and employee motivation, which includes the use of bonus incentives and flexibility in employment policy. In terms of the external orientation behavior of firms, the findings do not support the export|efficiency relationship. Sample firms with a high degree of export-orientedness were less efficient, possibly due to the high transaction costs in China of exportation. As for the effects of expatriate input on production, our empirical evidence revealed that firms with a relatively high expatriate ratio performed less efficiently than others did. These two findings may have significant implications for the marketing strategies and management (including the localization) of human resources of foreign-financed firms in China. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1203</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Vincent Mok</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Godfrey Yeung</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:107-113</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:107-113</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Investment in organizational capital</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Organizational capital is a specific form of capital that firms accumulate. It relates to the development of codes, technical languages, practical arrangements about how the work is done and to the creation of an organizational culture. The distinctive feature of this form of capital is the fact that it does not contribute directly to an output result. Instead, it can be thought as creating the correct environment for the human factor to maximize its capability of generating value, that is, organizational capital works as an external effect on the accumulation of the human capital input. Nevertheless, organizational capital is a form of capital and therefore it has an investment process associated with it. The paper considers the process of investment in this form of capital and recognizes that it introduces important changes over the firm's profit maximization problem. The problem gains new features relating to its dynamic nature and a condition that guarantees saddle-path stability can be derived. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1309</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Orlando Gomes</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:8:p:667-683</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:8:p:667-683</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Do the best companies to work for provide better customer satisfaction?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Using data from both the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) and Fortune Magazine's lists of Best Companies, we examine the relationship between making the '100 Best' list and customer satisfaction. Based on a subset of the 100 Best in each year from 1994 to 2002, we find strong evidence that firms on the list earn higher customer satisfaction ratings than firms not on the list. This result is stronger for firms in the service sector than for those in the manufacturing sector. Our analysis also suggests that the increase in customer satisfaction resulting from Best Company status yields about a 1.6 percent increase in return on assets. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1303</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Daniel H. Simon</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jed DeVaro</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:3:p:147-156</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:3:p:147-156</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>R&amp;D spillovers and strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Considering oligopolistic contests with R&amp;D spillovers and strategic delegation three results can be obtained: (1) There exist multiple asymmetric equilibria where one owner highly favors sales as a basis for his manager's incentives which drives the other firm out of the market. (2) If R&amp;D spillovers are zero, a managerial firm will have a strong strategic advantage when competing with an entrepreneurial firm. If both owners endogenously decide about delegation, each owner's dominant strategy will be to delegate, given that the manager's reservation value is not too large. (3) If R&amp;D spillovers are maximal, collusive market outcomes become very likely, which makes strategic delegation less important. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1142</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Matthias Kräkel</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:3:p:209-225</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:3:p:209-225</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Competition and market power in the European airline industry: 1976-90</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper, we study the market power of European airlines in an oligopoly structure with product differentiation for the period 1976-1990 and test the monopoly hypothesis (Captain, 1993). The paper analyzes the level of competition among eight major European airlines and finds little evidence for market power in the industry over that period. One of our main findings is that the high prices in Europe are not entirely due to the bilateral agreements (leading to possible monopoly power), but rather are a result of very high cost structures in the industry. These results are broadly in agreement with those of Roeller and Sickles (1994) which analyzes these issues in the European Industry by estimating a structural, two-stage game. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Purvez F. Captain</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Robin C. Sickles</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:1-10</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:1-10</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Do institutional shareholders police management?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Some have argued that legislation limits the ability of institutional shareholders to discipline shirking management teams. However the level of takeover activity in the 1980s suggests that the cost of using takeovers to discipline management has decreased. This may give institutional shareholders the ability to participate actively in corporate governance. This paper presents an empirical examination that is consistent with this hypothesis. First, institutional ownership concentration varies across firms according to the benefits of policing firms in 1988. The relationship is less pronounced in 1980. Second, firms characterized by concentrated institutional ownership are more likely to use takeovers as the disciplinary mechanism. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Paul Clyde</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:777-788</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:777-788</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Are they always offering the lowest price? An empirical analysis of the persistence of price dispersion in a low inflation environment</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We study the existence of price distributions and the intra-distribution dynamics for 10 food products across 131 retail stores in Germany for a time period of 43 weeks. Based upon Varian's (1980) model of sales, we aim at investigating whether the position of stores within the cross-sectional price distribution is persistent or changes over time (mixed-strategy equilibrium). Our results suggest a substantial degree of price dispersion even after controlling for unobserved store heterogeneity. Despite some intra-distribution dynamics, we find evidence for a persistence of stores in the cross-sectional price distribution over time. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1376</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Sebnem Bahadir-Lust</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jens-Peter Loy</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Christoph R. Weiss</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:229-229</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:229-229</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Editorial</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1336</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>John A. Vernon</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Richard L Manning</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:503-507</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:503-507</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The role of different types of health insurance on access and utilization: comparative results on two chronic conditions (hypertension and diabetes type II without complication)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1358</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Christine Huttin</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:1-3:p:133-142</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:1-3:p:133-142</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>First do no harm: what could be done by casinos to limit pathological gambling</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Casinos could help inhibit the development of pathological gambling by limiting the contributions they make to the development of pathology among gamblers. Reasonable strategies for limiting pathology might include limiting the size of jackpots, decreasing the length of play, limiting access, decreasing the rate of play, decreasing the arousal of patrons, decreasing the variability of games, and decreasing the inducements to play. These strategies could be employed in the domains of accessibility, environment, game structure, promotion|marketing, education and treatment. The author argues that the implementation of these strategies would not only inhibit the development of pathological gambling, but might also benefit the casinos and society. The suggested changes in casinos offers a focal point for further research and further dialogues between clinicians and casino operators. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1003</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Frank L. Quinn</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:6:p:397-405</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:6:p:397-405</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Subgame perfection and the ethics of competition</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper integrates economics and business ethics through the use of the subgame perfection|backward induction decision rule. It is shown that textbook examples of subgame perfection differ in their ethical complexity. Specifically, predatory pricing is difficult to justify on both game-theoretic and ethical grounds, whereas 'poison pill' takeover defenses have complex economic and ethical ramifications. Further, I employ backward induction to examine two additional areas of ethics and management decision-making: product recall (the Ford Explorer and Firestone tires), and price versus advertising competition. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1239</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Daniel G. Arce M</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:701-712</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:701-712</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Why do prices rise faster than they fall? With an application to mortgage rates</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Empirical literature shows that prices respond asymmetrically to cost changes in many markets, rising faster than falling. An example is the mortgage rate, which follows an increase in capital market rates faster than a decrease. We examine various theoretical explanations for asymmetric price adjustments in general and discuss their validity for the mortgage rate. We show that in The Netherlands mortgage rates indeed respond asymmetrically to changes in capital market rates and consider the relevance of theoretical explanations for this particular market. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1382</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Linda A. Toolsema</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jan P. A. M. Jacobs</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:6:p:331-342</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:6:p:331-342</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Economics and operations management: towards a theory of endogenous production speed</dc:title>
  <dc:description>A firm chooses the production speed and amount of labor that maximizes profit in a perfectly competitive market. Faster production raises management expenses and the unit cost of production mistakes. Adding workers enhances the division of labor on the production line and raises work-in-process inventory. When the division of labor is high, a rise in the wage can increase the optimal production speed and quantity of output. When price falls, optimal production speed and optimal division of labor can move in opposite directions. Output quantity can also rise, generating a downward sloping supply curve in the absence of increasing returns to scale. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1057</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Philip T. Powell</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Roger W. Schmenner</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:4:p:243-248</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:4:p:243-248</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Horizontal alliances and the merger paradox</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Mergers and alliances are two organizational forms which allow firms to combine complementary capabilities to realize strategic goals; they are, in many cases, strategic substitutes. Managerial decision-makers, therefore, require a framework for choosing between the two strategies. This paper contributes to this decision-making process by highlighting one advantage of alliances over mergers. Specifically, while the profitability of a cost-reducing horizontal merger is diminished by the resulting expansion of non-merging competitor(s), an alliance, where partners collaborate to reduce costs but sell their product independently, enables its partners to realize the benefits of merging but avoid the problem of strengthening competitors. A model is developed which demonstrates the profitability of establishing such an alliance compared to a merger. The implications of this strategy for antitrust review are briefly discussed. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1210</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>James Sawler</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:763-775</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:763-775</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Retail prices during a change in monetary regimes: evidence from Sears, Roebuck catalogs, 1938-1951</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We present microeconomic evidence on US pricing dynamics pre and post-establishment of the Bretton Woods (BW) monetary regime. We track prices of 49 goods (1172 observations) in 1938-1951 Sears, Roebuck catalogs. The average length between (nominal) price changes was over 2 years. The average was higher (2.05 years) in the pre-BW period than in the later (2.01 years). We find that prices of brand name goods were relatively rigid; three never changed price. Price changes were larger during the 1945-1951 period than pre-BW by between 0.60 and 1.83%. Price changes displayed a higher correlation with inflation pre-BW. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1378</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Andrew T. Young</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Alexander K. Blue</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:209-224</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:209-224</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The performance effects of unintended and purposive multimarket contact</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Multimarket contact may arise from unintended encounters among competitors pursuing uncoordinated market expansion strategies, as well as from the strategic intent of firms seeking mutual forbearance with their rivals. Are the performance effects of unintended multimarket contacts different from those of purposeful contacts? Results in the US airline industry indicate that they are not. Multimarket contacts have a constant marginal effect on margins regardless of whether they occur at a level below or above the level that would be expected just by chance. In this case, the performance effect of multimarket contact is determined by the realized strategy, regardless of whether it was deliberate or emergent. Implications for other areas of strategy research are discussed. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1062</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Javier Gimeno</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:4:p:335-342</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:4:p:335-342</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A Note on the Pythagorean Theorem of Baseball Production</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Recent analyses of baseball managers' performances have employed the so-called 'Pythagorean Theorem' of baseball. This 'theorem' states that the ratio of wins to losses can be approximated by the square of the ratio of team runs scored to opposition runs scored. Recent publications assume this approximate relationship can be used to evaluate managers; implicit is the additional assumption that the Pythagorean relationship constitutes a production process. It does not. This paper derives the exact relationship between the wins, losses, runs scored and runs allowed. The result is an identity. We conclude that application of the 'Pythagorean Theorem' for manager evaluation is inappropriate. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>John Ruggiero</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Lawrence Hadley</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Gerry Ruggiero</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Scott Knowles</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:5:p:307-318</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:5:p:307-318</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Insider ownership and firm performance in Taiwan's electronics industry: a technical efficiency perspective</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper applies agency theory to explore the relationship between insider stock ownership and firm performance, particularly in terms of technical efficiency. Insiders are further classified into executives, outside directors, and large shareholders to conduct a detailed study. Six-year (1996-2001) panel data of 416 Taiwanese listed electronics firms are examined by the stochastic production frontier approach. It is observed that raising the executive-to-insider holding ratio first causes a decrease and then an increase in technical efficiency, forming a U-shaped relationship. However, the board-to-insider holding ratio is negatively associated with technical efficiency. The results indicate that equity ownership of top officers in high-tech firms should be encouraged to enhance firm productivity. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1228</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Her-Jiun Sheu</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Chi-Yih Yang</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:5:p:375-381</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:5:p:375-381</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Optimal ticket pricing for performance goods</dc:title>
  <dc:description>When purchasing a ticket to a performance good, such as a movie or sporting event, the consumer does not actually buy the product, but simply access to viewing the product. Although the performance is the primary impetus for the ticket purchase, many performance goods offer complementary products such as concessions to their patrons. This paper suggests that when the price setter receives a share of revenues from concessions, overall profits will be maximized when tickets are priced in the inelastic section of demand. The model can be used to explain inelastic point estimates for ticket pricing found in other performance good studies. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Daniel R. Marburger</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:317-330</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:317-330</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Five strategies for rapid firm growth and how to implement them</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Analysis of 45 rapidly growing, profitable firms reveals five strategies: (1) product proliferation, (2) mass market development, (3) increasing value to select customers, (4) distribution innovation, and (5) acquisition and consolidation. These five strategies are not restricted to high-growth industries and arise when firms exploit market disequilibrium to the their advantage. The profitable growth strategies are based on multiple, reinforcing sources of scale, scope, and time-based advantages. The study details the steps needed to implement each growth strategy and potential pitfalls to avoid. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1068</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Briance Mascarenhas</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Arun Kumaraswamy</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Diana Day</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Alok Baveja</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:439-451</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:439-451</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Entry and competition in generic biologics</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Patents for several blockbuster biological products are expected to expire soon. The Food and Drug Administration is examining whether biologics can and should be treated like pharmaceuticals with regard to generics. In contrast with pharmaceuticals, which are manufactured through chemical synthesis, biologics are manufactured through fermentation, a process that is more variable and costly. Regulators might require extensive clinical testing of generic biologics to demonstrate equivalence to the branded product. The focus of the debate on generic biologics has been on legal and health concerns, but there are important economic implications. We combine a theoretical model of generic biologics with regression estimates from generic pharmaceuticals to estimate market entry and prices in the generic biologic market. We find that generic biologics will have high fixed costs from clinical testing and from manufacturing, so there will be less entry than would be expected for generic pharmaceuticals. With fewer generic competitors, generic biologics will be relatively close in price to branded biologics. Policy makers should be prudent in estimating financial benefits of generic biologics for consumers and payers. We also examine possible government strategies to promote generic competition. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1352</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Henry G. Grabowski</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>David B. Ridley</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Kevin A. Schulman</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:5:p:203-206</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:5:p:203-206</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Investment with an arithmetic process and lags</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper presents an explicit solution of a simple investment problem with entry lags and when the underlying stochastic process is arithmetic. It is shown that, without abandonment, the optimal investment plan is independent of the length of the lag. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.973</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Avner Bar-Ilan</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:387-409</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:387-409</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Management, organization and human nature: an introduction</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Lívia Markóczy</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jeff Goldberg</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:4:p:283-284</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:4:p:283-284</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The nature of the farm: contracts, risk, and organization in agriculture, by Allen, D. W. and Lueck, D. MIT Press: Cambridge and London, 2002, viii &amp;plus; 258 pp., USD 35.00 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1240</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Charles R. Knoeber</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:64-66</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:64-66</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Book review: The Emerging New Order in Natural Gas: Markets versus Regulation, by De Vany, A.S. and Walls, W.T., Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Thomas Peyton Lyon</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:307-328</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:307-328</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Mergers and acquisitions in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We examine the determinants and effects of M&amp;A activity in the pharmaceutical|biotechnology industry using SDC data on 383 firms from 1988 to 2001. For large firms, mergers are a response to expected excess capacity due to patent expirations and gaps in a firm's product pipeline. For small firms, mergers are primarily an exit strategy in response to financial trouble (low Tobin's q, few marketed products, low cash-sales ratios). In estimating effects of mergers, we use a propensity score to control for selection based on observed characteristics. Controlling for merger propensity, large firms that merged experienced a similar change in enterprise value, sales, employees, and R&amp;D, and had slower growth in operating profit, compared with similar firms that did not merge. Thus mergers may be a response to trouble, but they are not a solution. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1343</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Patricia M. Danzon</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Andrew Epstein</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Sean Nicholson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:6-7:p:503-514</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:6-7:p:503-514</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Bank borrowing constraints and the demand for trade credit: evidence from panel data</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Monetary policy contractions exacerbate credit constraints stemming from asymmetric information, incentive problems and limited collateral. During such periods financial intermediaries reduce the supply of credit to smaller businesses. Although trade credit is a less desirable alternative of corporate financing, it may play a special role in alleviating credit rationing. This paper is an empirical investigation of the interaction of monetary policy, credit market conditions and corporate financing over the business cycle. It provides a simple test of the existence of a credit channel of monetary policy transmissions. Using individual firm data we find that during periods of tight money the proportion of bank-borrowing constrained firms increases. Borrowing constrained films are found to substitute away from bank credit to trade credit. Such evidence supports the existence of a credit channel of monetary policy transmission: firms do not voluntarily cut bank loans (e.g. because of demand slowdown) since they increase their demand for a less desirable alternative (trade credit). Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1134</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Christina V. Atanasova</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Nicholas Wilson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:7:p:539-545</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:7:p:539-545</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Managerial incentives for process innovation</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Cost-reducing investments by firms are often not publicly observable. This lack of observability would preclude a strategic use of process innovation. However, we show that an observable and verifiable contract that provides direct monetary incentives for cost reductions - an innovation incentive contract - can act as a strategic commitment device. Our model predicts that manager-led firms are more innovative than owner-led firms and that these contracts become less prevalent as product market competition intensifies. Both predictions are consistent with recent empirical evidence. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1416</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Bastiaan M. Overvest</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jasper Veldman</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:4:p:235-249</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:4:p:235-249</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Determinants of technology licensing: the case of licensors</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper empirically analyzes the behavior of technology licensors using a large dataset of US-traded companies. The stock of technological knowledge of the licensor, this company's prior exposure to licensing, the rate of growth of its primary sector, the strength of IPR protection, and the nature of the technology are found to be important determinants of the propensity to sell technology through nonexclusive licenses. Smaller firms in industries with 'simpler' technologies tend to sell technology through exclusive licenses more than others. In contrast, larger firms in industries dealing with more 'complex' technologies engage relatively more in cross licensing. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1249</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>YoungJun Kim</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Nicholas S. Vonortas</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:7:p:385-397</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:7:p:385-397</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Assessing academic department efficiency at a public university</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The assessment of public universities has gained importance because of the demands from such state government bodies as the executive and the legislature. Public universities are increasingly being asked to account for how efficiently they have used diminishing state financial resources. Administrators thus have the responsibility of ensuring that the university's financial, human, and physical resources are allocated to academic departments in a manner that enhances the institution's efficiency. In this paper, data envelopment analysis (DEA) is proposed for evaluating the efficiency of academic departments at a public university. DEA provides a single measure of efficiency for each academic unit. It also identifies the causes behind the inefficiencies exhibited by poor performing units, as well as the changes that these units need to make in order to improve their efficiencies. Its usefulness as a planning tool is also discussed. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1075</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Abel A. Moreno</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Raghu Tadepalli</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:2-3:p:187-211</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:2-3:p:187-211</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Transaction costs and capabilities as determinants of the R&amp;D boundaries of the firm: a case study of the ten largest pharmaceutical firms in Japan</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The boundaries of the firm are an important issue in relation not just with the make-or-buy decision in production but also with research and development (R&amp;D). Firms depend on universities to gain scientific knowledge, outsource some of their R&amp;D works, purchase patented technologies, commission research, and participate in consortia. In this paper, we take the case of the 10 major pharmaceutical companies in Japan and show that they employ various types of research alliances with various partners, domestic or foreign. Two major theories to explain the boundaries, the transaction-cost theory and the capability theory, are discussed and we argue that the observed pattern of research alliance is more consistent with the capability theory. Discussion is also made on the consortia and national projects these firms participate. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1083</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Masao Nakamura</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Hiroyuki Odagiri</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:7:p:355-368</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:7:p:355-368</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Real estate and corporate valuation: an asset pricing perspective</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Property is a significant asset in the balance sheets of some Singapore industrial|commerce firms and hotel corporations. In this research, we take on the task of examining the relationship between real estate and stock market valuation of these business firms from an asset pricing perspective. Specifically, the real estate sensitivity of 'property-intensive', non-real estate stocks is investigated in both a three-index (market, sector and property) of stock returns and in an arbitrage pricing theory (APT) framework. The APT model is further recast as a multivariate non-linear regression model with across-equation restrictions. Using weekly returns on 'property-intensive' stocks in the period 1989-1998 and three shorter-sample periods, iterated non-linear seemingly regression techniques (ITNSUR) are employed to obtain joint estimates of stock sensitivities and their associated APT risk 'prices'. The 'real estate' sensitivity is found to be systematic and priced in the APT sense of corporations being paid an ex ante premium for bearing property market risk in investing and owning properties in two of the three sample periods (1989-1991, 1992-1994). The empirical results provide some support that property is a factor in corporate valuation, and is broadly consistent with the efficient markets hypothesis. The implications for portfolio and corporate management are examined. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1025</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Liow Kim Hiang</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:4:p:309-327</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:4:p:309-327</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A Pilot Exploration of Random Period Duration in Experimental Financial Markets: A Treatment Variable?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This exploratory paper reports a pilot study of the impact of random period duration on the trading behaviour observed in experimental financial markets. Results reported in earlier experimental studies, many of which report a flurry of trade just prior to the end of a trading period, may have been influenced by knowledge of trading period duration. These exploratory findings suggest that the introduction of random period duration results in an increased volume of trade early in a period, which may then impinge upon the informational efficiency of the asset markets. These findings necessitate that future refinements to theoretical models of bid, ask and transaction price behaviour in double auctions explicitly address the influence of known period duration. However, no significant difference between the two markets is found with respect to allocational efficiency. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Darren Duxbury</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:57-70</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:1:p:57-70</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Hidden monopsony rents in winner-take-all markets-sport and economic contribution of Spanish soccer players</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In labor markets where few companies compete for many workers, economic theory predicts monopsony rents. Surprisingly, soccer clubs do not profit from the expected rents. The purpose of this study is to explain such contradictory evidence. &lt;P&gt;Our model and empirical test, using data obtained from the Spanish professional soccer league for the season 2001|2002, suggests that monopsony rents that the clubs were to obtain from most of the soccer players would eventually revert to the superstars. The study also illustrates that the market value of players stems both from their sporting performance and their economic contribution. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1313</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Pedro Garcia-del-Barrio</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Francesc Pujol</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:1:p:25-35</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:1:p:25-35</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Joint ventures for entry deterrence</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The literature of joint ventures has not discussed whether joint ventures may be used to deter entry. This paper then addresses how joint ventures may be used strategically for this purpose. Under the assumptions of linear demand and linear cost, as well as Stackelberg-Cournot interactions between incumbents and their joint venture firms, it is found that the incumbents can deter entry by creating independent joint ventures. Furthermore, it is shown that the optimal number of the joint ventures for the deterrence and the optimal deterrence strategies are functions of the number of potential entrants. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Shaoping Zhao</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:101-112</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:101-112</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The Concept and Practice of the Production Seat System</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper presents features of the production seat system and its industrial applications in Japan. Like an airline reservation system, customers' orders are booked on the production seat table in the production seat system. Then orders are released from the production table to work processes at every production order cycle. To show the effectiveness of the production seat system, a simple simulation was conducted. It was observed that the production seat system would achieve better observance of customer delivery dates and would reduce the average production lead time when compared with the traditional production planning and scheduling system. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Takayoshi Tamura</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Seiichi Fujita</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Takeo Kuga</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:3:p:137-141</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:3:p:137-141</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Vertical externality and strategic delegation</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper examines the effects of vertical externality generated by the upstream monopoly on the incentives that owners of competing downstream firms give their managers. It is shown that the introduction of the upstream monopoly may have significant effects on the incentive schemes for the downstream firms' managers. In particular, it is shown that in equilibrium, each owner obtains the simple Nash equilibrium outcome regardless of the mode of competition (quantity or price) in the downstream market. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1051</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Eun-Soo Park</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:4:p:283-290</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:4:p:283-290</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Strategy as economics versus economics as strategy</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Clearly, strategy and economics differ along one critical dimension: strategy is concerned descriptively with firms and normatively with the tasks of managers, whereas economics is concerned descriptively with the entire economic system and normatively with the efficiency of that system. Nonetheless, the overlap is considerable, and both management scholars and economists have ransacked economic thought for inspirations to strategic theory and managerial practice. This essay will examine and evaluate that enterprise. More interestingly, perhaps, it will suggest that perhaps the process ought to be reversed. Economics as it is now practiced would do well to learn from strategy. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1121</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Richard N. Langlois</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:6:p:413-434</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:6:p:413-434</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Price-setting power and information asymmetry in sealed bidding</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Diverging from the historical precedent of using a midpoint rule (k=½) to experimentally structure two-person bargaining under incomplete information, extreme values of k (k=&amp;lcub;0, 1&amp;rcub;) are invoked in an asymmetric information environment endowing one player with exclusive price-setting power and the other player with veto-only power. Theoretical analysis suggests that regardless of who possesses an information advantage, expected profits for a seller (buyer) decrease (increase) in k. Yet, experimental results show that under conditions of dramatic information asymmetry, not only is the observed share of the surplus is much smaller than predicted for the player with price-setting power, but also the player with the information advantage is unable to garner a greater share of the surplus as has been consistently demonstrated in previous studies providing a boundary test of Daniel et al.'s Information Disparity Hypothesis (1998). Published in 2006 by John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1279</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>James E. Parco</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:3:p:141-153</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:3:p:141-153</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>On the impact of managerial bonus systems on firm profit and market competition: the cases of pure profit, sales, market share and relative profits compared</dc:title>
  <dc:description>By designing remuneration schemes based on a bonus rewarding specific firm-level outcomes, the owners|shareholders of a firm can manipulate the behavior of their managers. In practice, different bonus anchors take center stage: some are profit-based, others use sales as the key yardstick and still different ones focus on relative performance vis-à-vis a peer group. In this paper, we focus on the impact of remuneration schemes on firm-level profitability. The profit effect is investigated for (all possible combinations of) four bonus systems using delegation games. In the context of a linear Cournot model for two or three firms, we model a two- or three-stage decision structure where, in the first stage (or first two stages), an owner decides on the bonus system for his manager and where, in the final stage, the manager takes the daily output decision for her firm. It appears that the bonus system based on relative (profits) performance is superior throughout. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1437</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Thijs Jansen</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Arie van Lier</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Arjen van Witteloostuijn</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:5:p:167-180</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:21:y:2000:i:5:p:167-180</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The effect of ESOP adoptions on corporate performance: are there really performance changes?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Employee Stock Ownership Programs (ESOPs) have long been promoted as a motivational tool: employees become profit-minded owners. Latterly, however, more ESOPs are being used as part of a takeover defense: here the ESOPs main purpose is to put more company stock in friendly hands-the employees-who, like existing management, could suffer layoffs, etc. in a hostile takeover. We find that, as a group, only the takeover-related ESOPs are associated with increased leverage (itself a takeover defense). Non-target firms show no long-term increase in debt-to-assets. We find little evidence to support the motivation hypothesis: while actual labor costs are lower for ESOP firms, after industry-adjusting they tend to be unaffected or higher. We find that a few measures of firm financial performance &amp;lsqb;return-on-equity (ROE), return-on-assets (ROA), net profit margin (NPM)&amp;rsqb; do improve significantly, but this appears to be largely a short-term effect. Industry-adjusted holding period returns appear to be unaffected by the ESOP; however, ESOP firms that leverage show evidence of long-term market underperformance. We conclude that ESOPs provide, at best, only a short-term boost to corporate performance. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.971</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>William N. Pugh</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Sharon L. Oswald</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>John S. Jahera Jr.</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:7:p:601-607</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:7:p:601-607</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Behavioral approaches to optimal FDI incentives</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Countries attempt to attract foreign investors by offering them a set of incentives. The most common types of foreign direct investment incentives are grants and tax relief. Although the amount of the grant is independent of future situations, the value of a tax relief depends on future profits. Our study used the behavioral approach to test experimentally the preferences of managers regarding the desired types of incentives under various conditions. We found, 'Regret Effect', 'Statues Quo Bias', and 'Insurance Effect' in subjects' decision making. A country can improve the incentives it offers by considering the various behavioral biases of the companies' managers. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1435</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>M. Rosenboim</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>I. Luski</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>T. Shavit</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:1:p:1-16</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:1:p:1-16</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Financial health and airline safety</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Agency-cost models suggest that firms may pursue riskier strategies in times of financial distress. For example, stockholders of financially weak firms in industries where quality cannot be observed ex-ante have an incentive to compromise safety and quality to maximize current period profit. However, there exists only a modest amount of empirical evidence that relates financial health to the risk-taking behavior of firms.&lt;P&gt;We explore this relationship for the airline industry. Using bond ratings to proxy for financial health and airline mishaps to measure safety, we find a significant correlation: airlines with higher quality bond ratings are less likely to experience mishaps than airlines with lower quality ratings. On average, a whole letter grade better bond rating is associated with a 10% lower probability of a mishap. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1133</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Gregory Noronha</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Vijay Singal</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:3:p:227-234</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:3:p:227-234</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Life cycle cost: an individual consumer's perspective</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Pricing of certain items (mainly durables) involves two components: purchase cost and maintenance cost. The interaction between both cost components is commonly referred to by the term Life Cycle Cost (LCC). Previous studies indicate that potential buyers are not always aware of the adverse financial outcomes that may stem from certain selections where alternative LCC items are considered. Nevertheless, all these indications are rather indirect. The present study examines directly both the awareness of potential buyers to LCC considerations as well as their capability of handling 'properly' LCC decisions. In this regard hypotheses are formulated and tested against experimental data that simulate both durable and non-durable purchase situations. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Yehoshua Liebermann</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Meyer Ungar</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:6:p:293-298</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:6:p:293-298</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>On the relationship between product substitutability and tacit collusion</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper examines the effect of increased product substitutability on quantity-setting firms' ability to sustain tacit collusion in a market. It uses a general demand function and the trigger strategy of Friedman (Friedman JW. 1971. A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. Review of Economic Studies 38: 1-12) to show that while increased product substitutability hinders sustainability of tacit collusion in the case of linear and concave demand functions, it may either hinder or facilitate firms' ability to sustain tacit collusion in the case of convex demand functions. Thus, this paper adds to the growing view that one must use a case-by-case analysis in judging whether firms in more homogenous product markets find it easier or harder to tacitly collude. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Rajeev K. Tyagi</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:131-139</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:131-139</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Top-down Production Management: A Recent Trend in the Japanese Productivity-enhancement Movement</dc:title>
  <dc:description>It is well known that many of the manufacturing practices advanced in Japan in the 1970s and 1980s emphasize bottom-up decision processes characterized by teams, the empowerment of multi-skilled workers on the shopfloor, demand-pull and horizontal decision mechanisms. These practices include Just-in-Time (JIT) and quality management practices such as quality circles (QC) and total quality management (TQM). While these practices continue to be effective under appropriate circumstances, the drastic appreciation of the Japanese yen that has taken place since the mid-1980s and the prolonged recession following the burst of the bubble have forced many Japanese manufacturers to adopt new methods to improve their production efficiency. In this paper we discuss one of such methods called Total Productivity Management (TPM). Unlike JIT or TQM, implementing TPM requires a top-down approach. TPM provides direct connections between corporate-wide objectives such as the overall cost reduction and shopfloor practices. It is possible that TPM has contributed significantly to Japanese manufacturers' recent success in reducing their cost of operation. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>W. Mark Fruin</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Masao Nakamura</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:145-155</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:145-155</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Firm governance and duopoly: in weakness may lie strength</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The paper proposes a model of firm governance when two firms compete in a duopoly. The paper assumes that a motivational asymmetry exists between owners and managers: owners wish to obtain maximum profits, managers wish to maximize sales. Managers perceive that salary, social status or future job prospects are more closely associated with firm size (i.e. sales) than with firm profits. The paper takes an agency view of the firm where owners only indirectly influence the behaviour of firms through the level of control they exert over managers. The paper demonstrates that a weakly governed firm, acting as a sales maximizer, can gain a competitive advantage over a strongly governed firm, acting as a profit maximizer. The paper examines the extent of this advantage under cost leadership and differentiation strategies. The paper also demonstrates that the objectives of profit maximization and maximization of competitive advantage are not necessarily congruent. The paper graphically represents the profit functions of the two firms illustrating the Nash equilibrium under Cournot and Stackelberg conditions. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1318</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Malcolm P. Brady</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:4:p:223-242</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:4:p:223-242</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory: an organizational economics approach to strategic management</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Property rights theory has common antecedents with contractual theories of the firm such as transaction costs and agency theories, and is yet distinct from these theories. We illustrate fundamental theoretical principles derived from these three theories by analyzing the business case of oil field unitization. Theoretical principles and application of theory to oil field unitization are each summarized. From this, it is possible to see how property rights theory is well suited to explain business situations where inefficient economic outcomes persist. Additionally, property rights theory forges new theoretical connections with other branches of organizational economics, in particular, resource-based theory. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1218</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jongwook Kim</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Joseph T. Mahoney</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:2-3:p:173-187</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:2-3:p:173-187</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Explaining clustering in social networks: towards an evolutionary theory of cascading benefits</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Individual and organizational actors enter into a large number of relationships that include benefiting others without ensuring the equality of reciprocal benefits. We suggest that actors have evolved mechanisms that guide them in the choice of exchange partners, even without conscious calculation or bookkeeping of gain and loss. One such mechanism directs actors to membership in clusters, which are homogenous groups of actors densely connected among themselves and only loosely connected to other groups. We suggest that clusters offer network externalities, which are not possible in sparse networks, thus conferring cascading benefits on the actors contained in those clusters. Using this logic, one can understand the omnipresence of clustering in social networks of individuals and firms. We review the benefits and challenges associated with clustering and use the logic of cascading benefits to derive empirical predictions. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1291</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Sheen S. Levine</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Robert Kurzban</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:293-306</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:293-306</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The cost of US pharmaceutical price regulation: a financial simulation model of R&amp;D decisions</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Previous empirical studies that have examined the links between pharmaceutical price controls, profits, cash flows, and investment in research and development (R&amp;D) have been largely based on retrospective statistical analyses of firm- and|or industry-level data. These studies, which have contributed numerous insights and findings to the literature, relied upon ad hoc reduced-form model specifications. In the current paper we take a very different approach: a prospective micro-simulation approach. Using Monte Carlo techniques we model how future price controls in the US will impact early-stage product development decisions in the pharmaceutical industry. This is done within the context of a net present value (NPV) framework that appropriately reflects the uncertainty associated with R&amp;D project technical success, development costs, and future revenues. Using partial-information estimators calibrated with the most contemporary clinical and economic data available, we demonstrate how pharmaceutical price controls will significantly diminish the incentives to undertake early-stage R&amp;D investment. For example, we estimate that cutting prices by 40-50% in the US will lead to between 30 and 60% fewer R&amp;D projects being undertaken (in early-stage development). Given the recent legislative efforts to control prescription drug prices in the US and the likelihood that price controls will prevail as a result, it is important to better understand the firm response to such a regulatory change. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1342</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Thomas A. Abbott</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>John A. Vernon</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:129-143</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:129-143</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Bank monitoring, managerial ownership and Tobin's Q: an empirical analysis for India</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The paper examines how banking relationships and managerial ownership relate to firm valuation. It is argued that both the number of banking relationships (which serves as an external monitoring function) and managerial ownership (which serves as an internal monitoring function) affect firm value, while internal monitoring by managers and external monitoring by banks were viewed as substitutes or complements. After controlling for the effect of exogenous variables, the results reveal the existence of a complementary monitoring effect between banks and the managerial group. On the other hand, the results indicate that increased external monitoring by banks will simultaneously raise the incentive on the part of managers to engage in internal monitoring. Also, firm valuation is found to be a significant determinant of managerial ownership. A disaggregated analysis of firms according to size and leverage suggests the existence of a complementary monitoring effect between banks and managers, except for small-sized firms. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1315</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Saibal Ghosh</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:169-170</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:169-170</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Notorious murders, black lanterns, &amp; moveable goods: the transformation of Edinburgh's underworld in the early nineteenth century, by Symonds, D. A., Series on International Political and Economic History, University of Akron Press: Akron, OH; 2006, xiv&amp;plus;180pp., USD 39.95 (cloth).</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1363</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>William F. Shughart</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:509-520</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:509-520</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Rx Roulette: combatting counterfeit pharmaceuticals in developing nations</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The debate over access to medicines has principally centered on pharmaceutical patents and prohibitively high drug prices. Although a less recognized problem, counterfeit pharmaceuticals are certainly a more insidious barrier to access. Pharmaceutical counterfeiting is an invisible threat, not only by nature, but also because the industry has historically downplayed it. However, that has changed. Pharmaceutical firms now not only readily concede counterfeiting is a threat to their business, but in some cases publicly address their strategies and the anticounterfeiting technologies in use and development. Acknowledging the problem has benefited the industry because it alters the ways in which firms are able to combat counterfeiting, allowing them to more overtly confront the problem. In addition, it allows them to better partner with governments and health advocates since their incentives are aligned in efforts to prevent counterfeiting. In light of the more public and more aggressive campaign against counterfeiting, it is important to examine the variety of strategies firms may utilize to prevent their sale. Through a theoretical model of the market in a representative developing country, several anticounterfeiting strategies are considered. Some strategies appear to be more effective than others in the battle against fake drugs. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1359</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Kristina M. Lybecker</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:3:p:273-274</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:3:p:273-274</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Book review: Regulations, institutions, and commitment: comparative studies of telecommunications, by Levy, B. and Spiller, P. T. (eds), New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>J. P. Singh</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:6-7:p:483-501</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:6-7:p:483-501</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Determinants of the collateralization of credit by small firms</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study presents results of an empirical investigation of debt collateralization using samples of small firms. We examine the fraction of debt that is collateralized and find substantial support for firm size, firm age, and collateral quality as determinants of collateralization. Our results regarding firm size and age are different from prior research and may stem from basic financial differences between small and large firms. We find mixed support for growth opportunities and taxation and little support for default probability, regulation, and form of legal organization as determinants of collateralization. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1071</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Heather M. Hulburt</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Frederick C. Scherr</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:7:p:389-398</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:7:p:389-398</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The probability and timing of price reversals in the property market</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper, we develop models for estimating the time varying probability that there will be a price reversal in the property market. Knowledge of such price reversals may be helpful in forming property trading strategies, and providing confirming evidence of turning points in property cycles. Using an index from the UK property market, we obtain the time varying probabilities by estimating state transition rates. State transition rates are estimated for cases where the up-state (a run of positive price changes) switches to the down-state (price falls) and vice versa. We also estimate a model for absolute transitions, where we take no account of the direction of the state transition. The predictive power of our models is assessed using data from a holdout period. We find that the absolute transition model performs worse than separate state transition models for the up-state and the down-state. For these latter models, the more rapid the decline in the forecast probability of a run continuing beyond a certain time, the less likely it is that the run will actually continue. Further, the probability profiles provide a perfect rank ordering of the length of runs in the holdout period. This suggests that the probabilities could be used to predict whether a sequence of price rises or falls will be long- or short-lived. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1028</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Graham Partington</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Max Stevenson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:4:p:345-346</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:4:p:345-346</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>BOOK REVIEW: CURB RIGHTS: A FOUNDATION FOR FREE ENTERPRISE IN URBAN TRANSIT, by Klein, D. B., Moore, A. T. and Reja, B., Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Paul A. Pautler</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:7:p:400-401</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:7:p:400-401</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Secret Origins of Microeconomics: Dupuit and the Engineers, by Ekelund, R.B. Jr. and Hébert, R.F., Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999, xv&amp;plus;468 pp., $40.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-226-19999-1.</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>John K. Whitaker</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:5:p:391-398</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:5:p:391-398</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>R&amp;D in a strategic delegation game</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper studies how a separation of ownership and management affects firms' R&amp;D and production decisions in Cournot quantity competition. It is found that when R&amp;D spillovers are small, owners strategically direct their managers away from profit maximization towards sales. Consequently, managerial firms invest more in R&amp;D and have higher output and lower prices compared to their entrepreneurial counterparts. On the other hand, when spillovers are large, owners 'penalize' managers for sales. In this case, managerial firms have lower R&amp;D, lower output and higher prices. Nonetheless, managerial firms have lower profits than their entrepreneurial counterparts regardless of spillovers. This paper also examines the welfare effects of a separation of ownership and management. It is found that in terms of first-best social welfare, managerial firms are more (less) efficient than their entrepreneurial counterparts with low (high) spillovers. However, in terms of second-best social welfare, managerial firms are less efficient with all spillovers. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Jianbo Zhang</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Zhentang Zhang</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:3:p:157-165</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:3:p:157-165</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Managing gray markets through tolerance of violations: a transaction cost perspective</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Exclusive territory distribution arrangements are commonly observed in many markets. Once deployed, such arrangements are often subject to gray market activity, in the form of unauthorized sales which violate assigned restrictions. Interestingly, however, firms frequently choose to tolerate violations, rather than pursuing complete enforcement (i.e., by terminating violators) or abandoning exclusivity entirely. We draw from the literature on transaction cost economics to propose that tolerance of gray market activity is a function of a firm's ability to detect violations, and of the existence of credible threats and commitments. We also draw on the traditional literature on exclusive territories to suggest that minimizing distributor free-riding on services, which influences the decision to use exclusive territories in the first place, continues to be a concern after deployment. We collect micro-level data and test our predictions through a survey of managers who were responsible for the distribution decisions in their respective companies. Our results suggest that tolerance of violations is influenced both by transaction cost and free-riding considerations. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Mark Bergen</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jan B. Heide</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Shantanu Dutta</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:7:p:437-438</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:7:p:437-438</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Markets for Technology: The Economics of Innovation and Corporate Strategy, by Arora, A., Fosfuri, A. and Gambardella, A. Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2001, xi&amp;plus;338 pp., USD 35.00 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1094</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Tuomas Takalo</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:5:p:389-405</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:5:p:389-405</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Keeping it real: anticounterfeiting strategies in the pharmaceutical industry</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Although pharmaceutical counterfeiting incidents can be traced back thousands of years, it has been downplayed and even dismissed by pharmaceutical manufacturers in the past. That has changed. Pharmaceutical firms are newly dedicated to eradicate counterfeits globally and spending more money on anticounterfeiting efforts than ever before. The confluence of three factors seems to have drastically changed the existing paradigm for the pharmaceutical industry: increasing globalization, advancing technology, and the controversies surrounding the WTO Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement and access to medicines. Given that counterfeit pharmaceuticals slip into the supply chain at every link, multinational pharmaceutical firms are searching for global solutions through increased interfirm cooperation along the supply chain. This research presents a theoretical model for characterizing the implications of these interventions on the motivations driving counterfeiters. The interventions are shown to increase the share of real pharmaceuticals and decrease the welfare losses attributable to counterfeiting. In practice, it is too early to evaluate the success of these new measures, but this research reflects on the extent of cooperation both across the supply chain and national boundaries and examines the likely long-run implications of these measures. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1405</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Kristina M. Lybecker</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:5:p:221-229</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:5:p:221-229</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The construction of a firm's governance structure in a setting of uncertainty</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Why does the firm look the way it does? Why does it have the structures it has? In particular, what is the function of the board of directors? Many papers have tried, and failed, to link the board's structure to the performance of the firm. Might the board have an alternative rationale for existence? In this paper, I explore the possibility of the board being used as a signaling device. The management, having information about the state of the world the investor does not, constructs a signal (the board of directors) to promote efficiency in an uncertain world. The construction of the board signals the state of the world to the investor, reducing the uncertainty, and thereby attracting necessary capital to the firm. I then examine the size of the signal with respect to other key firm characteristics. I find that the size of the signal diminishes as investors become more concentrated. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1144</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Erik J. O'Donoghue</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:4:p:317-336</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:4:p:317-336</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Joint venture evolution: extending the real options approach</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Real options theory has emerged as a promising avenue to study joint venture (JV) evolution as a strategic response to managing uncertainty. We extend the real options approach by integrating it with game theory. Such a combined method enriches the valuation functions of each partnering firm and helps to identify the optimal decisions for exercising options in a JV. In our model, each firm's synergy from the joint operation and its knowledge acquisition capability (KAC) can significantly influence the competitive dynamics between partners, potentially affecting how each firm decides to acquire, divest, or dissolve. We employ a new solution technique in real options theory to capture the stochastic process of three factors, and use computer simulation to test the model under varying conditions. The results are stated in five testable propositions, providing a better understanding of the dynamics of a JV. We find that symmetries between partners in synergy or KAC contribute to stability or dissolution of the JV, whereas asymmetries in synergy or KAC make acquisition of the JV assets by one partner desirable. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1407</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jing Li</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Charles Dhanaraj</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Richard L. Shockley</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:261-282</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:261-282</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The rise of human service chains: antecedents to acquisitions and their effects on the quality of care in US nursing homes</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper studies acquisitions of nursing home facilities by chains. We first test alternative 'cream-skimming' and 'turn-around' arguments concerning nursing home acquisitions. We then consider post-acquisition changes in nursing home health performance, differentiating effects of the acquisition process from those of prior strategy and performance of the acquired home and acquiring chain. Our dynamic empirical analysis of more than 5000 acquisitions by US nursing home chains from 1991 through 1997 shows that nursing home chain acquisitions are driven by a turn around logic, and that performance depends on the prior quality of the target and acquirer. Our analysis is relevant to policy on the nursing home sector, helping clarify why certain homes are acquired and how being acquired affects their residents' welfare. At a more general level, we offer insights concerning strategic factors that promote acquisition and drive expansion of service sector chains. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1065</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jane Banaszak-Holl</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Whitney B. Berta</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Dilys M. Bowman</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Joel A.C. Baum</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Will Mitchell</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:6:p:407-409</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:6:p:407-409</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation, by Bebchuk, L. and Fried, J. Harvard University Press: Cambridge and London, 2004, 304 pp. USD 24.95 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1250</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Ken B. Cyree</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:2-3:p:51-69</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:2-3:p:51-69</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Measuring the impact of US research consortia</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper empirically evaluates the impact of the US Advanced Technology Program-sponsored consortia on the ex-post research productivity of participating firms. We find that there is a positive association between the intensity of participation in research consortia and the overall research productivity of participants. We also find a positive impact of consortia on the research productivity of participants in the technological areas targeted by the consortia. This positive impact is higher when the average technological proximity of participants is high. There is evidence that large, R&amp;D intensive firms tend to benefit more from participation in consortia. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1077</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Masao Nakamura</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Mariko Sakakibara</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Lee Branstetter</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:1:p:1-7</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:1:p:1-7</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Warranties as a device to extract rent from low-risk users of a product</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We develop a simple model that provides a new rationale for why a monopolist should bundle its product with a warranty even when all parties are risk neutral. In our model, a risk-neutral monopolist faces two types of risk-neutral consumers-low-risk users that are unlikely to cause product failure and high-risk users that are more likely to cause product failure. We find that when the firm fails to provide a warranty, a low-risk user acquires a strictly positive rent by pretending to be a high-risk user and receiving a price discount. By imposing a warranty, however, the monopolist can increase the price to high-risk users, which in turn removes the incentive for a low-risk user to pretend to be a high-risk user, and the firm successfully extracts rent from the low-risk user. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1367</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>David Hakes</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Dongsoo Shin</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:8:p:619-627</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:8:p:619-627</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Innovation and the opportunity cost of monopoly</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Innovation enables monopolists to lower their costs, expand their outputs, and reduce their prices. It is conventional to conclude that social welfare unambiguously increases as a result. Assuming linear demand and marginal cost, this paper shows, however, that innovation raises the opportunity cost of monopoly: as a firm enjoying market power becomes more efficient, greater amounts of surplus are sacrificed by consumers because of the progressive monopolist's failure to produce the new, larger competitive output. Innovation, in other words, increases the social value of competition by raising the deadweight cost of monopoly. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1425</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Michael Reksulak</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>William F. Shughart</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Robert D. Tollison</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:2:p:87-94</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:2:p:87-94</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Inelastic sports pricing</dc:title>
  <dc:description>A recurrent finding in estimates of the gate demand for sports events is pricing in the inelastic portion of demand. With few exceptions, this finding has either been ignored or (rather poorly) explained away. In this paper, the recurrent outcome is detailed and the explanations given by past authors are discussed. Then, profit maximization theory is explored for its inelastic pricing implications. It ends up that the local TV revenue relationships between MLB teams satisfy the situation that theory predicts would generate inelastic gate pricing. This suggests two things. First, inelastic pricing is consistent with profit maximizing team behavior. Second, fuller specification of revenue functions will enhance future work in the area. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1108</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Rodney Fort</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:7:p:549-561</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:7:p:549-561</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Family ownership, corporate governance, and top executive compensation</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this study we investigate how top management pay is determined in a family firm environment where even listed firms are effectively controlled by a single individual or a single family. Using data from Hong Kong, we find that executive directors' pay is reduced if the directors have substantial stockholdings. Moreover, pay is related to profits but not to stock returns. Our results are consistent with external blockholders and independent non-executive directors persuading firms to base top management compensation on a firm's profitability. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1273</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Suwina Cheng</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Michael Firth</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:6:p:525-538</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:6:p:525-538</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>An empirical analysis of the effect of volunteer labor on public library employment</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study is an empirical investigation of the effect of library volunteers on public library demand for paid workers. Unlike previous studies, it estimates the impacts on different types of paid labor. The main purpose is to test whether volunteer labor replaced or complemented paid employees. A translog cost function is used to derive cost shares and elasticities of substitution for Pennsylvania public libraries. Cross-elasticity estimates of substitution and input demand suggest a strong complementary relation between volunteers and professional workers. Most of the other Allen cross elasticities were not statistically significant. None of the estimates indicate that paid labor was being replaced by volunteers. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1422</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>William F. Stine</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:5:p:345-350</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:5:p:345-350</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Stackelberg leadership with demand uncertainty</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We consider a simple Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty only for the first mover in order to compare the advantages of leadership and flexibility, and use an example to provide some discussion about the endogenous order of moves in the presence of demand uncertainty. We find that only when the realized demand is in an intermediate zone does the first mover preserve its advantage; when the realized demand is far from its expected value, the second mover obtains higher profit than the leading firm, as the leadership advantage is dominated by the benefit of flexibility when demand fluctuation is significant. Even with this risk of losing flexibility under significant demand variation, for some parameter values in our model the first firm still has incentive to choose Stackelberg rather than Cournot competition. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1226</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Zhiyong Liu</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:4:p:189-204</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:4:p:189-204</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>How do workers decide their jobs? The influence of income, wage and job characteristics</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper provides results on the economic decision-making process of Spanish workers, who decide their jobs from the effects of variations in the non-wage income, the wage and the prices of non-pecuniary job characteristics. To that end, we formulate a non-separable generalization of the Linear Expenditure System (NLES) as a joint model of labor supply and job characteristics demand, estimated separately for both males and females, using a 1991 Spanish survey. The main results show that: (i) some job characteristics have a positive effect on the wage, whereas others have a negative effect; (ii) the average percentage effect of employer size and the complexity index are higher for males than for females, with the fatal accident risk displaying similar values; (iii) if the non-wage income of every worker increases, these individuals will prefer to devote less hours to work, and will also prefer jobs in smaller companies and with a lower risk; and (iv) if the wage and hedonic prices of non-pecuniary job characteristics increase, then both males and females will prefer to reduce their labor supply, and devote their available time to jobs in bigger firms, with a higher risk and complexity. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Inmaculada García</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>José Alberto Molina</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:2:p:107-111</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:2:p:107-111</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Full or partial market coverage? A note on spatial competition with elastic demand</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper, a spatial model is used to endogenously determine product locations and prices when consumers have an elastic demand with a finite reservation price. I show under which condition a two-stage Bertrand-Nash equilibrium yields maximal product differentiation with full market covering. Additionally, this paper highlights the effects of a change in the reservation price and in the utility loss rate on the equilibrium values of the model. The ambiguous effect of a change in the utility loss rate on prices constitutes a rather puzzling result. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Giovanni Nero</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:1:p:57-70</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:1:p:57-70</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Efficiency in complementary partnerships with competition</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The objective of this paper is to show how efficiency can be implemented in a market with strictly complementary inputs when the productive firms undertake unobservable effort. The observable output is a joint undertaking by a partnership consisting of two types of firms. It is shown that simple linear sharing rules cannot implement socially optimal effort, but a modified linear sharing rule can implement the first-best outcome provided that commitment to the proposed sharing rule is possible. This is so even when the sharing rule is proposed by one of the active partners. When opening up for the possibility of renegotiating sharing contracts that have undesirable properties for one or more of the firms, it becomes more difficult to implement socially efficient solutions. Implementation of the socially efficient outcome requires that the sharing rule is proposed by an outsider to the partnership. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1438</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jan Y. Sand</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:2-3:p:131-143</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:2-3:p:131-143</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Envy and positional bias in the evolutionary psychology of management</dc:title>
  <dc:description>We propose that humans have evolved at least two specialized cognitive adaptations shaped by selection to solve problems associated with resource competition: (1) a positional bias by which individuals judge success in domains that affect fitness in terms of standing relative to their reference group; and (2) envy, an emotion that functions to alert individuals to fitness-relevant advantages enjoyed by rivals and to motivate individuals to acquire those same advantages. We present new data supporting the existence of design features of these hypothesized psychological adaptations and discuss implications for economists, organizations, marketers, and managers. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1288</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Sarah E. Hill</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>David M. Buss</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:2:p:71-79</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:2:p:71-79</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Valuation effects of foreign divestitures</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study assesses announcement period valuation effects of foreign divestitures and explains why these valuation effects vary among firms. Significant positive valuation effects are observed. The valuation effects of foreign divestitures are positive and are similar in magnitude to those of a matched control group of domestic divestitures. Results of a cross-sectional analysis suggest that valuation effects are positively related to the relative size of the divested unit. Valuation effects are more favorable when divestitures are for strategic reorganization purposes and|or to raise cash, and valuation effects are more favorable for foreign divestitures in industrialized host countries. Several important managerial implications emerge from the results of this study. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Stephen F. Borde</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jeff Madura</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Aigbe Akhigbe</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:7:p:431-444</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:7:p:431-444</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Disclosure level and cost of equity capital: evidence from the banking industry</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The impact of voluntary disclosures on cost of equity capital is of significant interest to investors and managers. Using a disclosure scoring model this association is examined for 135 banks from Europe, North America and Australia. After controlling for the cross-sectional variation in beta, firm size, price to book value and price to earnings ratios, the study found that higher disclosure levels are associated with a reduction in cost of equity capital. Disclosures about risk management practices seem to most influence the reduction in the cost of equity capital. European banks show greater reduction in the cost of equity capital from improved disclosures compared to their non-European counterparts. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1256</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Sunil Poshakwale</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>John K. Courtis</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:3:p:141-145</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:3:p:141-145</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Analysing absence behaviour using event history models</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper analyses the absence behaviour of a group of industrial workers. Part of their remuneration scheme comprises an experience rated sick-pay scheme (linking level of sickpay to past absence) which determines the cost of a day's absence for a worker, both contemporaneously and in terms of expected future cost. This cost is explicitly computed for each worker and we show that this cost is negatively related to absence. Using an event history model with a Markov structure for the absence histories the size of this effect is shown to depend on the state occupied. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1136</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Tim Barmby</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Suzyrman Sibly</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:4-5:p:201-212</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:4-5:p:201-212</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Strategy in turbulent environments: the role of dynamic competence</dc:title>
  <dc:description>It is often observed that firm survival and success have become problematic in the turbulent environments that firms face today. Resource-based theories propose that sustained competitive advantage is more a function of firm resources than of industry structure. In this paper, the nature of resources that help firms sustain (or try to sustain) a competitive advantage in turbulent environments is queried. Viewing the firm as a stock of knowledge, the argument that dynamic competence or the variety-generating capability of knowledge is an important antecedent of superior performance in such turbulent environments is developed. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1017</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>P.N SubbaNarasimha</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:6:p:345-347</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:6:p:345-347</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Morgan: American financier, by Strouse, J., New York: Random House, 1999, xv&amp;plus;796 pp., $34.95 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>William F. Shughart II</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:8:p:525-535</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:8:p:525-535</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Whither franchising? The case of Avis Europe PLC</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This case study of Avis Europe PLC examines the diminished role of franchising in the vehicle leasing firm's achievement of market dominance in Europe. Market maturity, industry consolidation, adoption of centralised, efficiency-oriented technologies, and strategic alliances are the principal factors in accounting for the decline in the reliance on franchisees for local entrepreneurship and market expansion. Though many theories of franchising find at least some support in this study, the life cycle or ownership redirection explanation proves particularly compelling. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1183</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Lowell R. Jacobsen</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:6:p:471-489</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:6:p:471-489</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Organizational strategy, managerial decision-making, and market-based environmental policies: utility company bidding behavior in the sulfur dioxide allowance trading auctions</dc:title>
  <dc:description>An environmental policy approach gaining increasing acceptance among regulators, industry, and environmental groups is the use of market-based instruments. The growth of such programs results in an important research need to understand how organizations respond to these tools. &lt;P&gt;Our managerial and organizational decision-making study examines the sulfur dioxide allowance trading program, part of the effort to reduce acid rain in the United States. This is one of the most visible and significant environmental market-based approaches as it is being implemented on a nationwide scale and impacts an important corporate sector-the utility industry. Our study seeks to understand why utility company participation in this program, as measured by bidding for allowances in auctions, has been under 10% of utilities able to bid, despite the low price of the allowances relative to alternative sulfur dioxide control measures. We utilize the organizational strategy literature to develop and structure our hypotheses. Our data collection method involves a mail survey to management's of 142 utility companies to assess their attitudes concerning a number of variables which were hypothesized to influence company bidding in the March 1994 allowance auctions. This attitudinal approach was selected since the newness of the sulfur dioxide allowance trading program results in utility decision-making significantly depending on management's perceptions of factors, such as future retaking rulings, state regulations, and public opinion, which are not easily observable or measurable by other methods.

The study finds that a range of organizational strategy models-economic, behavioral, stakeholder, and learning-are useful for understanding the observed behavior. A number of variables consistent with each model are shown to influence managerial decision-making to bid in the auctions. These variables include the expected treatment of the carrying costs of the allowances by public utility commissions, the costs of the allowances relative to other compliance strategies, an auction design characteristic, public opinion in the utility's service area, the importance of the allowances to meet demand growth, the competitive environment in which the utility operates, and the innovativeness of the utility. The findings are useful for gaining greater insight into managerial decision-making and organizational strategy as well as for improving both this specific market-based policy tool and the increasing number of market-based policy tools applied to other environmental issues. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Douglas J. Lober</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Michael Bailey</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:8:p:411-427</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:8:p:411-427</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Who is 'most valuable'? Measuring the player's production of wins in the National Basketball Association</dc:title>
  <dc:description>How does one measure the productivity of an individual participating in a team sport? The purpose of this inquiry is to answer this question via an econometric model that links the player's statistics in the National Basketball Association (NBA) to team wins. This model will then be employed in the measurement of each player's marginal product. Such a measurement is useful in answering the question offered in the title, or a broader list of questions posed by both industry insiders and other interested observers. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>David J. Berri</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:5:p:281-290</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:5:p:281-290</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Downsizing and productivity: The case of UK motor vehicle manufacturing 1974-1994</dc:title>
  <dc:description>An empirical investigation of the downsizing-productivity relationship has emerged from the USA. This paper presents further evidence drawn from another country's experience. Detailed commentary on key trends in the UK motor vehicle industry informs an analysis applying the Baily et al. &amp;lsqb;Baily, Bartelsman and Haltiwanger (1994) Downsizing and productivity growth: myth or reality? National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4741; (1996a) Downsizing and productivity growth: myth or reality? In Sources of Productivity Growth (edited by D.G. Mayes), New York: Cambridge University Press; (1996b) Downsizing and productivity growth: myth or reality? Small Business Economics, &lt;B&gt;8&lt;/B&gt;, 259-278&amp;rsqb; taxonomic model, yielding insights into the varieties of downsizing-productivity linkages therein. Evidence presented shows productivity growth was indeed higher in those plants that successfully downsized, but that those plants that were unsuccessful at downsizing tended to have among the worst productivity growth rates. Unsuccessful downsizers accounted for a significant part of the overall decline in productivity after 1989. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Alan Collins</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Richard I.D. Harris</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:47-53</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:47-53</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A Note on Fixed Costs and the Profitability of Depository Intermediaries</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper we consider some factors which are of potential importance in the debate concerning the sources of performance for intermediaries. Using data from depository institutions (banks and savings and loans), we find that the distributional intensity (provided by standardized number of offices in a market) is consistently important in explaining cross- sectional profitability. This result implies that the number of offices in a market is at least as important as more traditional measures of efficiency and concentration in determining returns in this sector of the financial services industry. Indeed, when pooled data are used, there is a strong quadratic relationship between return on assets and the number of offices in a market. We show that this relationship can be viewed as coming from spatially differentiated markets as opposed to collusion or efficiency per se. Finally, we provide evidence that results concerning the rule of efficiency versus market concentration are themselves sensitive to the implicit assumption that there are no close substitutes for the services provided by a sub-set of the industry. In particular, results from 'pooled' bank and thrift data often provide conclusions which are different from those which include only banks. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Iftekhar Hasan</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Stephen D. Smith</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:3:p:115-125</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:3:p:115-125</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The European single market and the regulation of the legal profession: an economic analysis</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The article analyses the effect of removing barriers between two autarkic legal markets with different technologies. Firms using the more efficient technology penetrate the other market. The result is mergers between firms from the efficient jurisdictions and those in the inefficient jurisdictions. Social welfare increases from reduced resource costs in the production of legal services even if prices remain regulated. This leads to pressure for prices for legal services to be reduced. Recent trends in the penetration of EU legal markets by English solicitors firms are discussed, particularly recent mergers involving English and German law firms. Implications for future market regulation are drawn. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1053</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Frank H. Stephen</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:3:p:175-176</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:3:p:175-176</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Negotiation games: applying game theory to bargaining and arbitration, rev. ed., by Brams, S. J. Routledge advances in game theory, ed. by Schmidt, C., London and New York: Routledge, 2003, xxvi &amp;plus; 297 pp., USD 33.95 (paper).</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1180</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Paul Pecorino</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:3:p:155-172</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:3:p:155-172</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Does corporate ownership structure matter for economic growth? A cross-country analysis</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The role of corporations in allocating resources has been of great importance in the debate about the manner in which enterprises should be governed to enhance economic growth. Corporate governance features seem to be central to the dynamics by which successful firms and economies improve their performance over time as well as relative to each other. In this paper we try to clarify the relationship between corporate ownership structure and output growth by using the data of La Porta et al. (J. Finance 1999; LIV: 471-517) on ownership structure of large- and medium-sized corporations in 27 economies. To search for empirical linkages, we use cross-country growth regressions. The evidence provided in the paper suggests that an environment with a higher percentage of directly and indirectly widely held companies and a lower degree of state than private ownership is associated with a higher growth rate of per capita income. We also conclude that a higher degree of institutional investment does not seem to enhance the growth performance of an economy. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1442</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Panayotis Kapopoulos</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Sophia Lazaretou</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:6-7:p:329-345</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:6-7:p:329-345</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Compensating for innovation: Do small firms offer high-powered incentives that lure talent and motivate effort?</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Empirical studies commonly confirm that small firms enjoy efficiency advantages in generating innovation. However, the origin of this advantage remains poorly understood. This study explores the hypothesis that small firms enjoy advantages over large firms in crafting effective, incentive-intensive employment contracts that lure top engineering talent and motivate high effort. These hypotheses are tested using data from a sample of R&amp;D engineers in Silicon Valley and the Route 128 area. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1194</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Todd R. Zenger</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Sergio G. Lazzarini</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:161-168</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:2:p:161-168</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A further clarification of OCRA and its properties in response to Wang and Wang (2005)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This is an exposition written in response to the claims in Wang and Wang (2005) about the problems with the method of OCRA, operational competitiveness rating analysis, for gauging the relative performances of a set of operating entities. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1364</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Celik Parkan</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:6:p:569-577</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:6:p:569-577</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Optimal price promotion in the presence of asymmetric reference-price effects</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this study we demonstrate how a reference price may affect the degree of price rigidity|flexibility. For this, we construct a model of reference-price formation, which we use to analyze the effect of asymmetric reference price (cut 'effects') on the profitability of price promotions. We derive explicit expressions for the additional profits earned during a promotional period due to consumer perception of a 'gain', and for the post-promotion loss of potential profits due to consumer perception of a 'loss'. We show that when effects of losses on demand are greater than effects of gains ('loss aversion'), price promotions always lead to a decline in profits. When, however, effects of gains are larger than those of losses, price promotions, as well as reverse price promotions (i.e. price increase) can be profitable. In the latter case we calculate the optimal depth and duration of a price promotion. We also show that reference price can affect price rigidity and flexibility. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1333</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Gadi Fibich</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Arieh Gavious</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Oded Lowengart</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:2:p:77-86</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:2:p:77-86</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Player salary share and the distribution of player earnings</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Veteran free agency in professional team sports has led to higher average player compensation, an increase in the share of league revenues going to players, and increased dispersion in player earnings. Tests on the distributions of player salaries in the last decade reject that they are the same in the early and later years. The variance in baseball player compensation is decomposed into share and marginal revenue product effects for 1990 and 1998, and it is found that both effects contributed to the increased variance in player salaries. A simulation of the effect of universal free agency in baseball suggests a modest increase in player salary share and a drop in compensation inequality among players. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1110</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Gerald W. Scully</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:7:p:593-600</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:7:p:593-600</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The impact of managerial quality on organizational performance: evidence from German soccer</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper we use a novel panel data set from the German premier soccer league (Bundesliga) as a case to show how variations in managerial compensation impact positively upon organizational (team) success. Using stochastic frontier analysis, we find that a team that hires a better quality coach can expect to achieve a higher league points total by reducing technical inefficiency. However, our results also suggest that the market for head coaches may be allocatively inefficient in that coaches are paid below their marginal revenue products. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1431</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Bernd Frick</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Robert Simmons</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:2-3:p:159-171</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:2-3:p:159-171</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The opt-out revolution in the United States: implications for modern organizations</dc:title>
  <dc:description>For the first time since American women joined the labor force in the 1970s, the number of working mothers has decreased. Dubbed the 'opt-out revolution' by The New York Times, the so-called exodus has left companies confused, social conservatives jubilant and feminists incensed. This article explores the reasons for women's workforce departure and argues that it is a predictable result of organizations' failure to understand differences between male and female workers, an ignorance that leads to flawed incentive structures which eventually drive women out of the workplace. I discuss three of the most problematic assumptions made by organizations: (1) men and women are motivated by the same things; (2) managers determine promotion and pay on merit; and (3) implementing policies designed for women, such as family-friendly benefits, will solve retention problems. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1290</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Mary C. Still</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:83-98</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:2:p:83-98</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Edith Penrose's legacy to the resource-based view</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper I argue that Edith Penrose's work anticipated the modern approach to strategy in general, and the RBV in particular. Building on the central tenets of Penrose's arguments-that firms are heterogeneous, which is the result of their path dependency-the paper demonstrates how her writings can be used to explain the latest developments of the RBV. Furthermore, the paper argues that many of the insights scholars require to take the RBV forward are still available to those willing to re-visit her writings. Simply stated: Her legacy endures. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1214</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Andy Lockett</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:4-5:p:251-263</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:4-5:p:251-263</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Modeling the competitive process</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Understanding the behavior of markets requires understanding not just the level of return but also its dynamics. The speed at which abnormal returns dissipate is one useful indicator of the competitive process. We model for US and Japanese firms the process of competition as reflected in the persistence of abnormal returns. While we find a similar aggregate distribution of firm persistence in both countries, we observe cross-national differences manifesting themselves in terms of inter-country differences in industry persistence. We find that both industry- and firm-specific factors influence firm persistence. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1020</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Robert Jacobson</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Gary Hansen</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:481-483</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:481-483</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>New estimates of pharmaceutical research and development spending by US-based firms from 1984 to 2003</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1362</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Joseph Golec</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>John A. Vernon</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:427-440</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:427-440</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>An evolutionary account of women's workplace status</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Although many believe that women's low representation among top executives and lower average income is primarily a result of socialization and discrimination, findings of psychology, biology, and anthropology suggest that evolutionarily derived temperamental sex differences exist that may explain much of these disparities. Stereotypes of men as more competitive and more inclined to take risks than women, and stereotypes of women as more attached to their children and more risk averse than men are true as generalizations. Traits for which average sex differences exist, such as aggressiveness, desire for status, and risk preference, are highly correlated with workplace outcomes. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Kingsley R. Browne</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:6-7:p:383-400</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:6-7:p:383-400</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Redeployment of corporate resources: A study of acquisition strategies in the US defense industries, 1978-1996</dc:title>
  <dc:description>How are excess resources redeployed when an industry declines? These resources can be redeployed within the firm through diversification and across firms through a market interface. Acquisitions can play an important role in either of these mechanisms. First, acquisitions can provide new complementary resources and facilitate the redeployment of excess resources within the firm through recombination. Second, horizontal acquisitions can facilitate consolidation and disposal of excess or redundant resources that can be redeployed elsewhere through a market interface. I study both these kinds of acquisitions in the US defense industries (1978-1996), and explain the choice between the two acquisition strategies on the basis of the business environment, underlying resources of the firm, and to a lesser extent, as a consequence of agency forces within the firm. I derive implications for strategic transformation of firms, and the resource-based and evolutionary perspectives. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1197</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Jaideep Anand</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:4:p:287-292</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:4:p:287-292</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Dynasties versus pennant races: competitive balance in major league baseball</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper examines the impact of competitive balance on attendance in Major League Baseball. Two types of competitive balance are included in a single-equation model of attendance: intra-seasonal balance and inter-seasonal balance. The metric used to calibrate the first is the ratio of the actual standard deviation of season win percents divided by the ideal standard deviation. Inter-seasonal balance is calibrated with Markov transitional probabilities of teams making the playoffs in consecutive seasons. The results indicate that intra-seasonal balance does not significantly impact attendance, and that inter-seasonal balance has significant but small impacts on attendance in the American League. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1260</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Anthony C. Krautmann</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Lawrence Hadley</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:2-3:p:133-145</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:2-3:p:133-145</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>What type of enterprise forges close links with universities and government labs? Evidence from CIS 2</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper tries to uncover some of the economic factors that encourage firms to seek information from universities and government labs or to collaborate with these institutions. We exploit the information contained in the second Community Innovation Surveys (CIS2) for France, Germany, Ireland and Spain. We estimate an ordered probit model on the importance of knowledge sourcing from universities and government labs controlling for selection bias, and a trivariate probit model explaining the decisions to innovate, collaborate in innovation, and in particular collaborate with universities and government labs. R&amp;D-intensive firms and radical innovators tend to source knowledge from universities and government labs but not to cooperate with them directly. Outright collaborations in innovation with universities and government labs is characteristic of large firms, firms that patent or those that receive government support for innovation. Members of an enterprise group tend to cooperate in innovation but not directly with universities or government labs. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1086</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Masao Nakamura</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Pierre Mohnen</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Cathy Hoareau</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:2-3:p:117-132</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:2-3:p:117-132</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Knowledge sharing in cooperative research and development</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This article examines the effects of knowledge sharing or endogenous spillovers among R&amp;D consortia participants on R&amp;D competition when R&amp;D enhances a firm's absorptive capacity. A three-stage model illustrates how different compositions of R&amp;D consortia affect endogenous spillover rates and R&amp;D spending of participants. When consortium participants possess complementary knowledge, the model suggests that participation increases the degree of knowledge sharing and intensifies firms' R&amp;D efforts to learn from other members compared with the case when no cooperation takes place. This type of R&amp;D consortia is welfare enhancing, justifying government support for these projects. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1080</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Masao Nakamura</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Mariko Sakakibara</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:195-208</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:195-208</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Environmental Management in Japan: Applications of Input-Output Analysis to the Emission of Global Warming Gases</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Environmental management requires, among other things, the incorporation of environmentally friendly technologies into production processes of environmentally friendly technologies into production processes at the producer level and the adoption of energy consumption patterns which save energy use at the household level. The systemwide approach involving both technology choice and consumer preference seems particularly essential for controlling the total emission of global warming gases. CO&lt;INF&gt;2&lt;/INF&gt; and other global warming gases, as well as certain pollution causing gases, are produced when fossil fuels are burnt; and the consumption of fossil fuels occurs in both the production and consumption of goods and services. In this paper we discuss how input-output analysis can be used to estimate the entire production and consumption of global warming gases conditional on production technology and consumer preferences. We also present estimation results and their application to some environmental management issues in Japan. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Hitoshi Hayami</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Masao Nakamura</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Mikio Suga</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Kanji Yoshioka</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:645-666</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:7-8:p:645-666</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Limits on managerial discretion in management buyouts: the effectiveness of institutional, market and legal mechanisms</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Recent changes in the legal environment faced by US corporations suggest that the shareholder-manager conflict of interest, and the effectiveness of mechanisms to narrow this divergence, are issues of continuing importance. This study examines the linkages between institutional, market and legal mechanisms to control managerial discretion in management buyouts, and the circumstances under which each type of mechanism is effective. We find that these mechanisms do act to control managerial discretion in management buyouts to some degree. At the same time, there appear to be significant frictions which act to partially insulate managers from these types of governance, limiting their effectiveness. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>John Easterwood</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Anju Seth</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Ronald Singer</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:1:p:9-21</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:1:p:9-21</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Product line extensions: causes and effects</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In this paper, and using data from a sample of five US manufacturing industries, we study the implications of market demand growth on product line extensions and the effects of the latter on industry profit margins. Companies extend their product lines in response to expansions in market demand and this tends to depress profit margins in the industry. Finally, these results are quantitatively significant. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1369</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Kostas Axarloglou</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:393-405</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:393-405</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>An industrial organization perspective on the influenza vaccine shortage</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper analyzes reasons advanced for the recent shortage of influenza vaccine in the United States and numerous other similar shortages in recent years. Explanations have included high regulatory costs, inadequate profitability, and mergers. Using Census data, it shows that vaccine producers realize unusually high price-cost margins, but are probably also unusually capital-intensive. Applying theories of scale economies to existing information, it identifies the extent to which, for diverse types of vaccines, economies of scale limit the number of vaccine producers, exposing the nation to stochastic shortage risk. A benefit|cost analysis explores whether it is economically worthwhile to maintain additional production sources with surge capacity. It is found that under plausible demand, external benefit, and stochastic supply failure conditions, such multiple sourcing yields more benefits than its cost. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1349</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>F.M. Scherer</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:4:p:229-237</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:4:p:229-237</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Competitive vertical foreclosure</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Richard S. Higgins</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:657-668</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:7:p:657-668</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The mechanics of price adjustment: new evidence on the (un)importance of menu costs</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper examines nominal price rigidities in an environment, e-commerce, where literal menu costs can be assumed not to exist. We argue that if we can empirically show that nominal rigidities do still exist in the e-commerce environment, then it implies that other kinds of costs besides menu costs, such as management costs, must be causing these nominal rigidities. This evidence is of importance because of the central role that menu costs play in Keynesian macroeconomics. In this paper we examine the price changing behavior of two leading online booksellers-Amazon.com and BarnesandNoble.com-and find strong evidence that nominal price rigidities do indeed persist on the Internet. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1374</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Rajesh Chakrabarti</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Barry Scholnick</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:5:p:243-254</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:5:p:243-254</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Consumer rationality and credit card pricing: An explanation based on the option value of credit lines</dc:title>
  <dc:description>An option is embedded in credit cards. Since credit cards offer open credit lines, cardholders can borrow at the same terms when they become riskier. This option value raises the zero-profit card rate. Furthermore, adverse selection occurs if cardholders are better informed about the probability of becoming riskier in the future and borrow more when they become riskier. The adverse selection can limit rate competition and keep the card rate above the zero-profit card rate. An up-front fee is not a good alternative because it is also vulnerable to adverse selection. A low introductory card rate is an effective way to avoid the adverse selection problem when asymmetric information is mainly about the change in the borrower's risk profile in the future, as opposed to the riskiness in the present period. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1146</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Sangkyun Park</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:1:p:65-66</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:1:p:65-66</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Book review: Stee-rike four! What's wrong with the business of baseball? by Marburger, D.R.(ed.), Westport, CT and London: Praeger Publisher, 1997</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>B. Goff</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:2:p:113-114</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:2:p:113-114</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>To profit or not to profit: The commercial transformation of the nonprofit sector, edited by Weisbrod, B.A. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998, XII&amp;plus;340 pp., $69.95 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>James T. Bennett</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:7:p:397-398</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:7:p:397-398</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Competition, innovation and the Microsoft monopoly: antitrust in the digital marketplace, edited by Eisenach, J.A. and Lenard, T.M., Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999, x&amp;plus;297 pp., $89.95 (cloth).</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Stan Liebowitz</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:39-50</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:39-50</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>A comparison of ownership structures and innovations of US and Japanese firms</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study analyzes the impact of ownership structure on innovation in the US and Japan. Agency theory is used to develop links between the distinct patterns of ownership in the US and Japan to differences in innovation. Empirical evidence shows that ownership concentration and the identity of the investors with large ownership positions affects innovation. This relationship differs across the two countries. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1188</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Peggy M. Lee</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:3:p:183-191</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:3:p:183-191</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Vertical merger: monopolization for downstream quasi-rents</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper provides a welfare analysis of vertical merger between an input monopolist and downstream firms that compete perfectly in a homogeneous product market. The distinguishing feature of the present model is that the downstream firms face capacity constraints. As a result of downstream quasi-rents, vertical merger-the extent of merger is gauged by the capacity share of the acquired downstream firm-may either raise or lower final output. An analytical criterion for distinguishing pro- and anti-competitive mergers is derived, which relies entirely on pre-merger market quantities and the capacity share of the downstream target. A common result is that vertical merger is output-increasing even when unaffiliated downstream rivals are completely foreclosed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1444</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Richard S. Higgins</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:3:p:144-145</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:3:p:144-145</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The Twenty-First Century Firm: Changing Economic Organization in International Perspective edited by DiMaggio, P., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, viii &amp;plus; 275 pp., $35.00|£24.95 (cloth).</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abtract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1056</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>David Flath</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:391-392</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:391-392</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The U.S. brewing industry: data and economic analysis by Tremblay, V.J. and Tremblay, C.H. MIT Press: Cambridge and London, 2005, xv&amp;plus;379 pp. USD 40.00 (cloth)</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1264</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Kenneth G. Elzinga</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:141-152</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:2:p:141-152</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Issues on Japan's Intellectual Product</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Evidence suggests that Japan's basic research levels seem to lag behind that of the USA. This paper seeks to investigate (1) the reasons for this difference in the context of societal impact on the creation of intellectual products, (2) the influence of the different legal systems as they relate to the treatment of intellectual products, and (3) the aspect of market size as an essential factor in the creation of intellectual products protected by copyright. This last category includes intellectual products such as visual products, publications, music, and computer software. © 1997 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Takanobu Nakajima</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Koichi Hamada</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:7:p:381-387</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:7:p:381-387</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Estimating serial cross-correlation in real estate returns</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Appraisal smoothing understates the true volatility of real estate returns, and consequently affects asset allocation decisions. The high level of smoothing observed in commercial property index returns can be shown to be largely influenced by the effect of serial cross-correlation. This paper examines this phenomenon by analysing the time series properties of a sample of individual property returns using the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model. The autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model, proposed by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986), is used to characterize time series data that exhibits clustering in the residuals. The time-varying conditional variance in ARCH models is often used as a measure of intertemporal risk. We use this property to analyse the cross-correlation coefficients of a sample of properties. Our results suggest that there is positive skewness in the serial cross-correlations. This is consistent with a process that would generate high serial correlation at the index level. We demonstrate that serial cross-correlation can be used as a proxy of the proportion of sticky values in an index. The results indicate that serial cross-correlation is time varying and positively skewed. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1027</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Gerald R. Brown</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Seow-Eng Ong</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:2-3:p:47-49</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:24:y:2003:i:2-3:p:47-49</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Research alliances and collaborations: Introduction to the special issue</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1076</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Masao Nakamura</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Masao Nakamura</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:5:p:259-266</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:20:y:1999:i:5:p:259-266</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The size of employee stakeholding in large UK corporations</dc:title>
  <dc:description>The existing debate about policies designed to foster the development of a stakeholder economy has largely avoided a fundamental question. How large is the financial stake employees currently hold in their companies? This paper addresses this question using data from the Datastream database, and finds that there is already a significant link between the pay of rank and file employees and the performance of their firms. It is found that a doubling of firm value increases employee pay in these firms by approximately 14%. Firms with explicit profit-sharing arrangements have a performance elasticity of approximately 0.32, while firms without explicit profit-sharing arrangements have a performance elasticity of only 0.11. This indicates that flexibility of pay is not limited to the explicit profit-sharing award. This is further substantiated by the finding that even after controlling for the levels of profit-sharing pay, the performance elasticity in the profit sharing firms is 0.27. These estimates are by no means a complete measure of the stakeholding relationship, but they do quantify the financial relationship between firms and a group of primary stakeholders: the workers. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Bruce A. Rayton</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jonathan S. Seaton</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:6:p:351-365</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:6:p:351-365</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Core complementarities of the corporation: organization of an innovating firm</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Despite the proliferation of arrangements to outsource or cooperate in Research and Development, the benefits and costs of alternative organizational forms are not very well understood. This paper develops a supermodularity model to highlight the conditions under which internal or external modes of organizing innovation activities are likely to occur. The technological and institutional environment drives firms' decisions to organize innovation and invest in learning, which determine firm performance in terms of innovation and growth. Internal organization is beneficial when complementarities among activities are strong. However, independent governance of complementary activities may become optimal when depreciation of knowledge is rapid due to radical technical change. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1232</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Aija Leiponen</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:333-353</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:5:p:333-353</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>The effect of communication in incentive systems-an experimental study</dc:title>
  <dc:description>In organizational theory, it is a widely accepted postulate that cooperation among subjects is enforceable. This assumption is essential for the evaluation of two frequently discussed incentive systems: team and tournament compensation. Whereas in team-based pay systems cooperation is highly desired, cooperation in rank-order tournaments-labeled as 'collusion'-is regarded as one of the main drawbacks of relative performance evaluation. In this experimental study, two different communication technologies are introduced into both incentive environments. The results indicate that when only limited communication is permitted subjects tend to cheat on each other in the tournament rather than in the team setting. Interestingly, allowing subjects to exchange emails leads to a similarly stable cooperation in both incentive systems. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1266</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Christine Harbring</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:6-7:p:401-420</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:25:y:2004:i:6-7:p:401-420</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Empirical evidence regarding the tension between knowledge sharing and knowledge expropriation in collaborations</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Interfirm collaborations can raise a fundamental dilemma. To create value, collaborators may have to adopt a variety of practices to facilitate knowledge transfer. Deploying these practices may increase the likelihood that economically valuable knowledge, which is (1) beyond the scope of the collaboration, and (2) difficult to legally protect, is expropriated. How can firms manage this dilemma? The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the veracity of a chain of propositions addressing this dilemma based on a novel joint knowledge-based view|transaction cost economics framework. A plausible chain of relationships is briefly summarized and explored in detail empirically using unrelated datasets. The chain links two knowledge-based attributes of collaboration-knowledge tacitness and problem-solving complexity-to the use of knowledge management practices-high-bandwidth communication channels and co-specialized communication codes. These practices are economic responses to knowledge-sharing difficulties as measured by tacitness and complexity. Increasing knowledge transparency via knowledge management practices, however, gives rise to opportunism hazards, which are safeguarded against via economizing governance choice. Our empirical effort examines the effects that two knowledge attributes of collaborations have on governance choice, first directly and then indirectly through the intervening linkages. Empirical results from both datasets indicate substantial support for the proposed chain of relationships. The results are provocative in that they offer the first preliminary evidence for a plausible reconciliation of two perspectives previously treated exclusively as adversaries. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1198</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Bruce A. Heiman</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Jack A. Nickerson</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:3:p:143-144</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:3:p:143-144</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Famous First Bubbles: The Fundamentals of Early Manias, by Garber, P.M. Cambridge, New York: MIT Press, 2000, 175 pp., $24.95 (cloth).</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1052</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Atin Basuchoudhary</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:149-156</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:23:y:2002:i:4-5:p:149-156</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Conversations on the dynamics, context, and consequences of strategy: introduction to the special issue</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1058</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Margaret A. Peteraf</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Walter J. Ferrier</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:61-64</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:1:p:61-64</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Book review: Contrived Competition, by Vietor, R.H.K, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1994</dc:title>
  <dc:creator>Roger Sherman</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:3:p:179-187</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1998:i:3:p:179-187</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Forecasting among alternative strategies in the management of uncertainty</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This paper explores why expectations elicited from corporate decision-makers may fall short of the rational expectations ideal: the formation of an informed forecast may just not be part of the optimal management of uncertainty. The analysis of an investment decision shows that when forecasting is expensive, this strategy is likely to be superseded by the possibility to wait, to switch between projects, or the alternative to eliminate inferior projects over time. Even at low forecasting costs it may be optimal not to forecast and instead to diversify over different projects. © 1998 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Tobias F. Rötheli</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:539-540</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:19:y:1999:i:7-8:p:539-540</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Book review: Unto others: the evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior, by Sober, E. and Wilson, D.S., Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998</dc:title>
  <dc:description>No Abstract</dc:description>
  <dc:creator>Kenneth G. Binmore</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:4:p:307-318</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:4:p:307-318</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Analysis of the effects of settlement of interfirm lawsuits</dc:title>
  <dc:description>This study examines the effects of news on settlement of interfirm lawsuits. We hypothesize that the defendant firms suffer damaged reputation as news on the interfirm lawsuit remains in the 'public eye', as such ending the litigation process through settlement is good news for the defendant firms. Thus, the stock market will react positively to the defendants when news of a settlement is announced. On the other hand, settlements end the free publicity that the plaintiffs enjoy. In addition the plaintiffs settle for less money than they initially seek. Thus, the implication of a reduced cash flow expectations that the announcement of settlements brings to the plaintiffs will cancel out the positive reputation effect. Therefore, there will be no significant stock market reaction to the plaintiffs when a settlement is announced. Furthermore, the stock market will show no significant reaction to the defendants who have been the subject of more than one lawsuit in a relatively short period of time prior to a settlement because their reputation is too severely damaged to be remedied through removal of their name from the limelight. The results of our analysis support the hypotheses and offer some insight for strategy development. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd.</dc:description>
  <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1263</dc:identifier>
  <dc:creator>Paul Sergius Koku</dc:creator>
  <dc:creator>Anique A. Qureshi</dc:creator>
</oai_dc:dc>
      
    
</metadata>
</record>
<record>
<header><identifier>oai:RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:2-3:p:189-201</identifier><datestamp>2009-04-27</datestamp><setSpec>RePEc:wly:mgtdec</setSpec></header>

<metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:amf="http://amf.openlib.org" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/                                    http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
  <dc:identifier>RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:2-3:p:189-201</dc:identifier>
  <dc:type>article</dc:type>
  <dc:title>Applying evolutionary psychology in understanding the Darwinian roots of consumption phenomena</dc:title>
  <dc:description>Consumer scholars have amassed an impressive body of knowledge using a wide range of methodological approaches and paradigms. Despite the scientific rigor of the consumer behavior discipline, most scholars that have reviewed the field agree that it has yielded a fragmented and confused literature. It is argued here that this is in part due to the near paucity of evolutionary-based theorizing within the theoretical frameworks used by consumer scholars. While evolutionary psy